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INTRODUCTION
This comment is the seventeenth in a series of annual efforts designed to
keep practitioners abreast of significant changes in labor and employment dis-
crimination law. Past Surveys have reported important developments occurring
from April I of one year to March 31 of the following year. However, since this
Survey year did not coincide with the Supreme Court Term, timely coverage of
Supreme Court decisions handed down between the end of the Survey year and
the close of the Supreme Court Term was not possible. In order to rectify this
situation, the Editorial Board has decided to shift the Survey year to coincide with
the Supreme Court Term. Accordingly, future Surveys will report developments
occurring from August .1 of one year to July 31 of the following year. To effectuate
this change, this comment covers decisions rendered from April 1, 1977 through
July 31, 1978.
It is important to note that the Survey does not attempt to cover all decisions
rendered during the year. Instead, the Survey seeks to provide comprehensive
treatment of those cases which consolidate, add substance to, expand upon, or
depart from prior law.
I. NLRB JoRisnicrioN
A. Foreign-Related Employers Doing Business in the United Slates:
State Bank of India; SK Products
In two related Survey year decisions, State Bonk of India.' and SK Products
Corp.,'' the National Labor Relations Board held that it possesses and will
exercise the statutory authority to assert jurisdiction over the commercial op-
erations of foreign and domestic corporations which have a "close relation-
ship" with a foreign government.' The decisions in Stale Bank India and
SA' Products Corp. mark a dramatic reversal from prior Board policy. Since its
1967 decison in British Roil-International, Inc.,' the National Labor Relations
Board had declined to assert jurisdiction over the commercial activities of
foreign governments or their agents conducted within the United States. The
Board's position was premised upon the conclusion that it would be an inap-
propriate exercise of its discretion to assert jurisdiction over domestic corpo-
rate employers occupying a "close relationship" with a foreign government.'''
' 229 N.L.R.B. 838, 95 1...R.R.M. 1141 (1977).
230 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 95 L.R.R.N.1. 1498 (July 27, 1977).
229 N.L.R.B. at 842-43, 95 1..12.R.•I. al 1117.
163 N.L.R.B. 721, 64 1..12.12.M. 1432 (1967). In this precedent setting case,
the Board exercised its discretion not to assert jurisdiction over British Rail-
International (BR!), a New York corporation engaged in the sale of rail tickets and
room and meal vouchers in connecti(m with rail travel in the United Kingdom. Al-
though incorporated under the laws of New York, BR1 was wholly owned by the
British Railways Board, an agency of the Ministry of Transport of the United King-
dom. Id. at 721, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1432.
Id. at 722, 64 L.R. R.M. at 1144; see also, AG1P, USA, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B.
1144, 1144, 80 1..R.R.M. 1245, 1246 (1972). In dGIP, the Board declined to assert its
discretionary jurisdiction over AGII', USA, a Delaware corporation functioning as the
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As a result. of the discretionary basis of the Board's policy, however, the
Board found it unnecessary to address the issue whether it had the statutory
authority under the National Labor Relations Act (or Act) to assume jurisdic-
tion over such employers.
The opportunity for the Board to reevaluate its jurisdictional policy arose
in Male Bank of India when the Chicago Joint Board, Clothing and Textile
Workers, ALF-CIO, sought to represent a stipulated bargaining unit of work-
ers employed by the State Bank of India's Chicago, Illinois branch office."
Although authorized by the State of Illinois to engage in a general banking
business,' the State Bank of India (SBI) was organized and owned by an
agency of the Indian Government. 8 As a result of the State Bank of India's
relationship with the government. of India, the union's representation petition
presented two questions for Board consideration. First., the Board confronted
the question whether it. possessed the requisite statutory authority under the
Act to assert jurisdiction and to direct an election. 9 Second, the Board
needed to determine whether it should abandon its discretionary policy of
declining to assert jurisdiction over domestic employers found to have a "close
relationship" with a foreign state." Both questions were subsequently
answered in the affirmative."
Addressing initially the issue of statutory authority, the Board first fo-
cused upon the scope of its jurisdictional power over domestically operated
United States purchasing agent for its Italian parent corporation, Ente Nationale ld-
rocarburi (EN!). Id., 80 L.R.R.M. at 1245-46. ENI itself was wholly owned by the Ital-
ian Government. and was one of three divisions of the Italian Ministry of Participatione
Nationale. Id., 80 L.R.R.M. at 1245.
" 229 N.L.R.B. at 838, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1142.
7 Id. at 839, 95 1.„R.R.M. at 1112. The State Bank of India's Chicago, Illinois,
branch ofTice was licensed to engage in a full spectrum of banking functions by the
State of Illinois under that state's Foreign Banking Office Act of 1973, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch . 16%2, §§ 501-519 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). 229 N.L.R.B. at 839, 95 L.R.R.N1. at
1143. Responsibility for the daily operations and personnel decisions involving the
Chicago branch lay with the local branch officers. The branch manager was authorized
to initiate recommendations regarding terms and conditions of employment based on
the prevailing local conditions, subject to approval by SBI's central offices. Id., 95
1...R.R.M. at 1144. The State Bank's international division and its overseas branch sec-
tion located in Bombay, India, however, made general policy decisions regarding S131's
overseas operations. Id., 95 L. R.R.M. at I 143.
229 N.I..R.B. at 838, 95 1..R.R.M. at 1113. The State Bank of India was
incorporated in India under the State Bank Act which provides that the Indian Gov-
ernment must hold at least fifty-five percent of the outstanding stock issued by the
State Bank. At present, ninety-two percent of the State Bank's stock is owned by the
Reserve Bank of India, a wholly owned and controlled agency of the Indian Govern-
►ent. The Reserve Bank of India and the Indian Government determine the goals of
the State Bank. In addition, the State Bank Act mandates that no fewer than nine of
the State Bank's eighteen directors must be directly appointed by the Government of
India. Id.
" Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1142.
Id.
11 1d.
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foreign corporations. With respect to the State Bank of India, the Board
noted that SBI's foreign organization and incorporation were immaterial to
the Board's statutory authority to assert jurisdiction. 12 Since SBI was en-
gaged in authorized commercial banking operations within the United States,
it was subject to the plenary jurisdiction of the Board regardless of the coun-
try of incorporation. 13
After finding that SBI's foreign incorporation did not preclude the asser-
tion of jurisdiction, the Board turned to the question whether the Indian
Government owned and operated Chicago branch bank was an employer as
defined in section 2(2) 14 of the Act." Although noting that section 2(2)
excludes from the definition of "employer" the "United States or any wholly
owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any state or
political subdivision thereof ... ," the Board concluded that the State Bank of
India did not fall within the exclusions." The Board inferred an intent to
exclude foreign government owned entities from the exclusions of section 2(2)
on the ground that the terms of the section were expressly defined in relation
to the antecedent "United States."" As a result, the Board determined that
the State Bank of India's status as a government owned corporation or an
instrumentality of a foreign state was insufficient to exclude the bank from
the coverage of the Act. Accordingly, the Board found that, for the purpose
of asserting jurisdiction, SBI was an employer as defined in the Act."
Having concluded that the State Bank of India was not an exempt
employer under the terms of section 2(2) of the Act, the Board proceeded to
examine whether the Supreme Court's decision in McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
cional de Marineros de Honduras" requires an expression of affirmative con-
gressional intent in order for the NLRB to assert jurisdiction over the com-
mercial operations of an agent or instrumentality of a foreign government.""
In McCulloch, the Board had asserted jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels of
a wholly owned foreign subsidiary of an American corporation. 2 ' The Su-
1(1. at 840 & n.8, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1144 & n.8.
13 Id. at 840, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1144.
" 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
1 ' 229 N.L.R.B. at 840, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1144.
16 Id.
" Id. at 840 & n.9. 05 L.R.R.M. at 1144 & 11.9.
" Id. at 840, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1144. SB1 did not contest the alleged impact of
the general banking operations of the Chicago branch upon interstate commerce.
Rather, S131 stipulated that during 1976 the Chicago branch had a gross volume of
business in excess of one million dollars and engaged in interstate financial transac-
tions exceeding one hundred thousand dollars. Id.
On the basis of the stipulated facts, the Board concluded that SBI'S Chicago
operations fell within the terms of section 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act, 29 USC §§ 152(6)
& 152(7) (1976). 229 N.L.R.B. at 840, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1144. The Board also found that
SBI's Chicago banking operations satisfied the Board's $50,000 discretionary jurisdic-
tional standard applicable to that type Of enterprise. id. at 840 & n.7, 95 L.R.R.N1. at
1144 & n.7.
372 U.S. 10 (1963).
21) 229 N.L.R.B. at 840, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1144.
71 372 U.S. at 14-15.
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preme Court, however, concerned with the international ramifications of Board
jurisdiction over the internal management and affairs of foreign flag vessels:22
concluded that. the Board lacked jurisdiction over such vessels. 2" The Court.,
relying on a territorial interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act,'
found that. the jurisdictional provisions of the Act were not intended to ex-
tend to the maritime operations of foreign registered vessels."-`' Con-
sequently, in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent to apply
the Act to such vessels, the McCulloch Court refused to sanction the exercise
of Board jurisdiction. 2 "
On the basis of McCulloch's admonition against. extension of Board juris-
diction into areas of international significance without. an express congres-
sional mandate, SBI maintained that the petitioning union had failed to dem-
onstrate the requisite legislative intent to vest jurisdiction in the NLRB over
the business enterprises of foreign governmems. 27 The Board, however, de-
termined that. SBI's interpretation of McCulloch was inapplicable for two
reasons. First, the Board noted that McCulloch never dealt with the issue of
NLRB jurisdiction over the commercial activities ()I' foreign governments con-
ducted within the territorial limits of the United States:" Second, the Board
reasoned that. McCulloch's admonition against extension of NLRB jurisdiction
was limited in application to those instances where neither the skits nor the
impact. of the labor dispute were within the territorial United States: 21) Be-
cause of the McCulloch Court's territorial interpretation of the Ni.RA, the
Board reasoned that a Foreign government controlled corporation engaged in
commerce within the United States would have to prove either a congressional
intent I.() exclude domestic employers from the coverage of the Act. or an intent.
to preclude the Board from exercising jurisdiction over such employers in
order to avoid NLRB jurisdiction." The Board determined that., absent such
a showing by SBI, there was no reasonable basis for the conclusion that the
Act. was intended to exclude SBI solely on the basis of the employer's "close
relationship" to a foreign state."' Thus, the Board concluded that it. had the
statutory authority to direct a representation election for SBI's Chicago, Il-
linois branch employees."'
Having resolved the question of statutory authority to assert jurisdiction
over foreign state businesses within the United States, the Board determined
further that it should no longer decline, as a matter of discretion, to exercise
jurisdiction over such employers." In so doing, the Board overruled its ear-
22 hi. at 21.
23 Id. at 22,
21 hi. at 17 - 20.
25 Id. at 21-22.
2Ii
2' 229 N.E..R. B. at 849, 95 L.R. R. M. at 1144.
28 hi, at 841, 95 I,. R.R. NI. at 1145.
25
 hi,
3 " Id. at 840, 95 L. R.R. M. at 1149-95.
3' hi. at 841, 95 L.R.R.11.1. at 1145.
/d. at 838, 95 1...R.R.M. at 1142.
"3 Id. at 842, 95 1-R.R.M. at 1147.
Novcinber 1978]
	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 67
Her decision in British Rail-International, Inc." The Board could discern no
public policy or policy of the Act which, on the ground that the employer is
found to be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of a foreign government, jus-
tified adherence to its practice of declining jurisdiction."' Consequently, the
Board concluded that it would better effectuate the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction over employees employed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States by an "agency" or "instrumentality" of a foreign slate
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act,"
While the rationale of State Bank of India focused on domestic policy con-
siderations arising from a local employer's relationship with a fOreign state,
the Board did not foreclose the possibility that it will decline, as a matter of
discretion, to assert jurisdiction where the international implications are com-
pelling. The Board has recognized that the impact upon foreign relations is a
relevant and proper factor to be considered when determining whether to
assert jurisdiction." State Bank of India, however, imposed no restrictions on
the Board's exercise of its discretionary power to decline jurisdiction. Rather,
Stale Bank of India merely expanded the range of commercial enterprises sub-
ject. to Board jurisdiction by concluding that domestic policy implications fail
to warrant the discretionary exclusion of Foreign state businesses from the
provisions of the Act."' Asa result., State Bank of India left unrestrained the
Board's power to decline jurisdiction where foreign policy requires.
sa Id. See text and notes 4-5 supra.
35 M., 95 1-R.R.M. at 1146.
'se Id. at 842-43, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1147. The Board buttressed its conclusion that
no valid justification remained for declining jurisdiction with reference to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (197(1). 229 N.1,.R.B. at
842, 95 I...R.R,NE at 1146. That Act defines the jurisdict.ion of United States courts in
suits against Foreign states, including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumen-
talities thereof, arising from the commercial activities of" the foreign slate occurring
within the United States by declining to extend the doctrine of sovereign immunity to
a foreign state's acts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)-1605(b) (1976). With the exception of puni-
tive damages, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that a foreign state is
liable to the same extent as a private individual in similar circumstances. 28 U.S.C.
1606 (1976). Although acknowledging that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act af-
fected judicial rather than administrative determinations of claims by foreign states to
sovereign immunity, the Board nevertheless reasoned that that Act provided an
analogous justification for its decision to treat foreign state enterprises as it would
similarly circumstanced private corporations. 229 N.L.R.B, at 842, 95 1-R.R.M. at
1146.
"' See Contract Servs. Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 862, 864, 82 L.R.R.M. 1757, 1759
(1973). The Board, in Contract Sea's., concluded that it had the statutory authority to
assert jurisdiction over a United States corporation employing Panamanian nationals in
the Canal Zone. Id. However, the Board, as a matter of discretion, elected not to assert
jurisdiction over the employer for fear of having a negative impact on the volatile
United States-Panama negotiations regarding Panamanian sovereignty. W. at 1759-60,
82 L.R.R.M. at 864-65.
38 See 229 N.L.R.B. at 842, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1146.
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In SK Products Corp.," the second Survey year decision to address the
Board's discretionary jurisdictional policy, the NLRB clarified its decision in
Stale Bank of India. The controversy involving SK Products arose when
Teamsters Local 473 sought to represent a stipulated bargaining unit of
workers employed at SK Products' Illinois, furniture factory." SK Products
(SK) is a wholly owned, controlled, and managed American subsidiary of a
Yugoslavian parent:" SR took the position that the Board should decline to
assert jurisdiction, consistent with its established policy, because SK's Yugosla-
vian parent participated in policy decisions affecting the wood product indus-
try at the highest levels of the Yugoslavian Government." The Board
reasoned that SK Products Corp. presented a stronger argument for assertion
of jurisdiction than did State Bank of India since SK was an American corpora-
tion, whereas SRI was a foreign corporation licensed to transact business in
the United States." The Board noted that when a foreign state chooses to
incorporate under the laws of an American state, the entity established is pre-
sumptively engaged in commercial or private activities." The Board
explained that this presumption negates the contention that the operations of
the corporation represent an exercise of foreign sovereignty. 45 As a result of
its status as a domestic incorporator, the foreign state has implicitly consented
to the treatment of the corporation as a citizen of the state of incorporation,
thereby surrendering any claims to sovereignty. 4 " Accordingly, the Board
concluded that SK's status as an American corporation justified assertion of
jurisdiction, regardless of SK's affiliation with the Yugoslavian Government."
" 230 N,L.R.B. No. 186, 95 I..R.R.M. 1498 (July 27, 1977).
4" hi,, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
" hi., 95 L. R. R. M. at 1499. SK's parent., Slovenijales, is an economic enterprise
socially owned by its workers for the benefit of Yugoslavia. hl. Because it is Yugo-
slavia's second largest producer of wood products, Slovenijales participates in high
level government. policy decisions regarding the wood products industry. id. In addi-
tion, Slovenijales sends representatives to various Yugoslavian governmental depart-
ments although its officers are not considered to be governmental officials and the
delegates are compensated by suhorganizations of Slovenijales.
43 Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1498-99.
43 hi., 95 L. R.R. M. at 1500-01.




" hi. In response to SK Products' contention that the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976), did not extend or expand the
authority of administrative agencies over domestic firms wholly owned or closely re-
lated to foreign governments or their instrumentalities, the Board developed its treat-
ment of the sovereign immunity concept advanced in State Bank of India with reference
to an American corporation. See note 36 supra. The Board found that under the def-
inition of an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign government contained in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, SK's incorporation under the laws of New jersey
defeated claims of entitlement to Foreign sovereign immunity. 230 N. L. R. B. No. 186,
95 L.R.R.M. at 1500-01. Section 1603(b)(3) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 defines an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" as any entity—"(3)
which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in Section 1332(c)
and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country." 28 U.S.C. §
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State Bank of India and its companion case, SK Products Corp., remove the
shield of immunity which the National Labor Relations Act previously ac-
corded to the commercial activities of foreign governments within the United
States. It is submitted that this result is based upon a sound interpretation of
the jurisdictional scope and underlying policy of the Act. The Supreme Court,
in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, construed the juris-
dictional boundaries of the NLRA as encompassing labor disputes arising only
among domestic employers and their local employees." As a result, where
matters involving labor-management relations occur within the territorial
sovereignty of the United States, the NI.,RA presumptively authorizes Board
jurisdiction over their resolution. The Board's decision requiring either a
demonstration of congressional intent to exclude from the NLRB's jurisdic-
tion domestic employers having a "close relationship" with a foreign govern-
ment or an intent to preclude the Board from exercising its jurisdiction over
such employers is consistent with the territorial construction of the NLRA
recognized by the Supreme Court,. Moreover, as the Board has acknowledged,
it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended to immunize the
commercial operations of foreign governments or their agents within the ter-
ritorial United States from the provisions of the NLRA, while requiring com-
pliance with other federal statutes regulating the transaction of business."
Consequently, there is no reasonable basis for the conclusion that the National
Labor Relations Act excludes domestic employees and their local employers
who otherwise satisfy the requirements of the Act merely because of their
relationship to a foreign state.
In both SK Products Corp. and State Bank of India, the Board has recog-
nized that, with the expansion of foreign nationalized industries in the United
States, a policy of continuing to decline jurisdiction over such employers
would insulate a substantial segment of the American labor force from the
protection of the NLRA. Therefore, the decisive question for the Board in
the future is whether the commercial operations of an "agency" or "instru-
mentality" of a foreign state in the United States meet the minimum jurisdic-
tional standards established for the enterprise in question. Where these re-
quirements are met, an employer's connection with a foreign government will
no longer play a determinative role in the decision to assert. Board jurisdiction
unless the international implications are compelling. Consequently, the domes-
tic employees of foreign nationalized industries will now have the opportunity
to organize and bargain collectively according to the provisions of the Act.
1603(b)(3) (1976). Section 1332(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that a
corporation shall he deemed to be a citizen of any State in which it. has been incorpo-
rated. 28 U.S.C. 1332(c) (1976).
" 372 U.S. at 18 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138,
144 (1957)). For the purpose of asserting jurisdiction under the Act, the Board has not
distinguished between United States citizens and foreign nationals employed within the
United States. See, e.g., C. P. Clare, 191 N.L.R.B. 589, 590, 77 L.R.R.M. 1535, 1536
(1971) (NLRB jurisdiction asserted over Mexican Nationals working in the United
States pursuant to "green card" permits).
" 230 N.L.R.B. No, 186, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1501.
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13. Law Firms; Foley, Hoag & Eliot
In Foley, Hoag & Elio].' decided this Survey year, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board asserted jurisdiction over law firms for the first. time. 2 Although
the Board previously had recognized its statutory authority to assert jurisdic-
tion over law firms,' it had declined to do so on the ground that a law firm's
connection with interstate commerce was merely incidental,' and thus poten-
tial labor disputes between law firms and their employees had only a minimal
impact on interstate commerce.' In Foley, Hoag, the Board reversed its previ-
ous policy, holding that law firms as a class have a sufficient impact on com-
merce to warrant the Board's assertion of jurisdiction."
The opportunity for the Board to reevaluate its jurisdictional policy with
respect to law firms,arose when representatives of a prospective bargaining
unit_ of file clerks and messengers of the Boston law firm Foley, Hoag Sc Eliot
filed a petition for certification.' After the regional director dismissed the
petition, the union filed a request for Board review of the dismissal and re-
consideration of the Board's policy of declining to assert jurisdiction over law
firms."
Foley, Hoag & Eliot did not contest, the Board's statutory jurisdiction over
law firms under sections 2(6) amt (7)" of the National Labor Relations Act.'"
Section 14(c)(I) of the Act, however, authorizes the Board to decline jurisdic-
tion over any class of employers when, in its opinion, the effect of a labor
dispute on commerce is not substantial enough to warrant. the exercise of its
jurisdiction." Thus, the issue in Foley, Hoag was whether law firms as a class
' 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 95 1..R.R.M. 1041 (May 4, 1977).
hi., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1043.
" See, e.g. , Bodle, Fog-el, julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. 512,
512, 84 1...R.R.M. 1321, 1321 (1973); Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216, 1216, 79
1..R.R.M. 1181, 1182 (1972).
See Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. 512, 513. 84
L.R.R.M. 1321, 1322 (1973).
5 Id.
" 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1043.
Foley. Hoag & Eliot employs about 150 persons, including approximately
sixty attorneys. Its gross annual revenue exceeds $500,000 and is derived primarily
from the firm's provision of legal services to clients subject to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1041. These ['acts are significant because they indicate
that Foley, Hoag & Eliot. clearly met the jurisdictional standards set by the Board pur-
suant to 14(c)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976).
The Board's jurisdictional standard for notirethil businesses is $50,000 outflow or in-
flow, direct or indirect. Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81, 85, 43 1..R.R.M. 1056,
1058 (1958). Since indirect outflow refers to "sales of goods or services to users meet-
ing-
 any of the Board's jurisdictional standards ..... id., Foley, Hoag & Eliot's provision
of legal services to clients subject to the Act satisfies this minimum jurisdictional re-
quirement.
8 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 95 1..R.R.M. at 1041.
29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6), 152(7) (1976).
'" See Brief in Support of Employer's Opposition to Petitioner's Request lO•
Review at 39.
" 29 U.S.C.	 164(c)(1) (1976). This section effectuates one of the primary
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act—the elimination of interruptions of in-
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have a substantial effect on 'interstate commerce, The Board decided that they
do.'"
The principal reason for the Board's conclusion was the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Goldlarb v. Virginia Stale Bar.'" In Goldfarb, the Court held
that legal services performed locally may effect. interstate commerce enough
to bring a law firm within the ambit of the Sherman Act.' 4
 As the Court
stated, "[iin the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities of
lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse ...." 15
 The Board
regarded Goldfarb as dispositive of the issue before it in Foley, Hoag.'" Since it
was clear from the decision in Goldfarb that law firms substantially effect in-
terstate commerce, the Board concluded that its assertion of jurisdiction over
law firms was proper."
As additional support for its decision to exercise jurisdiction, the Board
noted that labor disputes in law firms may disrupt commerce. It observed that
law firms play such a vital role in commerce that without their services clients
terstate commerce due to labor strife—by allowing the Board to employ its limited
resources in only those cases where the employer's operations have a substantial impact
on interstate commerce. See also 29 U.S.C. 151 (1976). The Board has declined to
assert its jurisdiction over employers who, in the Board's opinion, do not have a sub-
stantial impact on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Centennial Turf Club, Inc., 192
N.L.R.B. 698, 698, 77 L. R.R.M. 1894, 1895 (1971) (declined to assert jurisdiction over
race tracks). In addition, the Board limy set minimum jurisdictional standards for vari-
ous classes of employers to insure that it deals only with that pan of' an industry which
exerts a substantial impact on commerce. See, e.g., Salt & Pepper Nursery School &
Kindergarten No. 2, 222 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1296, 91 L.R.R.M. 1338, 1339 (1976) (juris-
dictional standard lin -
 day care centers: $250,000 gross annual revenue); East Oakland
Community Health Alliance, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1271, 89 L.R.R.M. 1372, 1374
(1975) (jurisdictional standard for health care institutions: $250,000 gross annual
revenue For hospitals, $100,000 gross annual revenue for nursing homes).
229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 95 L.R. R.M. at 1043. See also [iodic, Fogel, julber,
Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. 512, 516, 84 1.. R. R. M. 1321, 1325 (1973)
(Members Fanning and Penello, dissenting).
'" 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Court held that a minimum fee schedule for title
searches by attorneys violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1976), and
reasoned that since title searches frequently are financed by funds from outside the
state they are part of an "interstate transaction. -
 42l U.S. at 783-84. The local nature
of the services performed does not necessarily negate their effect on interstate com-
merce. See irl. at 783. Consequently, the Court found that a minimum fee schedule for
title searches was a restraint on interstate commerce within the meaning of § I of the
Sherman Act.. Id. at 785. The Court. cautioned, however, that "there may he legal
services that involve interstate commerce in other fashions, just as there may be legal
services that have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus are beyond the reach of
the Sherman Act. - Id. at 785-86.
' 4 42l U.S. at 785-86.
Id. at 788.
229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1043. Although Goldfarb involved the
Sherman Act rather than the National Labor Relations Act, the Board was cognizant
of Congress' intent in the National Labor Relations Act "to exercise fully the same
plenary and comprehensive commerce power which it had exercised in regulating
commerce under the Sherman Act." Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at. 1043 (quoting Van Camp Sea
Food Co., 212 N.1..R.B. 537, 537, 86 L.R.R.M. 1573, 1574 (1974)).
11 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 95 L.R.R.M. at. l043.
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would be tillable to engage in normal business.'" Furthermore, recognizing
that the impact on commerce resulting from the disruption of a law firm's
operations is similar to the impact resulting from the disruption of the opera-
tio ► s of other service enterprises over which the Board already has extended
jurisdiction, the Board found no justification for distinguishing between law
firms and other businesses for jurisdictional purposes.'"
The Board's decision seems unassailable, particularly in light of the
Board's customary test for determining whether an employer's activity has a
sufficiently substantial impact on interstate commerce to warrant the exercise
of jurisdiction. Under this test, the magnitude of a specific employer's in-
terstate operations is irrelevant so long as there is some connection with com-
merce beyond de minimis." The Board must consider the impact on com-
merce of the totality of operations by all employers in the class and the effect
on commerce of all disruptions of these operations by labor strife." Under
the Board's own test, it could continue to decline to assert jurisdiction over
law firms only if it decided that law firms as a class do not have a substantial
impact on interstate commerce. The Board noted in Foley, Hoag that although
law firms' operations might be considered primarily local, law firms as a class
significantly affect. commerce because of their vital role in a multitude of
commercial transactions. 22 This has been recognized in contexts other than
the NLRA. Legal services provided incident to real estate transactions have
been held to fall within the parameters of commerce for purposes of the
Sherman Act:2 " . Title VI 1, 24 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938."
While decisions finding jurisdiction in the context of other statutes are not
controlling, they are highly probative because of' the similarity between the
jurisdictional grants in each of these statutes and that in the NLRA. 2" Con-
sequently, given the implicit legislative preference in the Act" for the asset --
' 8 M., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1042.
I" Id.
20
 See, e.g.. NLRB v. Fainblau, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
" See NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (per curium);
Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944).
22 See 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1042.
21 Id,
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1976); EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp.
175, 181-82 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
23 29 U.S.C. § 2(11 et serf. (1976). See Wage & Hour Opinion Letter, 6 LAR, REL.
Rep. (BNA)	 91, al 904 (June 2, 1964).
2 " Contpare Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § I (1976), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e(g), (h) (1976), with National Labor Relations Act, §§ 2(6), 2(7), 29 U.S.C. §§
1 52(6), 152(7) (1976).
The Supreme Court has drawn on Sherman Act cases in deciding whether
activities of employers affected interstate commerce for purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act. See generally NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 605 n.1 (1939);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34 (1937).
27 q: National Labor Relations Act, 	 1. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) ("It is ... the
policy of the United States to ... protect the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association ..."). Congress manifested an intent to exercise the full sweep of its con-
stitutional authority in the Act by regulating not only commerce but. also matters which
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don of jurisdiction and the generally recognized importance of legal services
in interstate commerce, the Board's decision in Foley, Hoag seems correct.
The decision in Foley, Hoag, however, does not mean that the Board in-
tends to assert jurisdiction over all law firms. Consistent with its policy of
setting minimum monetary standards for classes of employers, 28
 the Board
announced the jurisdictional standard for law firms in Camden Regional Legal
Services, Inc., 29 decided shortly after Foley, Hoag. In Camden, the Board stated
that it would assert jurisdiction over law firms with gross annual revenues in
excess of $250,000. 3 °
In addition to the question of minimum jurisdictional requirements, the
Board's decision in Foley, Hoag left open two other questions: whether legal
service corporations are included in the Board's jurisdiction over law firms
and whether the Board will approve a bargaining unit of attorneys in the
context of a law firm. 3 ' In another Survey year decision, Wayne County
Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc., 32 the Board addressed the question whether
legal service corporations are law firms for purposes of the Board's jurisdic-
tion. The Board chose to treat a nonprofit legal services corporation as a law
firm because it found no significant differences between the corporation and
private law firms." 3 Consequently, the Board extended its jurisdiction to en-
compass nonprofit legal services corporations."'
Wayne County also approved a bargaining unit of attorneys. 15 The ap-
proval of an attorney bargaining unit raises two concerns which, although
they did not arise in Wayne County, are likely to be significant issues in other
"affect commerce." See NLRB, v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1963)
per curiam); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944).
23 See note 11 supra.
29 231 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 95 I..R.R.M. 1545 (Aug. 8, 1977).
30 Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1545. The Board based its jurisdictional standard for law
firms on data collected by the Bureau of the Census and the American Bar Founda-
tion. Id., 95 L.R.R.M, at 1545 & n.5. However, the Board did not include any specific
data in Camden which it considered relevant, nor did it indicate how it arrived at the
$250,000 figure. See id.
3 ' The prospective bargaining unit in Foley, Hong consisted only of clerical and
secretarial employees. See text at note 7 Supra..
32 229 N.L.R.B. No. 171, 95 L.R.R.M. 1209 (May 27. 1977).
33 The Board stated that "Nile only apparent differences between the
Employer and a private law firm are that all attorneys receive an annual salary as
opposed to sharing in the firms profits, and the Employer, rather than being paid for
services rendered, is annually funded independently of the clients represented." hi., 95
L.R.R.M. at 1210-11 (footnote omitted). The Board also noted that the payment of the
legal services attorneys is similar to the payment of associates and other non partners in
private law firms. Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1210 n.5.
34 Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1211. See Legal Services for Nw. Pa., 230 N.L.R.B. No,
103, 95 L.R.R.M. 1403, 1404 (July 7, 1977); Camden, 231 N.I„R.B. No. 47, 95
L.R.R. M. at 1545.
35 Wayne County, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 171, 95 L.R.R.M, in 1212. This did not
mark, however, the first time the Board has approved a bargaining 111111 consisting of
attorneys. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Ina 97 N.L.R.B. 929, 931, 29 L.R.R.M.
1155, 1156 (1951) (labor union employer); Lumhermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B.
1132, 1137-39, 21 L.R.R.M. 1107, 1108-09 (1948) (insurance company employer).
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cases: the notion of attorneys as confidential employees"" and the exclusion of
attorneys who perform supervisory functions.
Historically, the Board has declined to include in a bargaining unit
employees "who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who exer-
cise 'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations." 37 Labor attorneys
representing management participate in the formulation and effectuation of
their clients' labor relations policies and perform basically the same functions
as a labor relations executive employed directly by the client." Although, as
members Murphy and Walther noted in dicta in Foley, Hoag, attorneys are
arguably "confidential employees,' they belie:ve that any problems can be
dealt with on an individual basis." While the Board is willing to approve a
bargaining unit of attorney's who either do not. practice labor law or do not.
represent management in labor matters 41- such as those in Wayne County --it.
may not approve a bargaining unit. of attorneys in a law firm that conducts a
management-related labor law practice.
The NLRA's exclusion of "supervisory employees" from the Act's protec-
tion also may limit the attorneys who will be included in such a unit.''` At-
torneys who, through the exercise of independent judgment, hire, promote,
discharge, assign, discipline or direct other employees of the firm may be
excluded from a bargaining unit.'"
Foley, Hoag, 229 N.L.R.B. No. SO, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1043 :1.12. Sce Budle,
Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt K Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.R, 512, 514, 84 L.R.R.NI. 1321, 1323
(1973).
In Bottle, the Board stated that "potential conflicts of interest are likely to
develop if employees of law firms are to he represented by, and owe substantial loyalty
to, all organization which may well have interests conflicting with those of clients
Whom the lawyers represent. - Id. This concern arose in &idle even though the Board
was dealing with a potential bargaining Lunt. that did not include attorneys. Any con-
cern over a conflict of interest woukl seem to be enhanced where the prospective
bargaining unit consists of attorneys since they undoubtedly have greater access to
information about their clients than other firm employees. However, unlike the cases
involving private law firms, Wayne County does not discuss conflict of interest. Perhaps,
public legal service corporations whose clients are individuals rather than businesses do
not present the opportunity for a conflict of interest. If the Board is still concerned
about a possible conflict of interest in the context of a private law lion, it is not trou-
bled by conflicts in the context of a public legal services corporation.
Ford Motor Co., 66 N.1„R.B. 1317, 1322, 17 L.R.R.M. 394, 395 (1946).
See Foley, Haag, 229 N.L.R.B, No. SO, 95 1.. R.R.M. in 1043 n.12.
39 hl. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n,	 97 N.L.R.B. 929, 930-31, 29 1..R.R.NI.
1155, 1156 (1951).
4" 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 95 I„R.R.M. at 1043 n.12.
'' See Wayne County, 229 N.L. R. B. No. 171, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1212 (approving a
bargaining unit of attorneys not engaged in a labor law practice); Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Intl, 97 N.L.R.B. 929, 931, 29 L.R.R.M, 1155, 1156 (1951) (approving a bargaining
unit of attorneys employed by a labor union).
42 National Labor Relations Act, §§ 2(3), 2(11), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11)
(1976). See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 27 ,1 n.4 (1974): New York
Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1148, 1149, 91 1..R. R.111. 1165, 1169 (1975).
43 See Wayne County, 229 N.I„R.B. No. 171, 95 L.R.R.N1. at 12 12 (approved
bargaining unit excluded supervisory attorneys).
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Although the possible problems of attorneys as confidential or supervi-
sory employees did not arise in Illavne Couniy, where the Board was con-
fronted with a bargaining unit. of members of a nonprofit legal services cor-
poration, the problems probably will arise when the Board faces a prospective
bargaining unit of attorneys in private law firms. Thus, these issues are likely
to be important in future cases involving Board certification of attorney bar-
gaining units.
. RKPRESENTATIONA I. AND ORGANIZATIONAL. AcYrivrry
A. Elections
I. Conduct During Campaign: Shopping Kart
Since its inception, the National Labor Relations Board has struggled with
the problem of misleading campaign statements as part of its responsibility to
supervise union representation elections. In 1962 the Board announced in
Hollywood Ceramics Co.' that it would set aside an election when one party has
made a misrepresentation during the campaign which involved a substantial
departure from the truth, at. a time which prevented the other party from
making an effective reply. so that the misrepresentation likely had a signifi-
cant impact on the outcome of the election.'- 'This Survey year, in Shopping
Kart Food Market, Inc.," the Board expressly overruled its long-standing- Hol-
lywood Ceramics policy. The Board declared that it will no longer set aside
representation elections on the basis of misleading campaign statements.'
The dispute in Shopping Karl arose when the union's vice-president., ad-
dressing employees on the night before a representation election, overstated
the employer's profits for the preceding year.' After the union's election
victory, the employer filed an objection to certification of the union, alleging
that the union vice-president misrepresented material Facts which affected the
election's outcome. The Regional Director dismissed the objection, concluding
' 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51	 1600 (1902), Holivivood Ceramics involved a
last- minute handbill, grossly understating the wage rates paid by the employer and
exaggerating the rates paid by union organized plants in the same industry, which the
Board found to he fake and misleading. Id. at 225, 51 I..R.R.M. at 1002.
M. at 223, 51 I..R.R.M. at 1001. In addition to it.s power to order a new
election, the Board also has the power, if it deems the interference with employee
free choice sufficiently serious, to order an offending employer to recognize and bar-
gain with a union which has lost a representation election. NLRB v. (;issel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. at 575, 1110-615 (1909).
228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977).
1 Id. at 1313, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.
The union's vice-president and business manager told the employees that
the employer's profits for the preceding year were $500,000. Uncontroverted evidence
later established the profits to be approximately $50.000. Id. at 1311, 91 L.RAZ.N.I. at
1705. The profitability of a company has been recognized as an important factor in an
employee's decision whether to vote for union representation. See Argus Optics v.
NLRB, 515 V.2d 939, 9115, 89 2280, 2284 (6th Cir. 1975).
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that the statement did not constitute a material misrepresentation within the
Hollywood Ceramics rule." The Board unanimously affirmed the Regional Di-
rector's refusal to set aside the election and, by a three to two margin, over-
ruled Hollywood Ceramics.'
'The majority in Shopping Karl stated that, as a general policy, the Board
no longer will examine the truth or falsity of parties' campaign statements :Ind
thus will no longer invalidate elections on the basis of campaign misrepresen-
tations.' The Board noted, however, that it will continue to set aside elec-
tions where forged documents are used," or where the Board and its pro-
cesses are improperly involved.'" The Board also stated that it will continue
to invervene where campaign conduct. other than misrepresentation interferes
with an election."
The Shopping Kart Board, in narrowing the instances in which it will set
aside a union representation election, did not ignore the Hollywood Ceramics
Board's concern for ensuring employees complete freedom of choice in select-
ing a bargaining representative. The Board believed, however, that the stan-
dards announced in Hollywood Ceramics were too subjective and actually im-
peded rather than promoted employee free choice.''- The majority noted
that the Board and the courts applied these subjective standards inconsis-
tently, resulting in a body of confusing rulings which did not provide work-
His dismissal was based on the absence of evidence that the employees be-
lieved the union's vice-president had any knowledge about the employer's profits. 228
N.L.R.B, at 1311, 9.1 L.R.R.M. at 1705. The Regional Director relied on Cumberland
Wood and Chair Corp.. 211 N.L.R.B. 312, 86 L.R.1-2.M. 1.126 (1974), which held that
for a statement to constitute a "misrepresentation" it !mist refer to a matter about
which the person making the statement either has or could reasonably be perceived to
have knowledge. Id. at 314, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1427. See also NLRB v. A.G. Pollard Co.,
393 F.2d 239, 242. 67	 2997, 2999 (1st Cir. 1968) (test is not "whether the
speaker in fact had special knowledge, but 	 , whether the listeners would believe that
he had.").
Members Pencil() and Walther joined in a plurality opinion overruling Hol-
lywood Ceramics. Chairman Murphy concurred in a separate opinion. 228 N.L.R.B. at
1314, 9-i L.R.R.M. at 1708. This discussion will refer to Members Penello. Walther and
Murphy as the majority. :Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented, urging continued
adherence to Hollywood Compiles. Id. at 1315, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709.
" hi, at 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
at 1313-14, 94 L.R.R.NI. at 1708. E.g., Cascade Corp.. 205 N.L.R.B. 638,
84 L.R.R.M. 1093 (1973): United Aircraft Corp., Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 103
N.L.R.B. 102, 31 L.R.R.M. 1.137 (1953).
1 " 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313-1-1. 9.1 L.R.R.M. al 1708, E.g., Formco, Inc„ 233
N.L.R. B. No. 5, 96 L.R.R.NI. 1392 (Oct. 19, 1977); Dubie-Clark Co.. 209 N.L.R.B. 217,
L.R.R.M. 1322 (1974); Allied Electric Prods., Inc., 109 N.L.R. B. 1270, 3-1 L. R.
1538 (1954).
" 228 N.L.R.B. at 1314, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.
12 Id. at 1312, 91 L.R,R.N.1. at 1706. The exercise of a "free choice" implies
that the employees have access to relevant information and that they cast their ballots
under circumstances that are free from inaccurate representations of materiztl facts
and from influences that distort their assessment of the consequences of unionization.
See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAttv. L. REv. 38, 46-52 (1964).
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able guidelines for assessing the propriety of campaign representations:"
Such uncertainty, in turn, provoked protracted litigation because the losing
party in an election routinely objected to the opponent's campaign statements,
necessitating Board inquiry and delaying implementation of the election re -
sults. " Thus, the Shopping Kart majority perceived that the value of Board
conducted elections in resolving questions of representation was undermined
by the confusion and delay which the Hollywood Ceramics rule occasioned."
In addition to finding the Hollywood Ceramics rule counterproductive, the
Board posited another reason for not inquiring into election campaign state-
ments. Specifically, the Board stated that employees are "mature individuals
who are capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and dis-
counting it."'" In support of this position the majority cited a recent empiri-
cal study of NLRB elections, The study concluded that the majority of
employees are not attentive to representation campaigns and that campaign
statements therefore have no significant impact upon their voting behavior."
Rather, the majority of employees are primarily influenced by job satisfaction,
working conditions, and a predisposition fOr or against unions.'"
Not all members of the Shopping Karl Board, however, viewed the Hol-
lywood Ceramics rule as unwarranted. Dissenting Members Fanning and Jen-
kins defended the Hollywood Ceramics Board's conclusion that election
safeguards are necessary. to ensure that employees vote on the basis of com-
plete and accurate information.'" The dissenters noted that the Hollywood
Ceramics rule has three salutary effects. First, the rule has a significant deter-
rent effect. Parties are more conscious of the accuracy of their representations
when they know that a material misrepresentation is grounds fo r the invalida-
The Board has characterized its responsibility 10 ensure employee free choice
as follows:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory
in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly
ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees. It
is our duty to establish these conditions: it is also our duty to determine
whether they have been fulfilled.
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. I24, 127, 21 1..R.R.M. 1337, 11 ,11 (1948).
13 228 1\1.1..K.11, al 1312, 94 L.R.R.N1. at. 1706.
14 Id. at 1312, 94 L.R.R.N1. at 1707. One commentator observed that "kJhe
utility of elections lies in final, definitive and unchallenged results: elections become
useless when the results are challenged, uncertain, or rejected. Elections arc intended
to establish and stabilize representation. not in leave it unsettled and in dispute. -
Samar, NLRB Elections: Uncertainly and Certainty, 117 U. PA. i.. REV. 228. 228 (1968).
13 228 N.L.R.B. at 1312, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706,
'" Id. at 1313, 94 1..K.R.M. at 1707.
' 7
 Getman and Goldberg, The Behavioral Assmnpfions Underlying NLRB Regula-
tion of Can2paign Misrepresentation: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. I.. Rev. 261, 283
(1976). See also Getman, (;oklberg and Herman, NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics:
The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board Operates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1,165 (1975).
'" Getman and Goldberg, supra note 17, at 269-73.
19 228 N.L.R.B. at 1315, 9 , 1 L.R.R.M. at 1709. (Members Fanning and Jenkins.
dissenting).
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lion of an election. 2 ' ) Second. because employees arc aware of the Board's
election safeguards, they place confidence in the integrity of the election pro-
cess..." Third, by insisting upon truthful and accurate statements. the Hol-
lywood Ceramics rule ensures that erroneous information does not influence the
final election results. 2.2
Dissenting Members Fanning and Jenkins also challenged the majority's
assertion that the Board and the courts have applied inconsistently the 1-Iai-
5.1600d Ceramics ride. They interpreted the variation between the Board's and
the courts' application of Hollywood Ceramics not. as "judicial disenchantment
with the rule, hut. only disagreement with how strictly the rules should he
applied. - 23 Moreover, the dissenters believed any delay in the implementa-
tion of election results was an "unavoidable characteristic'' of maintaining high
campaign standards. 2 " Finally, the dissenters predicted an increase in the
number and degree of campaign misrepresentations as a result. of what they
characterized as Shopping Karts "almost. anything goes" standarc122 :1 After
Shopping Karl, the dissenters reasoned, campaigning parties will barrage voters
with misinformation which could preclude them from making a free and
reasoned choice. Unlike the majority, the dissenters were unwilling to assume
that employees can adequately decipher campaign misrepresentations. 2 "
After the clove of the Sur-vey year and while this issue was in the process of being
printed, the Board overruled its Shopping Karl decision and readopted the standards set
. forth in Hollywood Cminics. General Knit of . California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No.
101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (Dec. 6, 1978). The General Knit Board believed that the
Hollywood Ceramics rule better protects employee free choice and the fairness of Board
elections than did Shopping Kart. Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1691. The Board also found
that the "Hollywood Ceramics rule ... assures the public that the Board will not toler-
ate substantial or material misrepresentations mode in the . 1111(11 hours of an election
campaign and thereby gives stability to any bargaining relationship resulting from the
election." Id.
" Id. al 1317. 9.1 L.R.R.M. at 1710.
Id., 9t L.R.R.M. at 1711.
22 Id.
2" Id., 9•1
	 at 1710 See LaCrescen1 Constant Care Center, Inc. v.
NLRB, 510 F.2d 1319. 132.1, $8 1..R.R.M. 28.19, 2853 (8th Cir. 1975). The LaCrescent
court quoted approvingly from Hollywood Ceramics, but (filtered with the Board's deci-
sion to certify the election. concluding that a particular statement "was a complete
falsehood which cannot he characterized as less than a 'substantial departure from the
truth' tinder the Holhwood Cffamics test." Id. See abo NLRB v. Carlton McLendon Fur-
niture Co.. '188 F.2d 58, (12, 85 L.R.R.M. 2177, 2179 (5th Cir, 1974) (court described
its own parallel test and concluded that the Regional Director erred in Finding a last-
minute handbill immaterial); NLRB v. Cactus Drilling Corp,. -155 F.2(1 871, 876, 79
L.R.R.M. 2551, 2555 (5th (3i . 1972) (court was not satisfied with the Board's "strict7
application of the opportunity to reply criterio ► ).
22$ N.L.R.R. at 1318, 9.1 L.R.R.M. at 1711.
25 Id. at 1316, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710.
'2 ' Id., 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709.
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2. Prepaid Union Dues: Aladdin Hotel
In Aladdin Hotel Corp.,' decided this Survey year, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board held that. a union may require a majority of employees to prepay
a reduced initiation fee and one month's dues, both of which arc nonrefund-
able, before the union files a petition fOr a representation election.'-' Aladdin
Hotel is important because it further defines the Board's concept of fair union
campaign tactics. In addition, Aladdin Hotel demonstrates the Board's refusal
to extend the principles expressed in NLRB v. S'avair Manufacturing Co.," the
Supreme Court's most recent, major decision concerning permissible union
campaign practices. The Board's decision in Aladdin Hotel therefore may
foreshadow a conflict between the Board and the Court. over what. practices
constitute permissible union campaign tactics.
The facts of Alladdin Hotel are sufficiently similar to those in NLRB v.
Savair Manufacturing Co. to invite a coniparison of the two cases. In Savair, a
union circulated "recognition slips" among employees and promised that
employees who signed the slips before the election would not have to pay
"initiation fees" or "lines" if the union won the election.' The Supreme
Court. held that the union's practice of waiving initiation fees for employees
joining the union befOre the representation election, but not waiving fees for
employees joining after the election, enabled the union "to buy endorsements
and paint. a fake portrait. of employee support during its election cam-
paign." 5
 Furthermore, the Court noted that although employees who signed
recognition slips were not legally bound to vote for the union, they neverthe-
less may have felt obligated to do so." The Savair Court thus held that the
union's practice of waiving initiation fees only for employees who signed rec-
ognition slips before the representation election coerced employees to support
the union and thus undermined their freedom of choice.'
The dispute in Aladdin Hotel revolved around the union's policy of requir-
ing a majority of the prospective bargaining unit employees to pay a reduced
initiation fee and one month's dues before the union would file a petition for
a representation election.' If, alter receiving the advances and filing the peti-
tion, the union won the election, it would apply these funds to the employees'
first monthly dues." II, however, the union lost. the election, it would retain
' 229 N.L.R.R. -199, 95 1..R.R.M. 1150 (1977).
/d. at 499, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1151. Cf: Jag) Corp., 239
	 No. 97, 95
L.R.R.M. 1425, 1425 (July 6, 1977) (union policy of retaining initiation fees paid prior
to representation election, regardless of election outcome, was proper).
414 U.S. 271) (1973).
-I Id. at 272-73.
at 277.
" Id, at 277-78.
M. at 278. Although, as the Court noted, the union did nut. violate any
specific provision of the National Labor Relations Act., the Court. concluded that the
union's practice violated the general principles underlying § 7 and § 9(c)(1)(A), 29
§§ 157, I 59(c)(1)(A) (1976), -114 U.S. at 278-79.
" AIaddih. Hotel, 229 N.L.R.B. at 
-199, 95 1..R.R.M. at [151. If a majority of
employees did not 'my the initiation fees and First monthly clues in advance, the union
would not file a representation petition and would refund the advances. M.
" Id.
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the funds to defray its campaign expenses.'" In contrast to the union's prac-
tices in Savair, the union in Aladdin Hotel purported to offer reduced initiation
fees to employees who paid their union dues after the representation election
as well as those who paid the dues before the election, and hence, did not
directly violate the Savair rule.' 1 Nevertheless, the employer in Aladdin Hotel
argued that although the union's policy did not directly violate the Savair rule,
it did violate the spirit of the rule by undermining the freedom of choice of
those employees who prepaid the union dues.' 2
In rejecting the employer's contention, the Board first noted that the
union did not improperly induce employees to pay the initiation fees prior to
the representation election.'" The Board remarked that, unlike the union's
practice in Savair, the union's practice in this case was not objectionable on the
grounds that it allowed the union to "buy endorsements" and present an
exaggerated display of employee support. Indeed, the Board speculated that.
the union's practice served to give an understated indication of employee
support." The Board concluded that although the union's policy led a
majority of employees to make an early commitment to the union, this com-
mitment was not binding, and therefore, the Board found the union's practice
unobjectionable. 15 The Board also rejected the employer's contention that
the employees' contribution of money, as opposed to other forms of employee
support. created an unalterable obligation to vote for the union.'" Thus, the
Board held that the union's practice did not unlawfully induce or coerce
employees to vote for the union in the representation election.
Although the Board's holding does not literally contradict the Savair rule,
it does violate the principles behind the rule in several ways. As the dissenting
members of the Aladdin Hotel Board , Members  Pe nel lo and Walther,
suggested, the Board underestimated the economic "arm twist" to vote For the
union caused by the employees' prepayment of dues and their knowledge that
the money would he "lost" if the union lost the election." More importantly,
however, it is suggested that the Board misconceived the proper focus of its
examination of union campaign tactics by emphasizing the coerciveness of the
10 Id .
" Irl. Although Savair dealt only with a union policy of waiving initiation fees
for employees who joined the union prior to a representation election, 414 U.S. at
272-73, the Board extended the Savair doctrine to cover a union's practice of reducing
initiation fees for employees who joined the union prior to an election. See B.F. Good-
rich Tire Co., 209 N,1„R.B. 1175, 1175-76, 85 L.R.R.N.I. 1529, 1529 (1974).
' 2 See text at notes 23-25, iryizi.
'' 229 N.I.,12,14, at 499, 95 1..12,R.M. at 1151. Indeed, the Board believed that
if the itnion's policy had any effect on employees' decisions whether to support the
union, the effect was to discourage their support. As the Board stated, "[Dine might
well question the wisdom of a union organizing policy that offers nothing to prospec-
tive employees but instead seeks their financial support for the unionization effort. - Id.
at 500, 95 1..R.R.111. 1151.
" Id. at 500 & 11.4, 95 L.R.R.N1. at 1152 & 11.4.
15 Id. at 500, 95 1...R.R.M. at 1151.
'" Id. at 500 & 11.3, 95 I...R.R,111. at 1151-52 & n.3.
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solicitation of dues rather than the later effect of the solicitation upon the
employees' freedom of choice in the representation election.
The source of the Board's regulatory control over campaign practices,
sections 9(a) and (c) of the NLRA," concerns employees' selection of bargain-
ing representatives via a balloting process rather than an individual solicitation
process. Section 9(a) of the Act allows employees to choose or reject a bargain-
ing agent by majority rule; section 9(c) of the Act gives effect to section 9(a)
by authorizing the Board to take a secret ballot of employees to determine
their choice." In conjunction with its authority to direct the balloting of
employees, the Board has wide discretion to establish procedures safeguard-
ing employees' freedom of choice in the election. 2" Thus, the Savair rule—
prohibiting unions from offering free membership in the union to employees
in exchange for an early commitment. to the union—stems from the Board's
authority to regulate the election of bargaining representatives and to
safeguard employees' freedom of choice in the election. 2 ' In light of the
Board's responsibility to safeguard employees' freedom of choice, the Board's
emphasis in Aladdin Hotel on the question whether the union coerced
employees to prepay the union clues was improper. Instead, the Board should
have emphasized the question whether the union's prepayment and forfeiture
policy improperly induced employees who prepaid the dues to vote for the
union. 22
In addition to the Board's failure to accord determinative weight to the
pertinent issue, when the Board did address this issue, it underestimated the
economic persuasion to vote for the union which the union's prepayment and
forfeiture policy created. As the dissenters noted, the union itself was aware
that its prepayment and fOrleiture policy was a strong inducement to vote for
the union, at least for those employees who had prepaid the dues. 2 `a One of
the union's primary reasons for instituting the policy was to insure before the
election that a majority of the employees were committed to the union and
A	 Iwere not simply "window shopping. " 24
 As tile dissent. stated:
29 U.S.C. §§ 159 (a), (c) (1976).
it•
2 " NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946).
21 Savair, 414 U.S. at 276-77.
22
 Moreover, the Board's conclusion in Aladdin Hotel that the union did not
improperly induce employees to prepay the clues disregards the Court's suggestion in
Savair that employees' fear of facing a wrathful union regime, if the union wins the
election, may induce them to indicate support for the union prior to the election
whether or not they actually intend to vote for the union. See id. at 281. If an
employee's refusal to sign a recognition slip presents an ominous situation, as in SM'air,
an employee's refusal to help out a union financially at a time when it claims to need
economic support, as in Aladdin Hotel, ,is an even more ominous situation. However,
the Board did not consider whether employees' fear of facing an angry union regime,
should the union win, may have influenced their decision to indicate support for the
union by prepaying the dues.
2" 229 N.L.R.B. at 501, 95 L.R.R.M, at 1153 (Members Penello and Walther,
d issent i ng).
24 Id. at 501, 95 L.R.R.M. 1152. The union's other reason for its prepayment
and forfeiture policy was to help defray the costs of lost elections. hi.
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Since under the Union's policy the only way an employee can avoid
losing his prepaid money is to vote for the Union regardless of how
his sentiments may have changed during the course of the election
campaign, this policy clearly undermines the freedom of choice [in
the election] which the Board seeks to foster.= 5
The dissenters' position that the union's prepayment and forfeiture policy
coerced employees who had prepaid the dues to vote for the union finds
support in Savair. In Sovair, the Court found that although offering free
membership in the union to employees who signed union recognition slips did
not legally bind employees to vote for the union, "certainly there may be some
employees who would feel obligated to carry through on their stated intention
to support the union." 2" The Court implied t.hat the feeling of obligation
created by the employees' written commitment to the union undermined their
freedom of choice in the election.'' IF the &wail' Court is correct, giving
mono, to the union prior to an election creates an even stronger inducement
to vote For the union."- Consequently, for those employees who prepaid the
dues, the union's practice in Aladdin Hotel undermined the freedom of choice
in the election to an even greater extent than the union's practice in Savair. 2 •
The Board's refusal to extend S'arytir to analogous situations, presents a
potential for conflict between the Board and the courts over what practices
constitute permissible union campaign tactics. For the present, however, it is
clear that. Aladdin Hotel will have a significant impact on union campaign prac-
tices. Obviously, Aladdin Hotel's approval of a union policy requiring a majority
of employees to prepay nonrefundable initiation fees will help unions to de-
2r. 14. ai 501, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1 153. The majority of Ole Board concluded that
employees who prepaid the clues "lost - the money the moment they paid the dues,
since, win or lose, the union retained the inoney; hence, the employees had nothing-
more to lose by voting against the union. Id. at 500, 95 at 1151. This conclu-
sion, however, ignores the presumption that a successful union would use the dues in
its ellOrts to help the employees. Thus, dues paid to a successful union are not "lost''
but are simply an advance against services to be rendered to the employees in the
future, whereas dues paid to an unsuccessful union are, indeed, "lost - since the union
cannot render the services to the employees despite the advance.
Savair, A1.4 U.S. at 277-78.
27 id.
28
 See Aladdin Hotel, 229 N.t..R.B. at 501, 95 1_12.12.M. at 1153 (Members
Penello and Walther, dissenting); Jai) Corp., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 95 1..R.R.M. 1425,
1-426 (July 6, 1977) (Member Walther, dissenting).
2" '[he dissent raises one other, less significant flaw in the Board's decision in
Aladdin Hotel. The dissent maintained that the Board erred in failing to consider
whether the promise of reduced initiation fees lirr employees joining the union during
the "organizing campaign - led employees to believe that the reduced fees were avail-
able only to employees joining the union brfo,r the election. 229 N.1„R.B. at 502, 95
1..R.R.N1. at 1153. This criticism of the Board's decision seems valid because of the
meaning normally attributable to the phrase "organizing campaign." Indeed, the
Board recently held that a union's promise of reduced initiation fees during "this
campaign" was the equivalent of it promise of reduced fees only For employees joining
the union before the election. Deming Div. Crane Co., 225 N.L. R. B. 657, 159, 93
1..R.R.N1. 1181, 1182 (1976). Consequently, the Roard in that decision held that the
union's promise violated the Sazwir rule.
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fray the expenses of conducting union campaigns. Unions can assess early in
the campaign the strength of employee support and can discontinue cam-
paigns if the union does not command majority support, thus saving sonic of
the costs of conducting a full campaign that ultimately would prove unsuc-
cessful. Moreover, even if the union loses the election, it still can use the clues
collected 10 offset the expense of the unsuccessful campaign. Consequently,
unions adopting an Aladdin Hotel prepayment and forfeiture policy can insure
that virtually every full campaign it conducts will end either in a successful
election or one which does 110t deplete union funds.
B. Bargaining Unit Determination
1. ReligiouslLay Faculty Units: Niagara University; St. Francis College.
Since 1970, the National Labor Relations Board has asserted jurisdiction
in labor disputes involving private nonprofit colleges and universities) This
assumption of jurisdiction has required the Board to determine appropriate
bargaining units for teachers at colleges founded by religious orders. Because
the teaching faculty at such a college often consists of both lay and religious
members,"` the Board frequently has faced the question whether to exclude
from the bargaining unit faculty who are members of the founding religious
order. In 1971, the Board handed clown its first decision on this issue in
Fordham University." In Fordharn, the Board included the full-time Jesuit fac-
ulty members of Fordham University in the faculty bargaining unit)
' See Cornell Univ., 183 N.1..1-Z,B. 329, 334, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1275 (1970).
See also NI.1th v. Wentworth Inst., 515 l'.2d 550, 556, 89 L.R.R.M. 2033, 2037 (Ist Cir.
1975).
For an analysis of problems spawned by this assumption of jurisdiction see
generally Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Polieymaking Through
Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. E.. REV. 63 (1973); Menard and DiGiovanni, NLRB jurisdiction
over Colleges and Univer .ties: A Plea for Rielemaking, 16 Wm. & MARY l.. REV. 599 ( 975).
The determination of appropriate bargaining units for college teaching
professionals has been particularly troublesome. Unit determination problems have
included: multiple campus versus single campus units, department chairmen as
supervisors, part-time faculty, satellite faculty, and the collective exercise of
. supervisory
authority. See Menard, Exploding Representation Areas: Colleges and Universities, 17
I ND. & Coat. L. RE v. 931 (1976); Moore, The Determination o/ Bargaining Units for College
Faculties, 37 U. Pier. L. RE.'. 43 (1975).
2
 There are approximately 250 colleges and universities in the United States
founded by religious orders or dioceses. The percentage of faculty who are of the
same religious order as that founding the institution n•:1 ries widely. Nee College and
University Department, National Catholic Educ. Ass'n, Relations of American Catholic
Colleges and Universities with the Church (April 1976). reprinted in 74 CATtiouc Mtsw 51,
53 (Oct. 1976).
193 N.1..R.11. 134, 78 1..R.R.7vt. 1177 (1971).
In Fordham, the union wished to include the Jesuits in the unit. The
employer took no position on this issue. The Jesuits constituted 70 of the 500 lull-time
faculty and could leave die order at any time. There was no evidence that membership
in the order was "in any way inconsistent with collective bargaining with respect to a
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Two years after Fordharn, in Scion Hill College , 5 the Board excluded the
religious faculty members of Seton Hil l College from the faculty bargaining
unit. In so doing, the Board overruled its earlier decision in Fordham, to the
extent that Forelhain was inconsistent. with Scion Hill." In Seton Hill, the college
was owned by the Order of the Sisters of Charity of Seton Hill, and fifty
percent of the college's board of .
 trustees were members of the order.' Due
to their vow of poverty, religious Eiculty members did not receive wages di-
rectly. Instead, these wages were paid to the order, and, pursuant to a con-
tractual agreement, the order returned a fixed percentage of the salaries to
the college." The Board excluded members of the order from the faculty
bargaining unit primarily for two reasons. First, the Board found that because
the order owned and administered the college, and because each member of
the order had taken a vow of obedience, a religious faculty member would
"be subject to a conflict of loyalties." Second, the Board determined that
religious faculty members did not have the same economic interests as lay
faculty members since they had taken a vow of poverty and were under a
contractual obligation to return a substantial part of their salaries to the col-
lege.'" Accordingly, the Board concluded that a separate bargaining unit of
lay faculty was appropriate.
During the Survey year, two courts of appeals, the Second Circuit in Niag-
ara University v. NLRB" and the Third Circuit in NLRB v. St. Francis College,' 2
reversed bargaining unit determinations by the Board which, on the basis of
Seton Hill,"r had excluded religious faculty. In each case, the circuit courts
Jesuit's salary or other terms and conditions of employment." hi, at 139, 78 1,,R.R.M.
at 1183-84.
• 201 N.I..R.B. 1026, 82 I..R.R.M. 1434 (1973). Seton Hill College was
founded by the Order of the Sisters of Charity of' Sewn Hill. In 1973, members of the
order constituted 58 of the 92 persons on the faculty. hi. at 1026, 82 1..,R.R.M. at 1434.
Id at 1027 n.4, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1435 n.4.
7 hi. at 1026, 82 L.R.R.M, at 1134,
• hi. at 1026 -27, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1435.
• N. at 1027, 82 I..R.R.M. at. 1435.
'"	 'The Board also stressed t ha t the college had established a separate pro-
gram of fringe benefits for the lay faculty. hi.
" 558 F.2d 1116. 95 L.R.R.M. 3354 (2d Cir. 1977).
12 562 F.2d 246, 96 L.R.R.M. 2134 (3d Cir. 1977).
Subsegnent to Scion Hill, the Board relied on this decision to exclude mem-
bers ()I' religiotis orders from the bargaining unit when the particular order operated
the institution. Thus, the Board excluded religious faculty members in Catholic high
schools from the teachers' bargaining unit in Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223
N.L.R.B, 1218. 1223, 92 1„R.R.M. 11114, 1120 (1976) (parochial high schools in the Los
Angeles area). Similarly, it excluded from bargaining units health care employees ()I' a
religious order which owned arid operated a hospital, nursing home or healthcare
center. See St. Rose de Lima Hosp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1511, 1513, 92 L.R.R. M. 1181,
1184 (1976) (exclusion of nurses of the Sisters of' St. Dominic in hospital owned and
operated by the order): Carroll Manor Nursing Home, 202 N.I,,R,B. 67, 68, 82
L.R.R.M. 1479, 1481 (1973) (exclusion of 15 Sisters of the Order of Carmelite Sisters
who lived and worked at the home); Saint Anthony Center, 220 N.L.R.B. 1009, 1011,
90 L.R.R.M. 1405, 1409 (1975) (exclusion of members of the Sisters of Charity of the
Incarnate Word whose order owned and operated the geriatric care center).
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distinguished Scion Hill, and found the Board's unit determinations arbitrary
and unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.
In Niagara, the university refused to bargain with the Niagara University
Lay Teachers Association, the certified representative of full-time faculty
members, because the bargaining unit excluded religious faculty.' ' ' Niagara
College was founded by the Vincentian fathers, and is located in the Eastern
Province of that order. The religious faculty at the college was composed of
eighteen Vincentian fathers—seventeen from the Eastern Province and one
from the New England Province—and three nuns."' The college held title to
all buildings and property on the campus. A seventeen member board of
trustees, of whom not more than one-third could be• Vincentians, governed
Niagara.'" As in Scion Hill, the Eastern Province Vincentians teaching at the
college did not receive their salary checks directly, and these were sent instead
to the Province)? However, although the Eastern Province annually donated
a portion of these wages to the college, the Province was not, as in Scion Hill,
under a contractual obligation to do so.' " The Regional Director nevertheless
concluded that the religious faculty at Niagara College did not share a "com-
munity of interest with the lay faculty," and therefore excluded them from
the bargaining unit..' 9 The Board, without Opinion, upheld the Regional Di-
rector's decision.'"
After Niagara College filed a petition for review with the Second Circuit,
the Board issued a decision clarifying the original bargaining unit. determina-
tion. In Niagara University [Niagara II], 21 the Board amended the original
bargaining unit to include the four faculty members who were from religious
orders other than the Eastern Province—three nuns and a priest from the
New England Province—but maintained its exclusion of facility members
from the Eastern Province. 2 2
'' 558 F.2d at 1118, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3355.
15 The full - time faculty consisted of 134 lay and twenty-one religious mem-
bers. Id. at 1117, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3354.
' 6
 The Provincial of the Congregation of the Mission, Eastern Province, was
required to he an ex officio member of the board. hl. at 1117-18, 95 L.R.R.M. at.
3354-55.
" /d. at 1121 & n.4, 95 L.R.R.M. al 3357 & n.4.
I 8 Id.
" Id. at 1118, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3354-55.
2 " Id. Accordingly, the Board fount( that Niagara engaged in unfair labor
practices under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (5) (1976).
See Niagara Univ., 226 N.L.R.B. 918, 920, 94 L.R.R.M. 1082, (1976).
21 Niagara Univ., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 94 1„R.R.M. 1001. 1003 (Dec. 16,
1976) [hereinafter Niagara la
22 The Board found that, unlike the Eastern Province fathers, neither the Vin-
centian father of the New England Province nor the three nuns were "part of the
employer." The Board also found that their vows of poverty did not establish a sepa-
rate community of interests between lay and religious faculty. Id., 94 1..R.R.M. at
1001-02. In the Board's opinion, it was only important in finding a community of
interest with the lay faculty that these religious faculty members did not return all or
part of their paychecks to die employer—Niagara University—through their religious
order as did the Eastern Province fathers. Id., 94 L.R.R.M. at 1003.
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Reviewing the Board's exclusion of the Eastern Province Vincentians, the
Second Circuit first found that the identity of interests between the Eastern
Province Vincentians and the employer was not sufficient to exclude them
from the bargaining unit.":; The court next. determined that the Eastern
Province Vincentians' vow of poverty should have no bearing on whether they
shared a community of interest with the lay faculty members.'" Likewise, the
court. of appeals found that the Eastern Province's return of a portion of its
members' salaries to the college constituted a non-obligatory gilt which did
not affect the community of interest between the religious and lay faculty
members. ' The Second Circuit thus concluded that the Board's exclusion of
the Eastern Province Vincentians from the faculty bargaining unit was arbi-
trary and unsupported by substantial evidence. 26
St. Francis presented a factual situation similar to Niagara, Founded by the
Franciscan Order, St. Francis College operated as a nonprofit. corporation and
held title to all college property. 27
 The College was administered by a hoard
of trustees, a majority of whom were Franciscans. "" Salaries of Franciscan
faculty members were paid directly to the monastery where they lived, which
in turn made a substantial voluntary gift. back to the college. 2 " As in Niagara,
the Board excluded the religious Faculty members from the bargaining unit,"
finding that the "special relationship" between the Franciscan Faculty and St.
Francis College created a conflict of loyalties for the Franciscans. and that the
Franciscans' interest in their salaries differed significantly from that of the lay
faculty."'
Reviewing the Board's decision, the Third Circuit questioned the Board's
reliance on Selon Hill, and concluded that the Board had abused its discretion
in excluding the Fri.tnciscans." 2
 The court of appeals fOund nothing in the
record indicating that the Franciscans differed from the lay faculty in terms
of their employee-employer relationship." Furthermore, the court held that
the Franciscans' vow of poverty was an inconsequential Factor in unit determi-
nation.'" Unlike the situation in Seton Hill, the Franciscan monastery's return
to the college of part of the faculty members' salaries was a gift.'" Accord-
ingly, the court. denied the Board's petition to enforce an unfair labor practice
order against. St. Francis College.` [ [;
23 558 RN at [119, 95 [..R.R.1v1. at 3356.
". Id. at 1121-22. 95 1..R.R.N.1. at 3358.
25 hi .
29 I d .
" 562 F,2(1 at 251. 96 1...R.R.[VI. al 2137.
29 Id .
"" The l'acully bargaining- unit consisted of sixty-six full-time faculty members.
Six members of the Franciscan Order were excluded From the unit by the union. Id. at
248, 96 1,.R.R.\1. at 2135.
:" Id. at 253, 96 1..R.R.M. at 2138.
H. at 255, ¶16 1..R.R.M. at 2140•11,
M. at 253, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2139.
"' Id. at 254-55, 96 1..R.R.M. at 2139-40.
Id. at 255, 96 1...R.R.M. at 2140.
6
 A concurring opinion noted the lack or objective evidence offered by the
but emphasized that the holding of this case was limited to the facts befOre the
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The Second Circuit, in Niagara, and the Third Circuit, in St. Francis, each
focused on the two major justifications advanced by the Board for excluding
the religious faculty from the faculty bargaining units: the lack of common
economic interests among religious and lay faculty because of the religious
members' vow of poverty, which included a contribution of part of their sal-
ary to their employer-college, and the alleged identity of interest between the
employer and the religious faculty."' As to the first justification, the Second
Circuit. in Niagara noted an inconsistency in the Board's position." Although
the Board excluded Eastern Province Vincentian faculty members from the
Niagara bargaining unit on the ground that. the fathers' vow of poverty""
undercut any "common economic interest" among religious and lay faculty
members, the Board, in its interim clarification decision in Niagara II , 4" in-
cluded in the bargaining unit religious faculty who, though not Eastern Prov-
ince Vincentians, had taken a vow of povert y.41 The Board stated in Niagara
II that it did "not believe that the way a person chooses to spend his or her
money is a relevant consideration with respect to questions of unit place-
ment." 42 According to the Board's own analysis, therefore, the vow of pov-
court. Id. at 255, 257, 96 1..R.R.M. at 2141, 2143 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
It must be noted that in neither Niagara nor Si. Francis did the Board or court.
of appeals address the problems of religious discrimination or first amendment rights
raised by the exclusion of the religious faculty. For example, St. Francis College ar-
gued that the exclusion of the Franciscans violated: (1) the first amendment's free
exercise and establishment clauses. (2) 'Title VII of the Civil Rights Act Of 1964, and
(3) "the equal protection guarantee or the clue process clause of the fifth amendment. -
562 F.2d at 255 n.15, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2141 n.15. However, the court in Si. Franris, like
the court in Niagara, based its decision on secular labor law principles of unit determi-
nation.
The first amendment issue has been raised recently in a similar context in
cases involving the Board's assumption of jurisdiction over Catholic elementary and
secondary schools. This assumption of jurisdiction has been successfully challenged as
violative of the first amendment principle of separation of church and state. See
Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2c1 1112, 95 L.R.R.M. 3324 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. grantee!, 98 S.Ct. 1231 (1978).
" 7 In St. Francis, the court. characterized the concept as a "conflict of loyalties."
562 F.2d at 253, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2138.
" 8 558 F.2d at 1120-21, 9.5 L.R.R.M. at 3356-57.
The Regional Director found:
Under his vow of poverty, a Vincentian Father has it right to ownership
but can not use the property without the permission of his superiors. All
monies earned by the Vincentian Fathers are given to their Provinces and
they in return receive a monthly personal allowance. Further, the members
of the Order are provided with kiwi, clothing and slicker by their Prov-
inces.
558 F.2d at 1120, 95 L,R.R.M. at 3356.
70 227 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 9.1 I.. R.R.M. 1001 (Dec. 16, 1976).
I ' See text and notes 21-22
- ' 2 227 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 94 1..R.R.M, at 1003 (footnotes omitted). In an ac-
companying footnote the Board stated:
The alleged pertinence or questions on how money is spent seems in part
to rest. On an unstated and unproven assumption that a desire for income is
somehow related to the particular manner in which it is spent; i.e., on how
HH
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erty taken alone did not suffice to separate the Vincentians' interests from
those of the lay faculty.'" Rather, as the Board indicated in Niagara II, the
inquiry as to whether the fathers shared a community of interests with the lay
faculty should focus on the fact that the Vincentian fathers assigned their
paychecks to their Province which in turn made a gift to the university."
The Niagara court then proceeded to examine the significance of the
Vincentians' monetary contribution to the university. The Second Circuit
found that there was no evidence that the Eastern Province Vincentians were
under a contractual obligation to return part of their salaries to the univer-
sity. 4 ' On this basis, the court distinguished Scion Hill, where such a contrac-
tual obligation had existed.'" The court further determined that it was of no
consequence that the Vincentian faculty's paychecks were sent directly to the
Province; the controlling consideration was that the money returned to the
university by the Province was a Oft. 47 The court therefore concluded that
the Vincentians' return of a portion of their salary to the school through their
Province was not sufficient to undercut the community of interests between
the lay and religious faculty.'"
In St. Francis, the Third Circuit also referred to the Board's language in
Niagara 11 4 " in assessing the effect of the Franciscan faculty members' vow of
poverty.'" As did the Second Circuit in Niagara, the Third Circuit refused to
much it is needed. L. fite whole concept here is at best a morass with which
this Board has no special expertise to deal. Furthermore, it is beside the
'mint. To take an example, an independently wealthy lay professor would
not he excluded from a unit simply because he or she did not "need" the
income or had no interest in a pay raise.
ld., 94	 at 1003 n.6.
Indeed, the Board's analysis concerning the insignificance of the vow of
poverty with regard to the unit's community of interests seems to be supported by the
assertions of commentators that economic interests do not play a substantial role in
faculty organization in the first place. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 76.
. 1.1 See 558 F.2d at 1120-21, 95 1.„.R.R.M. at 3356 (quoting 227 N.1,.R.B. No. 33,
94 1.-R.R.M. at 1003 n.7).
15
 558 'F.2d at 1121, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3357.
Sec text at note 8 supra.
• 7 The court asserted that Niagatyi conflicted with the Board's earlier ruling in
D'Youville College, 225 N.L.R.B. 792, 92 11„R.R.M. 1578 (1976), where the Grey Nuns
on the faculty returned part of their salaries to their employer. 558 F.2d at 1121, 95
1...R.R.M. at 3357. See note 54 infta. This reading of D'Vouville seems incorrect, how-
ever. In D'Youville, the Board deemed the salary issue inconsequential only because all
the parties (lay faculty and employer) agreed that the nuns shared a sufficient com-
munity of interest to be included in the same unit with the lay faculty. See 225
N.1„R.B. at 792, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1579.
. 18 558 F.2c1 at 1121-22, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3358. The Niagara court concluded
that the terms and conditions of employment were practically identical for both lay
and religious faculty members, 558 F.2d at 1121, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3357-58. Religious
faculty were not paid "substantially less." (1' : Nazareth Regional High School v. NLRB.
549 F.2d 873. 879 n.3, 94 1...R.R.M. 2897. 2900 n.3 (2d Cit.. 1977) (religious faculty
paid "substantially less" than lay faculty). Differences in fringe benefits were therefore
insufficient to separate the religions from the lay faculty.
1 " See note 42 supra.
5" The court discounted the assertion that because of their vow of poverty, the
Franciscans were less interested in their salaries and thus unable to share interests with
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differentiate between religious and lay faculty members simply because reli-
gious faculty members had taken a vow of poverty. The issue in St. Francis, as
in Niagara, was instead whether the return of part of the salaries by the
monastery to the college was sufficient to negate a community of interest be-
tween lay and religious faculty. The Third Circuit deemed the return of the
salaries a gift, not an obligation, and found no basis for excluding the Fran-
ciscans from the bargaining unit."
The second issue facing the courts in Niagara and St. Francis was the
religious faculty's alleged identity of interest with the employer-college.
Adopting different approaches to the issue, both circuit, courts found no iden-
tity of interest between the employer and the religious faculty. The court in
Niagara approached this issue by focusing on the ownership and operation of
the university. Since the Vincentians neither owned nor operated Niagara, 52
the court rejected the Board's reliance on Seton Hill, where the religious order
did own and operate the college," as proving an identity of interest between
the religious faculty and Niagara. Rather, the court found the issue controlled
by the Board's more recent decision in D'Youville College. 54 In D'Youville, the
college was a corporation whose governing powers were vested in a board of
trustees of whom no more than one-third could be members of religious or-
ders. 55 In light of this corporate structure, the Board in D'Youville found no
the lay faculty. In fact, the court noted that the Franciscans did have an interest in the
size of their salaries. 562 F.2d at 254, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2139-40 (testimony from hear-
ings to the effect that the Franciscans were interested in bringing in additional money
to the Province and. consequently, to the religions community).
5 ' Id. at 255, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2140. The Board asserted that since the religious
faculty had no right to prevent. the return of their salary to the college (usually
amounting to 50% of the salary), this scheme was the equivalent of paying the religi-
ons faculty half of the salary paid to the lay faculty. The Board argued that this sub-
stantial difference in salary justified exclusion from the bargaining unit. Id. at 255
n.14, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2140 n.14; see Nazareth Regional High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d
873, 879 n.3, 94 L.R.R.M. 2897, 2900 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977).
In his concurring opinion in St. Francis, 562 F.2d at 255, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2141,
Judge Rosenn found the issue concerning the Franciscans' interest in wages to be eas-
ily decided. "[A]ny exclusion of employees from a bargaining unit which rests on the
Board's estimate of the employees' subjective interest in salary is per se unreasonable. -
Id. at 257, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2142.
52 Niagara University held legal title to the grounds and buildings; also the
Vincentians could constitute no more than one-third of the university's governing
body. See text at note 16 supra.
The court also noted disapprovingly the Board's opinion in Niagara 11 which
several times referred to the Eastern Vincentians as operating the university. See id., 94
L.R.R.M. at 1001, 1002. The court found this assertion by the Board unsupported by
the evidence and contrary to the findings of the Regional Director concerning the
operation of Niagara. 558 F.2d at 1119 11.2, 95 1.. R.R.M. at 3356 n.2.
53 See Sidon Hill, 201 N.L.R.B. 1026, 82 L.R.R.M. 1434 (1973). For discussion
of SeIon Hill, see text at. notes 5-10 DOM.
54 225 N.L.R.B. 792, 92 L.R.R.M. 1578 (1976), D'Youville College was
founded by the Order of Grey Nuns of the Sacred Heart. This clarification decision
involved the unit placement of four professors who were members of the Order of
Grey Nuns. Id.
55 Id. at 792, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1578-79. The corporation owned the employer's
buildings and administered the affairs of the college. Id.
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basis for holding that religious faculty members were affiliated with the
employer in any manner except in their teaching capacity..'^ Adopting the
Board's approach in D'Youville, the Niagara court looked to the composition of
the governing board of the university. Because of the limited presence of
Vincentians on the board of trustees,''' the court found no identity of interest
between the religious faculty and the employer.
The St. Francis court approached the identity of interest issue differently
than did the Niagara court. The Third Circuit. focused on the Board's asser-
tion that the "special and complex relationship" between the Franciscan fac-
ulty and the college would create a conflict of loyalties for the Franciscan
faculty members if they were also aligned with the faculty bargaining unit..'
The court first summarily dismissed the argument that because of the "family
resemblance" among Franciscans, they should be excluded from the faculty
bargaining unit just as relatives of management are excluded from other bar-
gaining units.'" The court also rejected the Board's assertion that the close
fraternal and religious ties of all Franciscans created an overlapping relation-
ship between the Franciscan faculty and the administration and trustees of the
" Id., 92 1..R.R.NI. at 1579. In D'Ymn 'illr, rrl patties were satisfied as to the
nuns' community of interest with the lay faculty and agreed to include the religious
faculty in the unit with the lay faculty. Id. Sec note 17 .yultra.
See text at note If) supra.
5 " 'F lie faculty are assumed to have an adversarial relationship to the college as
an employer. 562 F.2(1 at 252-53, 96 L.R.R,M. it 2138-39.
" See NLRB v. CaraveIle Wood Prods. Inc., 501 F.2d 1181, 1188-89, 87
L.R.R.M. 2579, 2584 (7th Cir. 1971) (relatives of stockholders/owners lacked sufficient
"community Of interest" with the other employees).
The cowl in Si. Pra»cis dismissed the issue by merely noting that the Francis-
cans were not blood relatives of each other. 562 1'.2d at 253, 96 1..R.R.M. at 2139.
Despite the court's curt rejection of this argument, however, the Board's analogy to a
"family resemblance" among Franciscans is intriguing. The family resemblance issue
stems from 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3) and 159(h). Certainly the case of the religious faculty
member does not lit within the exclusion of § 152(3); there is literally no "parent." or
"spouse" relationship in the order. NLRB v. Sexton, 203 F.2d 940, 32 I..R.R.M.
2105 (6th Cir. 1953) (per curiam) (exclusion of nephew denied). However, § 159(b)
gives the Board discretion in determining the bargaining unit. Relying on this section,
courts have excluded relations falling beyond the § 152(3) exclusion from bargaining
units because of their "special status. - So, Cherrin Corp. v. NLRB, 3.19 F.2d 1001,
1004, 59 1..R.R.M. 3016, 3018 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966). (f.
Caravelle Wood Prods. Inc., 504 F.2d at 1186, 87 1..R.R.M. at 2553 (interaction be-
tween § 152(3) and § 159(h)). In St. Francis, 'he evidence does not show that the Fran-
ciscans were accorded "special slants" in their employment. Consequently, on strict
statutory and case law analysis, the Board's hypothesis does not work. However, other
factors indicate that, taken as a whole, the Board's analogy may have some validity. For
example, the fact that the college president—a Francisan—resides at the same monas-
tery as the religious faculty seems to be of some importance. (.1: Parisoir Drive-1n
Mkt., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 813, 814, 82 1..R.R.11. 13-12, 1343 (1973) (relevant whether
employees lived at home with management personnel). Nevertheless, the court's accep-
tance of the "Limily resemblance" analogy would require a Imiad interpretation of the
National Labor Relations Act. So generally Reply Brief for NLRB at 6-7, NLRB v. St.
Francis College, 562 1 2 .2d 2-16, 96 L.R.R.M. 2134 (3d Cir. 1977),
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college!" The court was unwilling to accept this assertion without any objec-
tive evidence in the record for support. Because of the Board's inability to
produce such evidence, the court labeled the idea of a conflict of loyalties as
"mere speculation" and dismissed the claim."'
The decisions of the courts of appeals in Niagara and St. Francis raise two
issues: first, whether the Board is moving away from its position in Se/on Hill
regarding what is required to establish a community of interest between re-
ligious and lay faculty members; second, the role that an asserted "special
relationship" between members of a religious order and a school's administra-
tion should play in faculty unit determinations. The first issue arises from
intimations by both the Second and Third Circuits that the Board has shifted
its analysis in the religious faculty cases." 2
 In this regard, both courts pointed
to the Board's decision in Niagara 11. In Niagara II, the Board dismissed the
relevance of vows of obedience and poverty to whether a community of in-
terest exists between religious and lay faculty." It is submitted, however, that
the decision in Niagara 11 is not inconsistent with prior Board rulings. Prior to
Niagara H. the Board had been consistently troubled by the return of part of
a religious teacher's salary to the employing college. While it is true that in
Se/on Hill the Board mentioned the religious faculty members' vow of poverty
in concluding that a community of interest did not exist between the religious
and lay faculty, the Board also mentioned the fact that the members of the
controlling order were under a contractual obligation to return a portion of
their salary to the college."' Moreover, it should be noted that in Seton Hill,
the parties had included in the bargaining unit a nun and two priests from
other orders."'' Because these faculty were not members of the controlling
order—and therefore did not return money to the college—the Board
apparently had no objection to their inclusion in the unit. In D'Youville,"" the
Board expressed apprehension about a salary-return system, but this was
overcome by the agreement of all parties that the religious faculty shared a
community of interest with the lay faculty."' It is thus arguable that, prior to
"" 562 F.2d at 253, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2139.
" 1 Id. at 253 n,1 I, 96 L.R.R.M. ut 2139 n.11. Judge Rosenn, in his concurring
opinion, again noted the absence of objective evidence to establish this "special and
complex relationship" between the Franciscan faculty and. the college. Id. at 257, 96
L.R.R.M. at 2142. Had such evidence established the nature ()I' such a relationship,
judge Rosenn speculated, there might. have existed a valid basis for exclusion. Id.
Judge Rosenn emphasized, however. that the complex area of religious tics and com-
mitments required more than unsupported assertions and assumptions by the Board in
this case. Still, he noted, in conclusion, that. there remained the possibility of a case in
which religious faculty member's could he excluded from a faculty bargaining unit, Id.,
96 L.R.R.M. at 2143.
"2
 See St. Francis, 562 F.2d at 252. 96 L.R.R.M. at 2138; Niagara, 558 F.2d at
1121, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3357,
":1 See text and notes 14-15, 40-44 supra.
1" See text at note 10 salim.
" 201 N.L.R.B. at 1026, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1434.
''" See note 47 ,Yupra.
"7 11 -1 D . Y0,11 ,llie, the Board gave considerable weight to the decision of the lay
faculty to include the nuns. 225 N.L. R. B. at 792-93, 92 L. R.R.M. at 1579. On the
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Niagara II, the Board's disapprobation of the inclusion of religious faculty in a
bargaining unit depended not on whether religious faculty members had
taken a vow of poverty, but on whether they in fact. returned a portion of
their salary to the employer-college. In Niagara II, the religious faculty which
the Board included in the bargaining unit disbursed their salaries to institu-
tions other than Niagara University." 8 Therefore, the inclusion of those re-
ligious faculty in the bargaining unit is consistent with prior Board decisions
and does not indicate a shift in Board analysis."
The second issue presented by these cases—concerning the role of an
alleged "special relationship" between religious faculty and a college—was not
addressed in Niagara because the secular control of the university's adminis-
tration made such analysis unnecessary. However, the court in St. Francis
faced this issue of identity of commitment between employer and employee.
The identity of commitment is best. characterized as a general allegiance
among the members of the order; as a close group, the members of the order
are presumed always to ally themselves because of their religious ties.'"
Though difficult to pinpoint, both the majority" and concurring" opinions
in St. Francis acknowledged the existence of a "special and complex relation-
ship." The lack of objective evidence supporting its existence was the deter-
minative factor in the St. Francis court's failure to predicate exclusion of re-
ligious faculty on this relationship.
It is submitted that regardless of the existence of any identity of commit-
ment between the religious faculty and a college, the religious faculty should
be included in the bargaining unit. if a college is a distinct private entity,
incorporated under state law, and is not a religious corporation," there is no
identity of commitment between the members of the order on the faculty and
the college per se. Rather, this identity exists between the religious faculty and
those of the religious order who administer the college. Therefore, the critical
question focuses on the effect of the common commitment of members of the
other hand, in both Si. Francis and Niagara the lay faculty wished to exclude the reli-
gious members f'com the bargaining unit. While the court in St. Francis did not address
the issue, the court in Niagara held that the lay faculty's desire to exclude the religious
faculty was an insufficient reason to exclude the Vincentians. 558 F.2d at 1121, 95
L.R.R.NI. at 3358.
227 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 94 L.R.R.M, at 1002.
''" h. should also be noted that the Board's grouping in bargaining units of
religious and lay faculty has evolved on a case-by-case basis; the Board claims "no
policy of exclusion of religious faculty in every instance." Brief for NLRB at 7, NLRB
V. St. Francis College, 562 F.2d 246, 96 L.R.R.M. 2134 (3d Cir. 1977); see Brief for
NLRB at 7, Niagara Univ. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1116, 95 L.R.R.M. 3354 (2d Cir. 1977).
'" 562 F.2d at 253 n.11, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2139 n.11.
7 ' See al. at 253, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2138.
72 See hi. at 257, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2142 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
73 See, e.g., T. DoNovAN, THE STATus	 THE CHURCH IN AMERICAN CIVIL LAW
AND CANON LAW 119 (1966) (Doctoral dissertation).
Note, however, testimony of a member of the Franciscan order, reprinted in
the Board's reply brief in St. Francis: years of tradition certainly haven't broken
clown simply because of the legal separation of the Province and the College." Reply
Brief for NLRB at. 5.
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religious order, whether faculty or administration, on the functioning and
goals of the college.
The commitment of a religious order to a college seems to emphasize
academic freedom and religious cooperation, rather than control.' The
order's commitment thus entails avoidance of inappropriate control and
supervision which would diminish academic excellence. The members of the
religious order, whether on the faculty or the administration, share this com-
mitment to educational freedom. Similar educational interests are shared by
the lay faculty. Thus, it seems that members of the lay faculty and the mem-
bers of the religious order—whether faculty or administration—share a
common identity of interests and commitment in regard to the role of both
the teaching professional and the college. In the college setting therefore, the
"special relationship" between the members of the religious order does not
necessarily separate the interests of the religious faculty from those of the lay
faculty.
In conclusion, the circuit courts' decisions in Niagara and St. Francis to
include religious faculty in faculty bargaining units seem correct. The incor-
poration of the university as an independent institution has moved the school
further away from the notion that the church governs the operation of the
school. Meanwhile, the educational goals of both lay and religious have moved
closer and formed a community of interests. The Board must acknowledge
these trends if its groupings of bargaining units are properly to recognize a
community of interests among college faculty. The Board, in its future unit
determinations of college faculty, should follow the guide of the courts of
appeals and include in the unit faculty who are also members of the college's
founding religious order.
2. Hospital Employees
a. Maintenance Employees—During this Survey year, in Long Island College
Hospital v. NLRB (LICH),' St. Vincent's Hospital v. NLRB,' and NLRB v. West
Suburban Hospital, 3 three courts of appeals focused on the appropriateness of
Board certifications of separate maintenance units in hospitals. In both St.
" As one commentator noted:
Infringements on the freedom of college and university faculty to teach the
results of their study and research would destroy the opportunity for the
college to make its contribution to the church. Freedom from outside con-
straints is the very breath of life for a college and university.... If the
integrity and freedom of the academy is attacked, undermined by "an
academic law of the church," the church will be the first to suffer.
College and University Department, National Catholic Educ. Ass'n, 4elations of Ameri-
can Catholic Colleges and Universities with the Church (April 1976), reprinted in• 74
CATHOLIC MIND 51, 62 (Oct. 1976).
566 F.2d 833, 96 L.R.R.M. 3119 (2(1 Cir. 1977),
2 567 F.2d 588, 97 L.R.R.M. 2119 (3d Cir. 1977).
570 F.2d 213, 97 L.R.R.M. 2929 (7th Cir. 1978).
94	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:61
Vincent's and West Suburban, the circuit courts, finding the separate units inap-
propriate, denied enforcement of the Board's bargaining orders.' In LICH,
the court also denied enforcement of the Board's order, but remanded the
case to the Board for reevaluation of the appropriateness of the unit' In
each case the court. noted the inconsistency and general disarray of Board
decisions in this area." Yet, despite the decisions of these circuit. courts, the
problem of the appropriateness of hospital maintenance units remains un-
resolved because of the Board's refusal to adopt a clear standard of deci-
sion-making in this area. LICH, St. Vincent's, and West Suburban are therefore
significant because they highlight the problems created by the Board's in-
consistent policy regarding separate maintenance units in health care facilities.
Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act' authorizes the Board to
designate an appropriate unit of employees for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining. In making such determinations, the Board traditionally has consid-
ered whether employees in the proposed unit share a community of in-
terest.' Using the community of interest criteria in situations where a large
number of employees were performing different. functions or were employing
different skills, the Board has found that a separate unit of maintenance
employees was an appropriate bargaining unit." The Board's discretion in
making unit determinations, as accorded in section 9(h), is limited, however.
The Board's determination will be reversed if' its decision "oversteps the
law." i"
In 1974, Congress enacted the health care amendments to the NLRA."
Although the 1974 amendments did not create special rules with respect to
unit determinations for hospital employees, the legislative history of the
amendments indicates much congressional concern with the appropriateness 12
4 St. Vincent's, 567 F.2d at 593, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2123; West Suburban, 570 F.2d
at 216, 97 1„R.R.M. at 2932.
5 566 F.2d at 846, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3128.
" See text and notes 34, 17-49 i nfra.
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). The section provides in part:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by the
[Act], the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall
be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit., or subdivision thereof ....
8 See McLean Hosp., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 97 1-R.R.M. 1322, 1323 (Jan. 25,
1978). Included in the community of interests are: mutuality of interest in wages, ben-
efits and working conditions; commonality of skills and supervision: frequency of con-
tact with other employees; lack of interchange and functional integration; and area
practice and patterns of bargaining. Id.
9 American Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 910, 48 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1152
(1961). The Board held "that maintenance employees are readily identifiable as a
group whose similarity of function and skills create a community of interest such as
would warrant separate representation. - Id.
1 " Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947); see Chemical
Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 171-72 (1971).
" Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. I.. 93-360, §§, 1(a)-(e), 88 Stat. 395 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152(14). 158(d), 158(g) (1976)).
12 See Memorial Hosp. of Roxborough v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351, 360, 93
L.R.R.M. 2571, 2577 (2c1 Cir. 1976).
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and the proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry." Con-
sequently, a court reviewing a Board unit determination must consider
whether the Board's action has overstepped congressional intent with respect.
to bargaining units in the health care industry."
As first proposed by Senator Taft in S. 2292, the 1974 health care
amendments would have placed a statutory limit of four bargaining units in
health care institutions.'' This approach was not adopted is S. 3203 which
ultimately became the law.' However, the Senate committee which consid-
ered the bill addressed the problem with language directed toward the Board:
Due consideration should be given by the Board to preventing pro-
liferation of bargaining units in the health care industry. In this
connection, the Committee notes with approval the recent Board de-
cisions in Four Seasons Nursing Center, 208 NLRB No. 50, 85 LRRM
1093 (1974), and Woodland Park Hospital, 205 NLRB No. 144, 84
LRRM 1075 (1973), as well as the trend toward broader units enun-
ciated in Extendicare of West Virginia, 203 NLRB No. 170, 83 LRRM
1242 (1973).'
1. By our reference to Extendicare, we do not necessarily ap-
prove of all of the holdings of that decision.' 7
Despite this language, the comments of Senator Williams, the chairman.of the
committee and sponsor of the legislation, clearly indicate that the Board is to
continue to utilize its own discretion and expertise in making unit determina-
13
 See, e.g., S. REF'. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [19741 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3950; H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7
(1974).
14 See Memorial Hosp. of Roxhorough v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351, 361, 93
L.R.R.M. 2571, 2578 (2d Cir. 1976).
15 See 120 CONG. REC. 12942 (1974). The appropriate units would have con-
sisted of: professional employees, technical employees, clerical employees, and service
and maintenance employees. Id.
16 Senator Taft approved of the allowance of Board flexibility in unit determi-
nation cases, but repeatedly emphasized the need to reduce and limit the number of
bargaining units in health care institutions. Senator Tall noted: "1 cannot stress
enough, however, the importance of great caution being exercised by the Board in
reviewing unit cases in this area. Unwarranted unit fragmentation leading to jurisdic-
tional disputes and work stoppages must be prevented." 120 CoNc.. REC. 12944 (1974).
17 S. REP, No. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NENkS 3946, 3950.
While this legislative history indicates approval of the Board decisions in
Woodland Park and Four Seasons, these two cases are easily distinguishable from the
maintenance unit cases discussed in this note. In Woodland Park, the Board affirmed
the Regional Director's finding of a single unit of all hospital employees and rejected
the claim that x-ray technicians had a separate community of interests from other
technical employees. 205 N.L.R.B. 888, 889, 84 L.R.R.NI, 1075. 1077 (1973). In Four
Seasons, a unit of two maintenance employees—out of a total number of 143
employees in the center—was held inappropriate because the maintenance employees
performed mainly cleaning duties. 208 N.L.R.B. 403, 403, 85 I...R.R.M. 1093, 1093-94
(1974).
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tions." Additionally, in explaining the Senate report, Congressman
Thompson noted that the committee did not intend to preclude the Board
from continuing to determine the traditional craft and departmental units,
such as stationary engineers, in the health care field.''' Thus, congressional
language suggests a policy of non-proliferation, hut does not go so far as to
The reference to the Board's decision in Extendicare has been deemed "some-
what obscure" and not dispositive of' the maintenance unit issue. See LICH, 566 F.2d at
844 n.4, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3126 n.4.
'" Senator Williams noted:
While the committee clearly intends that the Board give due consider-
ation to its admonition to avoid undue proliferation of units in the health
care industry, it did not within this framework intend to preclude the
Board acting in the public interest from exercising its specialized experi-
ence and expert knowledge in determining- appropriate bargaining units.
120 Conn.. REC. 22575 (1974) (citation omitted).
'" 120 CONC. REc. 22948 (1974). The Third Circuit in Si. Vincent's placed very
little emphasis on the remarks of Senator Williams and Congressman Thompson. See
567 F.2d at 591 97 L.R.R.M. at. 2121 n.3.
It has been argued that the remarks of Senator Williams and Congressman
Thompson are not dispositive of the legislative intent behind the 1974 amendment. See
King, Legislative Review: Is Congressional Intent Being Realized—Or Are Subsequent Changes
Needed? ill LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE IN-
DUSTRY 159-60 (A. Knapp ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS];
Emmanuel, Hospital Bargaining Unit Decisions in HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS 202-03. These
authors have not ed that the COMIlletlI s of Williams and Thompson are "post-passage"
legislative history, and under the standards of . judicial review set forth in the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974), should not be accorded any
weight. in determining legislative intent. In the Rail Reorganization Cases, the Supreme
Court indicated that "post-passage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot
serve to change the legislative intent ()I' Congress expressed before [a statute's] pas-
sage." Id. Congressman Thompson made his remarks on July 22, 1974, 120 CONG.
REC. 22948, a date subsequent to original passage ()I' the amendment by the House of
Representatives (May 30, 1974) and the House's final approval of the Conference Re-
port (July 11, 1974). Senator Williams made his statement on July 10, 1974. 120 Coxe.
REC. 22575, sixty-lOur days after the Senate's original passage of the amendment, and
on the same day as the Senate's approval of the Conference Report. See generally
(19741 U.S. Com: Coxc. & AD. NEWS 3946.
However, it is submitted that the remarks of Williams and Thompson should
not be so easily discounted. The language of the Supreme Court in the Rail Reorganiza-
tion Cases is not precisely on point in this instance. In that case, the Supreme Court
dismissed statements by Congressmen made more than live months after the enactment
of' the statute at issue. 419 U.S. at 109, 132. As authority, the Supreme Court cited its
earlier dismissal of congressional comments in a prior case where remarks had been
made eleven years after the legislation in question had been passed. Id. at 132 (citing
United States v. Mine Workers of America. 330 U.S. 258, 282 (1947)). The chronolog-
ical legislative history of the 1974 amendment, however, shows that the remarks of
both Williams and Thompson were n ettle before the legislation was signed into law by
the President, .see 120 CONG. REC. 25802 (1974), and before the statute became effective.
See note I l,supra. :Moreover, the legislators made their remarks before the Senate voted
to approve the Conference Report. 120 Coxe. REc. 22583 (1974). Senator Williams
made the remarks in issue to express his "views on certain issues raised , in light of
the bill's language. its report and the explanation by its managers." 120 Coxe. REC.
22575 (1974).
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usurp the Board's authority to make its own expert determination. Still, the
policy against undue proliferation "does constitute a Congressionally pre-
scribed factor to guide the Board in the exercise of its discretion." 2 " Con-
sequently, in considering the appropriateness of separate bargaining units for
hospital maintenance employees, the Board and the courts have had to recon-
cile traditional unit standards with Congress' indicated concerns regarding
proliferation of hospital units.
Since the adoption of the 1974 amendments, the Board has followed an
inconsistent path in determining the appropriateness of maintenance-only
units. 21 An explanation for the "disarray" of Board opinions lies in the seri-
ous divergence of opinion among Board members as to the propriety of sepa-
rate units. 22 The differing views as to the application of traditional craft unit
criteria in the context of the health care Field have caused Board members to
reach divergent factual and legal conclusions in many cases." Members
Murphy and Fanning consistently have found maintenance units appropriate
upon the showing of a separate community of interests. These members em-
phasize the application of traditional Board standards under which the exis-
tence of a separate community of interests requires the establishment of a
separate bargaining unit to represent those interests. 24 Member Penello has
enunciated a rigid standard for finding a separate craft maintenance unit ap-
propriate. Under this standard, a maintenance unit is appropriate when,
viewed in light of the traditional unit determination criteria, its establishment
does not conflict with the congressional language against proliferation of bar-
" See Memorial Hosp. of Roxborough v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351, 361, 93
L.R.R.M. 2571, 2578 (2c1 Cir. 1976).
21 The Board has rejected maintenance-only units in: Peter Bent Brigham
How., 231 N.LR.B. No. 132, 96 L.R.R.M. 1546, 1548-49 (Aug. 31, 1977); Northeast-
ern Hosp.. 230 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 95 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1466 (July 21, 1977); St. Joseph
Hosp., 224 N.L.R.B. 270, 272, 92 L.R.R.M. 1209, 1211 (1976); Riverside Methodist
Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1087, 92 L.R.R.M. 1033, 1036 (1976); Jewish Hosp. of
Cincinnati, 223 N.L.R.B. 614, 616-17, 91 L.R.R.M. 1499, 1504-05 (1976); Shriners
Hosps., 217 N.L.R.B. 806, 808, 89 L.R.R.M. 1076, 1080 (1975). The Board has ap-
proved the separate unit in: McLean Hosp., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 97 L.R.R.M. 1323,
1325 (Jan. 25, 1978); Hebrew Rehabilitation Center for the Aged, 230 N.L.R.B. No.
35, 95 L.R.R.M. 1279. 1281 (June 17, 1977); Sinai Hosp. of Detroit, 226 N.L.R.B. 425,
426, 93 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1270 (1976); Eskaton Am. River Healthcare Center, 225
N.L.R.B. 755, 757, 92 L.R.R.M. 1569, 1571 (1976); St. Francis Hosp.-Medical Center,
223 N.L.R.B. 1451, 1455, 92 L.R.R.M. 1172, 1177 (1976).
22 See UCH, 566 F.2d at 843, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3126.
22
 See, e.g., Riverside Methodist Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1084, 92 L.R.R.M. 1033
(1976). In this case, the majority's opinion emphasized that the maintenance workers
performed work of a routine and uncomplicated nature. Id, at 1087, 92 L.R.R.M. at
1036. In contrast, the dissenting opinion of Chairman Murphy and Member Fanning
emphasized that the functions and skills of the maintenance workers set them apart
from other workers. See a at 1088-89, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1038-39.
" See, e.g., Eskaton Am. River Healthcare Center, 225 N.L.R.B. 755, 756, 92
L.R.R.M. 1569, 157! (1976); St. Vincent's Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 638, 639, 91 L.R.R.M.
1513, 1513 (1976) (concurring opinion of Chairman Murphy).
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gaining units in the health care industry. 25
 Former Member Walther shared
much the same view as Member Pene110. 2 " Member Jenkins, however, has
not aligned himself on any "side" of the maintenance unit issue." It is un-
clear at this time into which "camp" Member Trues&le will fall. Because of
this division of opinions, Board decisions can be "predicted" by viewing the
composition of the panel hearing the case. For example, a three-member
panel consisting of Chairman Fanning and Members Murphy and Jenkins vir-
tually assures approval of the maintenance unit."
In LICH, the first of the Survey year decisions concerning separate hospi-
tal maintenance units, the Second Circuit examined the propriety of the
Board's adoption of a thirteen-year old certification of a separate maintenance
unit by the New York State Labor Relations Board (SLRB) at Long Island
College Hospita1. 2 " The circuit court held that the NLRB could not adopt
the SLRB's certification as its own, but rather, must make an independent
determination of unit appropriateness." The Board could not accord "co-
mity" to the state labor board's unit determination because there was a signifi-
cant difference between state and federal law; the former compelled recogni-
tion of a craft unit while the latter did not. Thus, while the SLRB, under New
York law, had to recognize a separate bargaining unit of maintenance
employees, the NLRB was under no such compulsion. 3 ' The court con-
2S Member Penello set forth his standard in his concurring opinion in St. Vin-
cent's Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 638, 639-40, 91 L.R.R.M. 1513, 1513-14 (1976). The unit
in St. Vincent's satisfied Member Penello's criteria. In other cases, this standard has not
heen met. See, e.g., Northeastern Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 95 L.R.R.M. 1465,
1466 n.8 (July 21, 1977).
26 See, e.g., St. Vincent's Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 638, 640, 91 L.R.R.M. 1513,
1514-15 (1976).
27 Compare Shriners Hosps., 217 N.L.R.B. 806, 809, 89 L.R.R.M. 1076, 1080
(1975) (concurring in result rejecting a separate maintenance unit, but not in rationale)
with Eskaton Am. River Healthcare Center, 225 N.L.R.B. 755, 756, 92 L.R.R.M. 1569,
1571 (1976) (concurring in result granting a separate bargaining unit).
" See note 23 infra.
29 Long Island College Hosp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2c1 833, 96 L.R.R.M. 3119 (2d
Cir. 1977). In 1964 the New York State Labor Relations Board (SLRB) certified a
single unit of maintenance employees at LICH. 27 S.L.R.B. 405 (1964). LICH refused
to bargain, and extended litigation, resulting in unfair labor practices being sustained
against LICH, followed. LICH entered into negotiations for a brief time, but then
discontinued bargaining since it maintained that the unit was inappropriate. Mean-
while, the health care amendments of 1974 had been enacted and the union filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the Regional Director of the NLRB. An Administra-
tive Law Judge, finding the SLRB's certification both appropriate and valid, recom-
mended a bargaining order and a broad cease and desist order. A three member panel
of the NLRB adopted the ALys recommendations. See 228 N.L.R.B. 83, 94 L.R.R.M.
1438 (1977). For a detailed account of the procedural history of the LICH dispute see
566 F.2d at 835-38, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3120-21.
" 566 F.2cl at 845, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3128.
" 1 Section 705(2) of the New York Labor Relations Law provides:
The hoard shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to
employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization, to collective
bargaining and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this article, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer
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eluded that the NLRB, in making its unit determination, had to be free from
the state policy mandating the designation of a separate craft unit. 32
A new Board determination was necessary in LICH because the Second
Circuit was unable to determine how the Board would have decided the case
free from the state ruling. Counsel for the Board argued that the Board
would have reached the same result had it determined the proper bargaining
unit without reference to the SLRB opinion." In rejecting this argument,
the court pointed to the disarray of Board decisions on the subject of separate
hospital maintenance units and specifically noted the confusion resulting from
the divergence of opinions on this issue among individual Board members."
Because of the Board's lack of a clear, established policy on the maintenance
u.iit issue, the court refused to predict how the Board would interpret federal
law in the instant case. As background to its discussion of the maintenance
unit issue, the LICH court set forth the legislative history of the 1974 amend-
ments." The court attempted to explicate the various approaches taken by
Board members in reconciling the congressional admonitions against prolifer-
ation of bargaining units in hospitals with the notion of a separate community
of interest for hospital maintenance workers." In remanding the case to the
Board for a new determination of the appropriate bargaining unit, the Sec-
ond Circuit noted that it was permissible for the Board to designate separate
maintenance units.37 Thus, the court implied that it would not overturn a
unit, multiple employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or any other unit; pro-
vided, however, that in any case where the majority of employees of a
particular craft, or in the case of a nonprofitmaking hospital or residential
care center where the majority of employees of a particular profession or craft, shall
so decide the board shall designate such profession or craft, as a unit appropriate for
the purpose of collective bargaining.
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 705(2) (McKinney 1977) (emphasis added). This section is unlike the
second proviso of section 9(b) of the NLRA which provides that the Board shall not
(2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the
ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board deter-
mination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit
vote against separate representation ...
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2) (1976). Under 1.11e New York law the majority of a craft may
mandate a separate unit; the NLRA grants no such right to members of a craft unit
nor is the NLRB compelled to recognize a craft unit.
" 566 F.2d at 843, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3126.
33 Id. In spite of the court's rejection of this point, the Board counsel's position
seems correct. When the LICH case came before the Board, the three member panel
deciding the case consisted of then-Chairman Murphy and Members Fanning and
Jenkins. 228 N.L.R.B. 83, 94 L.R.R.M. 1438 (1977). This trio of Board members con-
sistently have found separate maintenance units appropriate. See, e.g., McLean Hosp.,
234 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 97 L.R.R.M. 1323, 1325 (Jan. 25, 1978); Eskaton Am. River
Healthcare Center, 225 N.L.R.B. 755, 757, 92 L.R.R.M. 1569, 1571 (1976); Sinai




F.2d at 843, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3126.
35 Id. at 838-39, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3121-23.
36 See id. at 843-44, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3126-27.
37 Id. at 844 & n.4, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3126 & n.4. Here the court agreed with the
language of the Board in Jewish Hosp. of Cincinnati, 223 N.L.R.B. 614, 616, 91
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subsequent Board approval of a LICH maintenance unit if the Board found,
independent of the SLRB determination, that such a unit possessed a suffi-
ciently separate community of interest.
The Third Circuit, in St. Vincent's," set aside a Board order which cer-
tified a group of four boiler operators as an appropriate bargaining unit." In
a somewhat similar factual situation in West Suburban,'" the Seventh Circuit
found that the Board certification 4 r of a twenty-one member maintenance
unit violated the congressional directive of preventing proliferation of collec-
tive bargaining units in the health care field. 42 Both courts followed similar
paths of analysis in citing much of the legislative history of the 1974 amend-
ments which stressed non-proliferation of bargaining units:" Considering
these expressions M' congressional policy, the circuit courts reasoned that.
Board unit determinations could not properly be made solely on the basis of
traditional factors and standards. Rather, the courts concluded, because ordi-
nary circumstances do not exist in the health care industry, traditional criteria
must be weighed in light of the unique integration of operations performed at
the hospital." Both courts concluded that the Board's decision to allow a
separate maintenance unit was incorrect.
L.R.R.M. at 1499, 1504 (1976), where the Board noted that. Congress never specifically
precluded the NLRB from certifying separate maintenance units.
" St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2t1 588, 97 L.R.R.M. 2119 (3d Cir.
1977).
"9 See St. Vincent's Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 638, 91 L.R.R.M. 1513 (1976). The
majority opinion of the Board emphasized that the boiler operators performed a I -Unc-
tion instrinsically different from what other employees do, have very little interchange
with other employees, and are licensed. Id. at 638, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1513. In her con-
curring opinion, Chairman Murphy noted that she would continue to find appropriate
a traditional powerhouse or maintenance unit in a hospital where such a unit. is
sought. Id. at 638-39, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1513. Member Pencil°, concurring in the result,
spelled out a rigid standard for approving maintenance units in health care facilities.
This standard was met in St. Vincent's because the boiler operators were all licensed
craftsmen engaged in a traditional craft work which was performed in a separate and
distinct location from other employees. Id. at 639-40, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1513-14. Member
Walther indicated his agreement with the reasoning of Member Penello's concurring
opinion. M. at 640, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1514-15.
4 " NLRB v. West. Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 97 L.R.R.M. 2929 (7th Cir.
1978).
41 . West Suburban Hosp., 224 N.L.R.B. 1349, 92 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1976). The
Board found that a separate maintenance unit, rather than a unit of all non-
professional employees, was appropriate. Id. at 1351, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1371. The major-
ity opinion by Chairman Murphy and Members Fanning and Jenkins claimed that it
was taking into account traditional unit criteria as well as the congressional admonition
against proliferation of units in considering the appropriateness of the unit. Id. at
1349, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1369. The Seventh Circuit characterized the Board majority's
claim that it heeded congressional intent as "mere lip-service mention." 57(1 F.2d at.
216, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2931. Members Penello and Walther dissented from the majority
in West Suburban, 224 N.L.R.B, at 1351, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1371, based on their analysis of
the factual situation in light of the standards enunciated' in their separate opinions in
St. Vincent's, 223 N.I.„R,B. 638, 639-40, 91 L.R. R.M. 1513, 1513-15; see note 39 SOM.
42 570 F.2d at 216, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2931-32.
13 See St. Vincent's, 567 F.2d at 590-91, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2120-22; West Suburban,
570 F.2d at 214-15, 97 L.R.R.N.I. at 2930-31.
44 St. Vincent's, 567 F.2d at 592, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2122; West Suburban, 570 F.2d
at 215, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2931 (citing St. Vincent's, 567 F.2d at 592, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2122).
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the St. Vincent's court. suggested that the Board should employ a balanc-
ing test—weighing the public interest in preventing union fragmentation in
health care facilities against traditional craft unit indicies—in deciding
whether to allow separate maintenance units. Noting that the Board had not.
considered the public interest in preventing the proliferation of hospital bar-
gaining units before it certified the separate maintenance unit in this case, the
court refused to enforce the Board's order."' Similarly, the West Suburban
court found that the Board had failed to give "clue consideration" to prevent-
ing the proliferation of bargaining units.'" The court alluded, as had the
courts in St. Vincent's 47 and LICK,"" to the inconsistency of the Board opinions
in this area." To alleviate this "disarray" of decisions, the court suggested
"Mixing a course with guidance from the congressional directive of prevent-
ing proliferation of collective bargaining units in the health care field ....""
Thus, the Seventh Circuit seemed to favor a standard whereby separate
maintenance units would infrequently be allowed in hospitals.
The three Survey year decisions highlighted the circuit courts' dissatisfac-
tion with the Board's maintenance unit decisions. In all three cases, the courts
emphasized the need to consider the legislative history of the health care
amendments in determining the appropriateness of the bargaining unit. The
courts also stressed the need for standards for unit. determinations by which
the Board would be able to interpret properly and consistently the legislative
history and the community of interest of maintenance workers. Nevertheless,
a proper reconciliation of the legislative history and the divergent views of
individual Board members is not easy. A balance .
 must be struck between the
desire to have a fixed rule to guide Board determinations and the need to
allow the Board flexibility in its discretion as mandated in sectiOn 9(h), Despite
suggestions by the court in West Suburban that a standard of non-proliferation
should apply,'' Congress evidently intended that the Board should retain
On this point both courts cited at length from the Board's decision in Shriners Flosps.,
217 N.I...R.B. 806, 808, 89 L.R.R.M. 11)76, 1079-80 (1975).
567 1:.2d at 592-93, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2122-23. The language in the Third
Circuit's opinion regarding the issue of certification of a separate maintenance unit is
somewhat confusing. While the thrust of the opinion seems directed to the conclusion
that separate maintenance units are never appropriate, the decision also infers that the
Board erred only in failing to take into account the congressional admonitions against
proliferation of bargaining units. Although Member PeneHo discussed, this latter,
balancing process in a concurring opinion, 223 N.L.R.B. 638, 639-40, 91 L.R.R.M.
1513, 1513-14 (1976), the court only briefly acknowledged Member Penello's opinion
and seems to have accorded it little weight. See 567 F.2d. at. 589, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2120.
By thus discounting Member Penello's opinion, the court leaves in doubt the weight
accorded to a future Board determination based upon a balancing test which would
take into account indications of legislative intent.
1 " 570 F.2(1 at 216, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2932.
17 567 F.2c1 at 592 rai, 97 L. R.R. M. at. 2123 11.6.
" 566 F.2(1 at 843, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3126.
4" 570 F.2d at 216, 97 L.R.R.M, at 2932.
50 Id .
51 Id. Sec note 45 supra.
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some discretion in the unit determination area." The Board's power to
grant separate maintenance units has been acknowledged by the entire
Board.°' Yet, the nature of the health care facility does create special prob-
lems because all the employees of the hospital are, to some extent, involved in
"patient care."" Fragmentation of bargaining units would increase the possi-
bility of strikes potentially disruptive of patient care.'
It is submitted that the most effective and plausible solution to the
Board's "disarray" is the balancing test set forth in St. Vincent's by Member
l'enello. 5 " This balancing test considers the characteristics of the craft unit in
each case, but also adequately heeds the danger posed by fragmentation of"
bargaining units in the health care industry. The entire Board should direct
its decision-making along the lines of this balancing test and clarify the status
of the hospital maintenance unit.
If the Board does not enunciate a uniform policy or standard, an attempt
by the courts to impose a standard of decision-making upon the Board will
not necessarily prevent Board members from expressing their individual
ideas. The Board members' adherence to their individual views on the ap-
propriateness of separate hospital maintenance bargaining units remains un-
shaken after the courts' attempts in St. Vincent's, West Suburban and LICH to
suggest standards. One need only look at the Board decision to certify a sepa-
rate maintenance unit in McLean Hospital," filed after the issuance of the
LICH and St. Vincent's opinions, to find that the Board and its members are
continuing to follow their own individual standards to determine unit appro-
priateness.
b. Housestaff—ln 1976, in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 58 the NLRB held
that hospital "housestalf"—medical residents and clinical fellows associated
with hospitals—were engaged primarily in graduate educational training, and
" See text and notes 18-20 supra.
53 Jewish Hosp. of Cincinnati, 223 N.L.R.B. 614, 616, 91 L.R.R.M. 1499, 1504
(1976) (separate maintenance unit denied).
54 See Mount Airy Psychiatric Center, 217 N.L.R.B. 802, 802, 89 L.R.R.M.
1067, 1068 (1975).
One further consideration noted by former Member Walther regarding the
separate maintenance unit issue should be mentioned. An Equal Employment. Oppor-
tunity Commission survey of hospital personnel in 1974 showed that the percentage of
blacks in hospital service jobs is more than double the percentage of blacks in craft
jobs. Minorities filled 16.8% of hospital maintenance positions and 34.3% of service
positions. Member Walther suggested that the certification of a separate maintenance
unit insulates an exclusive seniority and hiring hall arrangement, thus frustrating
minority employees' attempts to gain admission to or to transfer into the primarily
white maintenance departments. Consequently, the Board, by granting separate
maintenance units, may be unconsciously perpetuating racial discrimination in hospital
hiring. This issue has never been faced squarely by the Board, however. See Walther,
The Course of Charted and Uncharted Waters in HEAL:Ill CARE PROBLEMS, SUPra note 19, at
71.
5" See text and note 25 supra.
57 234 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 97 L.R.R.M. 1323, 1325 (Jan. 25, 1978).
" 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 91 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1976).
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thus were students rather than employees within the scope of the NLRA. 59
Consequently, the Board refused to certify a prospective bargaining unit of
housestaff. Decisions following Cedars-Sinai'i° confirmed that the Board was
establishing a policy that collective bargaining rights would not be extended to
housestaff. This policy withstood three attacks by the Committee of Interns
and Residents (CIR) during this past Survey year.
In the first attack, the CIR sought reconsideration of the Cedars-Sinai pol-
icy in St. Clare's Hospital." The Board, however, refused to renounce its posi-
tion. It reemphasized that Cedars-Sinai was not a decision about the health
care industry, but primarily a decision about students." The Board con-
trasted at length the educational process with the collective bargaining process
and concluded that collective bargaining should not be applied to what. is
fundamentally an educational relationship." Chairman Fanning, a dissenter
in the Cedars-Sinai decision, issued a lengthy dissent in St. Clare's" in which he
criticized both Cedars-Sinai and the- majority's "student-employee" analysis.
Chairman Fanning was particularly critical of some confusing language in the
majority's opinion to the effect that housestaff, while not "employees" under
the NLRA, are not beyond the reach of national labor regulation; rather, the
extension of bargaining rights to housestaff is contrary to national labor pol-
icy. 65
 Chairman Fanning found it anomalous that the Board could claim that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over housestaff since they were not
employees, yet, at the same time, claim jurisdiction to deny housestaff cover-
age under the Act."
Like the CIR's first attempt in St. Clare's, the CIR's second attempt to gain
recognition as a labor organization proved unsuccessful. In NLRB v. Committee
of Interns and Residents," the CIR filed an election petition with the New York
State Labor Relations Board. In the ensuing litigation, the NLRB unsuccess-
fully moved to enjoin such an election in federal district court."" Pointing to
the language of Cedars-Sinai and its progeny, the district judge reasoned that.
because housestaff were not "employees" under the NLRA, the NLRB had no
jurisdiction at all in this matter." 9 Since state labor relations boards are free
to regulate in areas where the NLRB has no jurisdiction, the state and the
59 Id. at 254, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1401. For a complete discussion of the Cedars-
Sinai decision, see 1975-1976 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 17 B.C. IND. & Com. I.. REV. 1041, 1105 (1976).
" See, e.g., Kansas City Gen. Hosp. (Kansa.s. City II), 225 N.L.R.B. No. 14A, 93
L.R.R.M. 1362, 1364 (Nov. 8, 1976).
' I 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 95 L.R.R.M. 1180 (1977).
62 Id. at 1000, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1181.
63 Id. at 1004, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1185.
64 Id. at 1005, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1186.
65 Id. at 1003-04, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1184-85.
66 Id. at 1005 n.38, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1187 n.38 (Fanning, Chairman, dissenting).
87 566 F.2d 810, 96 L.R.R.M. 2343 (2d Cir. 1977).
68 NLRB v. Committee of Interns and Residents, 426 F. Stapp. 438, 94
L.R.R.M. 2739 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
89 Id. at 442, 449, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2742. 2747.
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state labor board properly exercised jurisdiction over housestalf. 7 " Thus, the
district court judge denied the NLRB's request. for an injunction.n
The Second Circuit reversed the holding of the district court. It reasoned
that the exclusion of housestaff from "employee" status was part of the na-
tional labor policy," Thus, as the Board in St. Clare's noted, housestaff are
not beyond the reach of the NLRB and the Board has not ceded jurisdic-
tion over them simply because it did not extend bargaining rights to house-
staff. The circuit court held, therefore, that preemption prevented the Cl R
from circumventing this national policy by proceeding through the state labor
relations board. 73 the Second Circuit. was careful to note that it was not pas-
sing on the wisdom of the Cedars-Sinai decision.'" Nevertheless, the CIR
again met with defeat.
The third attack by the CIR on the Cedars-Sinai decision ultimately failed
as well. The CIR instituted suit in federal district court. to vacate the NLRB's
dismissal of a representation petition, and to order the board to assume juris-
diction over housestaff. The district court in Physicians National House Staff
Association v. Murphy 75 held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. It
noted that under the NLRA district court review of a Board order is Very
limited unless an unfair labor practice is asserted.``' In the instant. case, the
challenged NLRB order was a purely representational matter." Con-
sequently, review was precluded absent the presence of exceptional cir-
cumstances which would warrant the district court's assuming jurisdiction to
review the Board decision.'" The district court in House Staff found that such
exceptional circumstances did not exist. in this case. 7 " Thus, the court held
that the status of housestaff was primarily a factual determination left to the
discretion of the Board since there existed no statutory mandate that house-
staff members be treated as employees under the NLRA.""
Thus, the three attempts by the Cl R to overturn the Cedars-Sinai
decision—reconsideration of the decision by the Board, state labor board cer-
tification of' the CIR, and federal district court review of the Board's
orders—all failed. It appears that the CIR will remain unable to secure judi-
cial review of Cedars-Sinai as long as it is denied "labor organization - status,"
7" Id. it 453, 94 L.R.R.M. at '2,751.
" id.
72 566 F.211 at 815-16, 96 1...R.R.M. at 2346.
" Id.
74 Id. at 816, 96 L.R.R.IM. at 2347.
443 F. Supp. 806, 811. 97 1..R.R.M. 2444, 2447 (1).D.C. 1978).
Id. at 808, 97 L. R.R. M. at 2145.
"
" Id. Such "extraordinary circumstances" exist either when the NLRB order
was in excess of the Board's delegated power or when the case presented a public
question of national importance. See id. at 809, 97 I..R.R.M. at 2146.
7 " 443 F. Supp. at 810-11, 97 1..R.R.M. at 2447.
s" Id. at 811. 97 1..R.R.M. at 2447.
" Since, by delinition, a "labor organization" is composed of those deemed to
he "employees" under the Act, see 29 § 152(5) (1976), the denial of employee
status to the interns and residents necessarily prevents their "union - from being consi-
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since only a "labor organization - may commit an unfair labor practice or as-
sert that such a practice has been committed against it, and thereby obtain
court review of the decision. The limits on district court review indicate that
Cedars-Sinai, though much criticized." will remain as Board and national labor
policy.
Nevertheless the CIR may meet with success through an entirely differ-
ent avenue. Congress is presently considering legislation requiring recogni-
tion of housestaff and overruling Cedars-Sinai. A recent hill, introduced in the
House of Representatives,'" would modify section 2(12)(h) of the NLRA 84
and would include medical interns and residents within the definition of pro-
fessional employees covered by the Act. If passed, approximately 60,000 in-
terns and residents will enjoy the sought-after collective bargaining rights."
III. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
I. Successor Employers: Pacific Hide & Fur
In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
held that a successor employer must bargain with the representative of his
predecessor's employees if a majority of the successor's workforce consists of
holdover employees.' in the six years since Burns, the Board and the courts
have struggled to interpret that case. They have focused in particular upon
the following statement by the Burns Court:
Although a successor employer is ordinarily free to set initial terms
on which it will hire the employees of a predecessor, there will be
instances in which it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to
retain all of the employees in the unit and in which it will he ap-
propriate to have him initially consult with the employees' bargaining
representative before he fixes terms. In other situations, however, it
may not be clear until the successor employer has hired his full complement
of employees that he has a duty to bargain with a union, since it will
not be evident until then that the bargaining representative repre-
sents a majority of the employees in the unit .... 3
tiered a "labor organization.'• See 1975-1976 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and
Employment Discrimination Law, 17 B.C. INaf. & Com. L. REA, . 1041, 1114 (1976).
" For criticism of Cedars-Sinai see Gordon, Hospital Housestalf Collective Bargain-
ing, I EMPLOYEE REL. I.. J. 418 (1976): Thompson, The View From the House of Represen-
tatives in HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS, supra note 19, at 141.





" See 97 LAB. REL. REP. (11NA) 165 (Feb. 27, 1978). The bill was reported to
the House on March 16, 1978. H.R. REP. No. 980. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
406 U.S. 272 (1972). See generally 1972-1973 Annual Survey of Labor Relations .
and Employment Di,scrimination Law, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1209 (1973).
2 406 U.S. at 281.
8 Id. at 294-95 (1972) (emphasis added).
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During this Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB,' grappled with the meaning
and application of the phrase "full complement of employees." The Ninth
Circuit is the first court to consider this question.' The court concluded that
"full complement of employees" refers to the workforce needed to maintain .
the successor employer's desired production level, regardless of the size of the
successor's workforce when it begins production or when the union demands
recognition."
The successorship issue in Pacific Hide & Fur arose in a situation similar
to many others involving successor employers. Cohen Trading Company (Ca-
hen), a processor of fresh hides, employed between twelve and eighteen
employees.' For over twenty years, Cohen had recognized and bargained
with the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen (the union). In
March, 1975, Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. (Pacific) acquired Cohen 8 and
hired seven of Cahen's employees." Pacific subsequently hired three addi-
tional employees, none of whom had worked previously for Cahen.' ° On
April 17, when the union demanded recognition, a majority of Pacific's
employees were former Cohen employees. Pacific refused the union's de-
mand." Over the next several weeks, Pacific hired additional employees,
none of whom had worked for Cohen, until Pacific's workforce reached
nineteen—seven former Cahen employees and twelve new employees." Thus,
by the time Pacific had hired what it considered as its "full complement of
employees," former Cahen employees no longer composed a majority of the
workforce. Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge held, and the NLRB
agreed, that Pacific was under an obligation to bargain with the union." On
review, the Ninth Circuit set aside the NLRB's decision."
553 F.2d 609, 95 L.R.R.M. 2467 (9th Cir. 1977).
5 Id. at 612, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2469.
6 Id. at 614, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2471.
Id. at 610, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2468.
11 Id. Pacific purchased Cahen's tangible personal property. A corporation re-
lated to Pacific purchased Cahen's real property and leased it to Pacific. Id.
" Id. at 610-11, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2468.
" Id. at 611, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2468.
" Id. The last collective bargaining agreement between the union and Cahen
contained no provision making it binding upon Cahen's successors or assigns, or refer-
ring to the possibility of a sale or liquidation of Cahen. Id.
12 Id. There was no contention that Pacific's hiring practices were motivated by
antiunion bias. Id.
13 Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1029, 92 L.R.R.M. 1063
(1976). An earlier Board decision, Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194, 85 L.R.R.M.
1426 (1974), suggested the position the Board took in Pacific Hide & Fur. In Spruce Up,
the successor employer initially hired more new employees than former employees of
the predecessor. Within several weeks, however, subsequent hiring of some of the pre-
decessor's employees resulted in the holdover employees constituting a majority of the
unit. Id. at 194, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1427. The Board held that the successor was under an
obligation to bargain with the prior union and stated in dictum:
[W]e would find that at such time as the hiring engaged in by the successor results
in a reestablishment of a majority in the preexisting unit there arises a pre-
sumption of continuing majority status. If, after that point has been
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The Ninth Circuit began its inquiry into whether Pacific, as Cahen's suc-
cessor, had a duty to bargain with the union by reviewing established succes-
sorship law. The court noted that the first test of a duty to bargain with a
prior union is whether the successor continues to conduct. the same business
as its predecessor so far as the work of the employees in the unit are con-
cerned." If the successor's business is not essentially the same as that of the
predecessor, no duty to bargain arises." However, if the successor's business
reached, new facts and circumstances arise which under our usual tests
would provide the Employer with objective evidence casting doubt on the
continuance of the majority status, he might be justified in putting the
Union to the test of demonstrating its majority through a Board election or
otherwise.
Id. at 196, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1429 (emphasis added).
' 4
 553 F.2d at 614, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2471 (9th Cir. 1977).
15 Id. at 611, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2468. See NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 3,
92 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2003 (1st Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Daneker Clock Co., 516 F.2d 315,
316, 89 L.R.R.M. 2325, 2326 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424
F.2d 1159, 1162, 74 L.R.R.M. 2084, 2087 (5th Cir. 1970); Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc.
v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025, 1026-27, 73 L.R.R.M. 2020, 2020 (7th Cir. 1969). Factors
considered in determining whether a change in ownership has affected the essential
nature of the enterprise include: the operational structure of the business (product
lines and departmental organization), NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d at 1162, 74
L.R.R.M. at 2087, employee-job identity, id., number of employees and size of opera-
tion, id.; but cf. NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d at 6, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2003 (diminu-
tion in size of predecessor's operations after the take-over does not preclude finding of
successorship), continuity of operations, id. at 5, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2005; but cf. NLRB v.
Daneker Clock Co., 516 F.2d at 316, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2326 (8 month hiatus between the
operations of the old and new employers does not preclude finding of successorship),
and the "totality of circumstances," Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant
Employees and Bartenders, 417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974); NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 543
F.2d at 3, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
The Supreme Court has implied that the successor's business must be essentially
the same as that of the predecessor's before courts can require a successor to bargain
with the union; otherwise, the bargaining unit which the union represents may not be
appropriate. Cf. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280 (1972)
(similarity between the successor's and predecessor's operations was important factor in
ascertaining the continued appropriateness of the bargaining unit and, thus, the suc-
cessor's duty to bargain with the union). In other words, for the Supreme Court, the
ultimate consideration is whether the bargaining unit remains appropriate after the
take-over; whether the successor's business is essentially the same as that of the pre-
decessor is a factor in determining the continued appropriateness of the bargaining
unit. At least one other court, however, takes the opposite view. It contends that the
ultimate consideration is whether the successor's business is essentially the same as that
of the predecessor; whether the bargaining unit remains appropriate after the succes-
sor takes over is merely a factor in determining the sameness of the business. See
NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d at 3, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2003 (1st Cir. 1976). The
Board appears to be confused. See, e.g., Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194, 196, 85
L.R.R.M. 1426, 1428-29 (1974); see note 13 .supra.
' 6 See NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 3, 92 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2003 (1st
Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Daneker Clock Co., 516 F.2d 315, 316, 89 L.R.R.M. 2325, 2326
(4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159, 1162, 74 L.R.R.M.
2084, 2087 (5th Cir. 1970) (pre-Burns decision).
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is essentially the same as that of the predecessor, then the court must decide if
the second test of successorship—whether there is an identity between the
predecessor's and the successor's workforce—is met." Generally, if a major-
ity of the successor's employees arc not former employees of the predecessor,
the successor has no duty to bargain with the union.' If, however, a major-
ity of the successor's employees are former employees of the predecessor, the
successor has a duty to bargain with the union."
Although the Ninth Circuit easily determined that. Pacific satisfied the
first test of successorship, since Pacific conducted essentially the same business
as Cahen, 20 the court found it less clear that Pacific met the second test. While
the majority of Pacific's employees were former Cahen employees when
Pacific began its operations and when the union first demanded recognition,
because of subsequent hiring the majority of Pacific's employees were not
former Cahen employees by the time Pacific reached what it considered to be
its full workforce. The question facing the court, therefore, was when should
the court examine the composition of the workforce to ascertain whether
Pacific had a duty to bargain with the union)`
Although the court did not specify the precise date on which it was ap-
propriate to examine the composition of Pacific's workforce," it adopted the
suggestion in the Supreme Court's decision of Burns that a court should con-
sider the composition of a successor's workforce once the successor has hired
its "full complement of employees."" According to the Ninth Circuit, the
determination of when an employer has hired a "full complement of
17 See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 (1972);
Nazareth Regional High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 879, 94 L.R.R.M. 2897, 2900
(2d Cir. 1977).
18 Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders,
417 U.S. 249, 264-65 (1974); see NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S.
272, 281 (1972); cf. NLRB v. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc., 338 F.2d 833, 836, 57
L.R.R.M. 2442, 2442 (9th Cir. 1964) (pre -Burns decision).
It is possible that a majority of the successor's employees will not be former
employees of the predecessor since a successor employer need not hire the predeces-
sor's employees absent an agreement. to do so. Howard Johnson Co._ v. Hotel and
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders, 417 U.S. at 261; NLRB v. Burns Intl Security
Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. at 272-73 n.5. However, it is an unfair labor practice to refuse to
hire employees solely because of their affiliation with a union. Id.; Pacific Hide & Fur
Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d at 611, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2468.
'" NLRB v. Burns Intl Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 278, 281 (1972).
This rule is based on the assumption that the holdover majority continues to desire
union representation. Id. See NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d I, 4, 92 L.R.R.M.
2001, 2004 (Isl. Cir. 1976); Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194, 196, 85 L.R.R.M.
1426, 1429 (1974).
2" 553 F.2d at 611, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2468.
21 Id. at 612, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2469.
22 Id. at 614 n.3, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2471 n.3.
2' Id. at 612 & n.2, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2469 & n.2. Although, as the court in
Pacific. Hide 3 Fur notes, the "full complement" sentence in Burns is dictum, the court
gives weight to this language because it "appears to be a carefully formulated stan-
dard." Id.
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employees" cannot be made "by the application of a mathematical formula but
only by considering the facts of each case ...." 24
 The important facts in
Pacific Hide & Fur included Pacific's method of operation and the level of
output which Pacific could maintain:25
 Based on these facts, the court con-
cluded that Pacific reached its "full complement of employees" at a time after
former Cahen employees ceased to command a majority of the unit. 2 " Con-
sequently, the court held that. Pacific had no duty to bargain with the union."
Although the Ninth Circuit did not elaborate on its reasoning in Pacific
Hide & Fur, it is submittecl that the decision is correct given the policy under-
lying sections 7 2 ' and 9(a) 2"
 of the National Labor Relations Act. Section 7
provides, in pertinent part, that "felmployees shall have the right ... to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing ....""" Sec-
tion 7, by implication, also protects employees from being forced to accept a
bargaining representative whom they did not select..` Section 9(a) qualifies
this right by providing that a union chosen by a majority of the employees in a
bargaining unit shall represent all employees of the unit, including those who
did not vote for the union." 2 Thus, a tension runs throughout representation
cases between the "majority rule" established in section 9(a) and the
employees' right not to be forced to accept a union that they did not choose.
In cases involving successor employers, this tension is particularly apparent
because, as the court in Pacific Hide & Fur observed, any decision regarding
the employer's duty to bargain with the union affects the new employer, the
old employees whom he has hired, and the new employees who were not
previously represented by the union. The rights of all three must be consid-
ered." "" Thus, when faced with a decision involving a successor employer,
24
 Id. at 613, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2470.
25 ht. at 614 n.3, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2471 n.3.
21' Id.
27 Id. at 614, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2471. The court rejected the Administrative Law
Judge's contention that if a' successor employer can wait until it has hired what it
considers to he a full complement of employees before determining whether the union
enjoys majority support in the new unit, the successor can postpone bargaining with
the union arid, thus, "escape" its obligation. Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 2470. The court con-
cluded that the Administrative Law Judge's decision simply begged the question by
presupposing the existence of an obligation to bargain. The real question, the court
stated, is whether the obligation exists at all. Id.
The fears implicit in the Administrative Law Judge's opinion—that employers will
try to avoid successorship obligations by over-hiring to dilute the percentage of the
predecessor's employees in the work force, or that employers will delay hiring a full
complement of employees to postpone their obligation to bargain with the union—are
unfounded. An employer who engages in either conduct would be subject to unfair
labor practice charges under § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) (making it an un-
fair labor practice for an employer to restrain employees in the exercise of their § 7
rights), and § 8(a)(5), 29 § I58(a)(5) (1976) (making it an unfair labor practice
tot an employer to refuse to bargain with its employees' bargaining representative).
" 29	 § 157 (1976).
2" 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
2  29	 § 157 (1976).
"2 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
553 F.2d at 612, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2469.
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the court must respect not only the section 9(a) rights of the predecessor's
employees to be represented by their chosen representative, but also the sec-
tion 7 rights of the new employees not to be forced to accept a representative
whom they did riot choose.
Moreover, when faced with a successorship situation, the court must con-
sider that the purpose of section 7 is to allow employees to choose a bargain-
ing representative primarily "for the purpose of collective bargaining" with
the employer." As the court in Pacific Hide & Fur implicitly recognized, it is
irrelevant that the union did enjoy majority support among Pacific's
employees at one point; it is important, however, that the union did not enjoy
majority support among Pacific's employees by the time bargaining would
have begun. Thus, the court correctly balanced the section 7 rights of the new
employees against those of the former Cahen employees and protected the
right of the majority to choose their own bargaining representative."
B. Union Unfair Labor Practices
1. Recognitional Picketing: Iron Workers; Teamsters Local 344
a. Picketing To Enforce Prehire Agreement—Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a noncertified
union to picket an employer, where an object of the picketing is to obtain
employer recognition, unless the union files an election petition within 30
clays after the start of picketing.' In enacting section 8(b)(7)(C) as part of' the
34 29 U.S.C.	 157 (1976).
35 Furthermore, Pacific Hide & Fur's holding that the court will not look at the
composition of a successor's workforce to see if it has a duty to bargain with a union
until the successor has hired its "full complement of employees," parallels the rule
regarding the timing of representation elections where the employer is planning an
expansion of its workforce. This latter rule is aptly stated in K -P Hydraulics Co., 219
N.L.R.B. 138, 89 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1975): •
Normally, where a finding is made that the requested unit is expanding in
size and/or changing its basic character to such an extent. that the present
complement of employees is not substantial and representative in relation
to that projected for the reasonably foreseeable future, the Board does not.
direct an election but dismisses the petition as untimely filed.
Id. at 138, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1601. Accord, World So. Corp., 215 N.L.R.B. 287, 287, 87
L.R.R.M. 1633, 1633-34 (1974) (regional director erred in directing election where
employer planned to expand workforce from 297 to 455 within 3 months); Mil!brook,
Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 1148, 1149, 83 L.R.R.M. 1482, 1483 (1973) (election deferred until
seasonal fruit processing business was at its peak production level).
' 29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). Section 8(b)(7)(C) provides in Pertinent
part:
(h) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
....
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause
to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or
requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organiza-
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Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 2 Congress sought
to preserve majority choice of bargaining representatives. Section 8(b)(7)(C)
safeguards majority choice by preventing unions from engaging in "top
down" organizing campaigns whereby unions use "economic weapons to force
recognition from an employer regardless of the wishes of his employees."" At
the same time Congress enacted section 8(b)(7)(C), it also enacted section
8(f). 4
 Section 8(f) makes it lawful for employers and unions in the construc-
tion industry to enter into prehire agreements '' despite lack of majority
status.° Congress passed section 8(f) because it perceived structural aspects of
tion as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the
employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization
as their collective bargaining representative unless such labor organiza-
tion is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without( a petition
under section 159(c) of this title being filed within a reasonable period
of' time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such
picketing . „ : Provided, That when such a petition has been filed the
Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section
159(c)(1) of this title or the absence of a showing of a substantial in-
terest on the pan of the labor organization, direct an election in such
unit as the Board finds to he appropriate and shall certify the results
thereof: Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall
be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the pur-
pose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an
employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a
labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any
individual employed by any other person in the course of his employ-
ment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perfOrm
any services.
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act
which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this subsec-
tion.
2
 Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544 (1959).
• Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 632 (1975).
• Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 705(a), 73 Stat. 545 (1959).
5
 A prehire agreement is generally negotiated between a building and trades
employer and a building and trades union prior to the start of a construction project.
Therefore, when the agreement is executed, none or' very few of the workers in the
bargaining unit have been hired.
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(1) (1976). Section 8(1) provides:
(1) It shall not he an unfair labor practice under' subsections (a) and (h)
of this section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and con-
struction industry to make an agreement covering etoployees engaged (or
who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building-
 and con-
struction industry with a labor organization of which building and con-
struction employees are members (1101. established, maintained, or assisted
by any action defined in subsection (a) of this section as an unfair labor
practice) because (1) the majority status of' such labor organization has not
been established under the provisions of section  159 of this title prior to
the making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a condi-
tion of employment, membership in such labor organization after the
seventh day following the beginning of such employment or' the effective
date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires
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the construction industry which require relaxation of the rule that only unions
having majority status may negotiate employment agreements.'
The legislative objectives of sections 8(b)(7)(C) and 8(f) conflict when a
minority union pickets a construction industry employer to enforce a lawful
prehire agreement. During the Survey year, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v.
Local 103, Iron Workers," resolved this conflict between sections 8(b)(7)(C) and
8(0 by upholding the National Labor Relations Board's decision in Iron Work-
ers, Local 103,• that picketing by a minority union to enforce a valid section
8(1) agreement violates section 8(b)(7)(C). 1 " In condemning such picketing as
an unfair labor practice. Iron Workers overrules sub silcntio a prior Board de-
cision, Building and Construction Trades Council (Sullivan Electric Co.)."
In Iron Workers, the employer, Higdon Construction Company, and the
union, Local 103 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural & Or-
namental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, executed a lawful prehire agreement.
without. a union security clause." To avoid adhering to the terms of this
agreement and to employ nonunion labor on certain projects, Higdon Con-
struction organized a separate corporation, Higdon Contracting Company, to .
operate these Projects.'" Local 103 never attained majority status, nor did it
petition the Board for representational elections at any of the Higdon Con-
tracting sites." However, Local 103 picketed the disputed sites for over
thirty days, claiming Higdon Construction had violated its agreement." ht
the employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities for
employment with such employer, or gives such labor organization an op-
portunity to refer qualified applicants for such employment, or (4) such
agreement specifies minimum training- or experience qualifications for
employment or provides for priority in opportunities for employment
based upon length of service with such employer, in the industry or in the
particular geographical area: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall
set aside the final proviso to subsection (a)(3) of this section: Provhled
further, That any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (I) of
this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section
159(c) or 159(c) or this title.
S. REP. No. 187, 8601 Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinter/ in 1 NLRB, 1,Ems-
LATivE HisToRy of the LABOR-MANAGEMENT RE.PoRTING and DiscLosuRE AGE of 1959,
at 451-52 (1959) 'hereinafter cited as 1...Ecista•rivr., Has - roxYl.
8 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
216 N.L.R.R. -15, 88 1..R.R.11. 1067 (1975).
" h/. 434 U.S. at 350.
" 146 N.1,,R.B. 1086. 56 1..R.R.M. 1010 (1964). For further discussion of Sul-
livan Electric see note 63 iry'ra
216 N.1„R.1i. at 45, 88 1..R.R.N1. at 10117 (1975). A union security clause
requires every employee hired to join the union within a specified period of time,
usually seven days in the construction industry. lf the employee does nut comply, the
union may have hint removed from his job. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a)(3), (i) (1976).
216 N.L.R.B. at 45 & n.2, 88 1..R.R.N1, at 1067-68 & n.2. The Board Found
Higdon Contracting to be an alter ego of Higdon Construction and, therefore, subject
to the prehire agreement signed by Higdon Construction if the agreement was en-
forceable. ht. at 4(1, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1069.
' 4
 N. at 45-46, 88 1..R.R.NI. at 1067-68.
15 Id. at 45, 88 1..R.R.M. at 1068.
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response, Higdon Contracting filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging
violation of 8(b)(7)(C). 1 "
In concluding that the union's picketing was illegal, the Board stressed
the limitations of section 8(1)'s exception to the principle of majority represen-
tation. It noted that prehire agreements are not enfOrceable through section
8(a)(5) proceedings.' Rather, a union must attain majority status at a particu-
lar project after employees for that project have been hired.'" Until that
time, the contract is voidable by either party.'" Extending these principles to
Local 103's actions, the Board observed that it would be anomalous to allow
the union to picket to enforce an agreement it could not enforce by obtaining
a section 8(a)(5) bargaining order." Since the union's picketing was aimed at
enforcing a voidable contract, the Board found that the picketing was fin
recognitional purposes. Thus, the Board concluded that. Local 103 violated
section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act by picketing at Higdon Contracting's nonunion
projects. 2 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia summar-
ily reversed the Board's decision," adhering to its position in a former case"
that section 8(1) agreements are not voidable befOre a union demonstrates
majority status." Consequently, the circuit court refused to enforce the
Board's order against Local 103 25
 and instead held that Higdon violated sec-
tion 8(a)(5) when it refused to bargain with Local 103. 2 "
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reinstated the Board's decision that.
picketing by a minority union to enforce a prehire comma is an unfair labor
practice in violation of section 8(b)(7)(C)." In so doing, the Supreme Court
first examined the reasoning behind the Board's decision. The Court deter-
mined that "the Board's position is rooted in the generally prevailing statutory
policy that a union should not purport to act as the collective-bargaining
agent. for all unit employees, and may not be recognized as such, unless it is
the voice of the majority of employees in the unit."'" While acknowledging
16 Id. at 47, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1069.
' 7 See R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 693, 695, 77 L.R.R.M. 1493,
1494, 1496 (1971), enforcement denied sub nem. Local 150, 1ne1 Union of Operating
Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 83 L.R.R.M. 2706 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (union without
majority status unsuccessfully charged employer with § 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice for
violation of a § 8(f) prehire agreement).
18 216 N.L.R.B. at 46 Sc n.5, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1068-69 Sc 11.5.




22 Local 103, Intl Ass'n of Iron Workers v. NLRB, 535 F.2d 87, 90, 91
L.R.R.M. 2986, 2988-89 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
2' Local 150, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 83
L.R.R.M. 2706 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'g R.J. Smith Cons tr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 77
L.R.R.M. 1493 (1971).
24 535 F.2d at 90, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2989.
25 Id .
25 id .
27 434 U.S. at 350.
28, Id. at 344 (citing International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB,
366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961)).
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that section 8(f) is an exception to the rule against execution of a contract
with a minority union, the Court pointed out that. the exception is limited.
Specifically, the Court noted that, unlike a collective bargaining agreement, a
prehire contract is not a bar to an election petition to test a union's majority
status. 2 " This limitation on section 8(1) had previously led the Board to con-
clude in R.I. Smith Construction Co. 3 " that an employer's refusal to abide by a
section 8(1) prehire contract does not constitute an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a)(5) unless the union can demonstrate its majority status. 3 '
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Board had applied this same limited
view of section 8(f) in deciding Iron Workers. 'L In the Board's view, a con-
struction employer can challenge a picketing union's majority status by filing a
section 8(b)(7)(C) charge and will prevail unless the union has majority sup-
port." The Supreme Court determined that. In:'wiling in the language or
purposes of either § 8(f) or § 8(h)(7) forecloses this application of the stat-
u te. 34
Addressing the proper standard for reviewing Board decisions, the Su-
preme Court noted that Congress entrusted the Board with the responsibility
of striking the proper balance between sections of the Act in order to effec-
tuate national labor policy." Thus, when a court is called upon to review a
Board decision, the scope of review is limited to the question whether the
Board's interpretation is reasonable in light. of the purpose of the Act and
consistent with relevant legislative history." The court cannot disturb the
Board's interpretation simply because the court does not consider the Board's
interpretation to be the best one possible." Turning to the case at hand, the
Court concluded that the Board's reconciliation of sections 8(f) and 8(b)(7)(C),
although not the only possible interpretation, was a fair construction and
therefore entitled to deference."' The Court acknowledged that the Board's
decision in Iron Workers might be inconsistent with prior Board precedent,"
but remarked that an agency is entitled to change its mind. 40 When an
29
 434 U.S. at 345. Section 8(f) contains a proviso which declares that a § 8(f)
prehire contract "shall not be a bar to a petition tiled pursuant to section [9(c)] or
19(e))." 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
3° 91 N.L.R.B. 693, 77 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1971).
3 ' Id. at 695, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1496.
32




35 Id. at 350.
36 Id. at 346. See notes 43-44 infra.
37 Id. at 350.
38
 Id.
38 Id. at 350-51. The Court referred to Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B.
1384, 53 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1963), which involved a charge brought under §§ 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(2) against an employer based on the employer's repudiation of its prehire agree-
ment with the union. Id. at 1385-86, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1236-37. In that case, the Board
found that a valid § 8(f) contract hound the employer with the union until the termi-
nation date although the union had not demonstrated its majority status. Id. at 1387,
53 L.R.R.M. at 1238.
46
 434 U.S: at 351.
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agency does alter its position, a court's function is still only one of review; it
does not consider the issue de novo. 4 '
The Supreme Court's decision in Iron Workers reveals the Court's expand-
ing policy of allowing the Board substantial discretion in its interpretation of
the National Labor Relations Act." In the past, the Court has deferred to
the Board's expertise when the Board's interpretation is consistent with con-
gressional intent." Conversely, the Court has refused to defer when the
Board's decision is inconsistent with the legislative history and purpose of the
Act." It is submitted that the Court should not have deferred to the Board
in this case because the Board's decision conflicts with the policies embodied
in the National Labor Relations Act.
The strongest indication that section 8(f) was intended to be a broad
exception to the rule of majority choice is found in the report by the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. This report states that Irlepresenta-
tion elections in a large segment of the [construction] industry are not feasible
to demonstrate such majority status due to the short periods of actual
employment by specific employers."" The report also asserts that the bill's
supporters were not concerned with the union's majority status under a pre-
hire agreement because "tiff the employer relies upon this pool of skilled
craftsmen, members of the union, there is no doubt under these cir-
cumstances that the union will in fact represent a majority of the employees
eventually hired."" Thus, the Senate committee report refutes the Board's
present posture that the Act cannot countenance enforcement of a prehire
agreement where the union lacks majority status.
There is other legislative history which also undercuts the Board's narrow
view of section 8(f). Proponents of section 8(f) in the House of Representa-
Id.
42 See, e.g., Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977); NLRB v.
Pipefitters Local 638 (Enterprise Ass'n), 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
The applicable standard is set forth in Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411-13
(1941). Gray applied a two-tiered test for reviewing an agency's interpretation and ap-
plication of the statute which it administers. A court first must question whether the
agency is acting within the broad area entrusted to it by Congress. Id. at 413. This
question in turn involves two distinct inquiries: whether the agency correctly perceives
the parameters of the statutory term it is applying in light of the underlying rationale
of the statutory scheme; and, whether the area is one in which Congress intended the
agency to fill the interstices left by broad or vague statutory language. Nathanson,
Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470, 473-75
(1950). If both branches'of this first question have been answered affirmatively, the
court then examines whether there is a rational basis for the agency's application of a
statutory standard to a particular factual situation. 314 U.S. at 413. See Note, Secondary
Boycotts—NLRB Right-to-Control Analysis of Work-Preservation Disputes: Enterprise Associ-
ation, 1976-1977 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 18
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1047, 1057 (1977).
44
 See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' 1nel Union, 361 U.S. 477, 498, 500
(1960) (Court refused to uphold Board's interpretation because the interpretaion fell
outside policies delineated by the NLRA).
" S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in I LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 424.
46 S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 424.
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Lives explained that they rejected a requirement of union certification by a
majority of construction employees because the NLRB would be swamped
with jurisdictional disputes if unions had to conduct representational elections
for every project." And while opponents of section 8(f), such as Senator
Goldwater, objected to the provision because it eliminated the requirement of
majority support for a union which obtained a prehire agreement," their
objections were not heeded. Moreover, attempts to narrow section 8(f)'s ex-
ception to the usual rule of majority choice of bargaining representatives were
unsuccessful. For example, Senator Dirksen's proposal to require that. the
employer have at least a bargaining history with the union before a prehire
agreement could be valid 49
 was rejected by the committee.'" Thus, this legis-
lative history further refutes the Board's contention that section 8(f) is a nar-
row exception to the concept of majority choice of bargaining representatives.
The legislative history of section 8(f) also does not support the Board's
assertion that picketing to enforce a prehire agreement. is prohibited. Al-
though there is language in the legislative record indicating congressional
concern that employers should not be forced to sign a prehire agreement,"
there is nothing in the legislative history suggesting that, once an employer
voluntarily signs a prehire agreement., the employer cannot be forced to abide
by the agreement. Congress recognized that section 8(f) would serve little
purpose if unions could not enforce prehire agreements in the same manner
as other collective bargaining agreements. Representative Thompson, who
served on the Conference Committee," expressly stated that while section 8(f)
was not intended to coerce entry into a prehire agreement, it nevertheless did
not operate to deny the right of a union to strike or picket to compel com-
pliance with a prehire agreement." Congress intended no such exercise in
futility as to provide for a contract with a union which has minority status but
to permit an employer to abrogate that contract because of the union's minor-
ity status." By denying a minority union the right to strike to enforce a
prehire agreement, the Board's decision in Iron Workers frustrates Congress'
47 105 CONG. REC. 15542 (1959), reprinted in II LEGIstATivE HIsToRY, supra
note 7, at 1578 (speech of Rep. Rayburn submitted by Rep. Thompson),
48
 105 CONG. REC. 7633 (1959), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
7, at 1273.
48 105 CONG. REC. 6414 (1959), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HisToxy, supra note
7, at 1074.
58 105 CONG. REC. 6415-16 (1959), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, SUpEa
note 7, at 1075.
5 ' Senator Kennedy stated in the debate over § 8(f) that the section did not
"authorize a labor organization to strike, picket, or otherwise coerce an employer to
sign a prehire agreement where the majority status of the union had not. been estab-
lished." 105 CONG. REC. 18128 (1959), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE H ► S-
TORY, supra tulle 7, at 1715 (emphasis added).
52
 The Conference Committee adopted the provision of the Senate bill which
permitted prehire agreements in the construction industry. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 946.
53
 105 CONG. REC. 18134 (1959), reprinted in I1 LF.GISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 7, at 1721.
54
 Local 150, Intl Union of Operating F.ng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1190,
83 L.R.R.M. 2706, 2709 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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intent to legitimate prehire contracts because it allows employers to repudiate
them at will. 55
The frustration of congressional intent. in Iron Workers resulted from the
Board's disregard for the usual principles of statutory interpretation. When
the Board interprets a statute, it should not concentrate on isolated sections;
rather, "consideration must be given to the toal corpus of pertinent. law and
the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions.'' 5" In lion Workers,
the Board overemphasized the sections of the Act which call for representa-
tion of the employees by a majority agent and thereby lost sight of the Act's
overall purpose of promoting industrial peace and stability.• 7 This objective
of industrial stability was particularly apparent in the enactment of section
8(f). The reasons given For allowing prehire contracts—the necessity for
employers to know labor costs in order to estimate accurately For bids, and the
employer's need for a supply of skilled craftsmen ready for quick
referra1 58—indicate a congressional concern for insuring a stable labor sup-
ply. The Board's reconciliation of section 8(1) and section 8(b)(7)(C), however,
ignores this important policy.
Since the Board's decision in Iron. Workers goes against the weight of legis-
lative history and the overall purpose of the Act, the Supreme Court's defer-
ence to the Board's interpretation is questionable. Moreover, another reason
exists for questioning the propriety of the Supreme Court's decision to Up-
hold the Board's holding: the Board's Failure to account, for contrary prece-
dent. Contrary precedent existed in an earlier decision, Building and Construc-
tion Trade Council (Sullivan Electric Co.),`'" which held that section 8(b)(7)(C)
does not proscribe picketing to enforce a prehire agreement." It is an
elementary tenet of administrative law that an agency must either adhere to
its own precedents or explain any departure from them." The Board did
neither in Iron Workers. Nor did the Supreme Court's reasoning in Iron Work-
ers adequately distinguish Sullivan Electric so as to make explanation by the
Board unnecessary. The Supreme Court stated in Iron Workers that Sullivan
Electric does not encompass a situation where the union has not been chosen
as the representative of the majority." 2 The Court's explanation, however,
overlooked the fact that the union in Sullivan Electric did not represent the
majority of employees at the disputed sites."
55 Id.
56 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970).
" National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See, e.g., Retail
Clerks Local 128 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17,.27 (1962).
58 S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). reprinted in I LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 424; H. Rip. No. 741, 861.h Cong., 1st. Sess. (1959),
reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 777.
59 146 N.L.R.B. 1086, 56 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1964).
" Id. at 1087, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1011.
6 ' UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1341, 79 L.R.R.M. 2332, 2340 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
" 434 U.S. at 343-44.
"3 The union in Sullivan Electric was picketing the employer's project sites to
enforce a § 8(1) prehire agreement. 146 N.L.R.B. at 1091, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1011. The
company filed a complaint alleging a union violation of section 8(b)(7)(C). Id. at 1087,
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It is submitted that the Su preme Court should not have dismissed so
lightly prior, nomconforming Board precedent. The Court's affirmance in
Iron Workers is particularly distressing considering that. the Board's position on
this issue has vacillated. To promote predictability and consistency within the
law, an agency should explain thoroughly any new interpretation. Failure to
do so constitutes an abuse of discretion and presents inadequate information
to a reviewing court.'"
Regardless of the correctness of Iron Workers, the decision will have an
important impact on construction industry unions, The Board's decision per-
mits employers to engage in activities which would he unfair labor practices in
any other labor contract situation. For example, an employer can refuse to
bargain with the union, refuse to hire through the union hiring hall, and then
unilaterally repudiate the contract because the union, clue to the employer's
own action, has not attained majority status." In addition, lion Workers leaves
unclear whether a union security clause will adequately protect the enforce-
ability of a prehire agreement.. Even with such a clause, it appears that an
employer can repudiate a prehire agreement. prior to the start of a project.
because the employer has n ot hired any workers and, therefore, the uni o n
cannot have majority status at that time.'" Nevertheless, with a security
clause, the union will have a presumption of majority status where the
employer has not repudiated the agreement within seven clays of hiring for
the project."' Without. a union security clause, a union must. obtain Board
certification of its majority status or demonstrate its majority status in some
other way in order to hold the employer to the terms of its prehire agree-
ment." It therefore appears that the Board's decision in Iron Workers will
result in union insistence on security clauses in every prehire agreement.
b, Picketing After Board Determination Not To Hold Election —During the
Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
56 L.R.R.M. at 1010. Upon discovering this, the union's counsel wrote a letter to Sulli-
van Electric Company complaining that the company was in violation of the agree-
ments because its employees at the jobsites in question had not been hired through the
union hall and had not joined the appropriate union as required by the union security
clause. Id. at 1090-91, 56 L.R.R.M. at loll.
64 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 17.07-4 (1976).
65
 This danger was articulated by Judge Winter in the R.J. Smith appeal. Local
150, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs v, NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1190, 83 L.R.R.M.
2706, 2709 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"" See Local 103, Iron Workers, 216 N.L.R.B. 45, 46, 88 L.R.R.M. 1067,
1068-69 (1975).
An agreement with the employer to cover each new project may solve a
union's problems. However, this awkward arrangement will be impossible for unions
to comply with on smaller, limited projects. The impracticality of holding elections
for each small building project will result in union members taking jobs without the
benefit of union agreements since they cannot afford to let these jobs to nonunion
workers.
" 7
 216 N.L.R.B, at. 46 & n.5, 88 L.R.R.M. at. 1068-69 & n.5.
"8 Id. See R,J. Smith Const. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. at 695 & n.5, 77 L.R.R.M. at
1496 & n.5.
November 1978)	 A NN11/11„SU RVEY OF Limon LAtt,	 119
Teamsters Local 344 v. IVLRB (Purolator),' upheld the Board's position that rec-
ognitional picketing by a noncertifiable union after a Board decision not to
conduct an election is an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(b)(7)(C)
of the National Labor Relations Act. 2 In Purolator, the employer. Purolator
Security, Inc., employed guards to provide armored car services to customers
in the Milwaukee area. 3
 The Teamsters notified Purolator that they had col-
lected signed union authorization cards from a majority of its employees.
When Purolator refused to bargain with the union, the Teamsters filed an
election petition with the Board. 4
The NLRB Regional Director dismissed the election petition on the
ground that the Teamsters union admits both guards and nonguards to
membership.' The Regional Director relied on section 9(b)(3) of the Act,'
which precludes the Board from certifying a union as the representative of
employees in a bargaining unit of guards if the union also :tdmits nonguards
to membership,' After dismissal of its election petition, the union picketed
the premises of Purolator. The next day, the Regional Director filed a com-
plaint alleging that the union's picketing constituted an unfair labor practice
in violation of section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act.' A three-member panel of the
1 568 F.2d 12, 97 1..R.R.M. 2111 (1978).
2 29	 § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). Section 8(b)(7)(C) provides in pertinent
part:
(b) It shall he an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents—
(7) to picket or cause to he picketed, or threaten to picket or cause
to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requir-
ing an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of
an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective
bargaining representative unless such labor organization is currently cer-
tified as the representative of such employees:
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition
under section 159(c) of this title being filed within a reasonable period of
time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing
" 568 F.2d at 13, 97 1..R.R.M. at 2113.
Id. at 14, 97 L.R.R.NI, at 2113.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976). Section 9(b)(3) provides:
'''he Board shall decide in each case the unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining . „ Provided, That the
Board shall not ... (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such
purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual
employed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons
rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of
persons on the employer's premises; but no labor organization shall
he certified as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit. of
guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated di-
rectly of indirectly with an organization which admits to membership,
employees other than guards.
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Board, with one member dissenting, concluded that. the union's picketing was
indeed an unfair labor practice."
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit,, the Teamsters argued that its picketing
did not violate section 8(b)(7)(C). 1 " The circuit court, although noting that.
section 8(b)(7)(C) does not expressly forbid such picketing, concluded that this
section allows recognitional picketing only as a prelude to an election."
Therefore, section 8(b)(7)(C) does not. allow recognitional picketing when the
Board has already denied an election petition." The court reasoned that the
policies underlying section 8(b)(7)(C) support its conclusion that recognitional
picketing by a noncertifiable union is prohibited. First, the court pointed to
the strong public policy favoring the orderly settlement of labor disputes. Al-
lowing unlimited picketing, the court concluded, would negate rather than
promote this policy.'" Second, the circuit court noted that Congress, in enact-
ing section 8(b)(7)(C), intended to prevent organizational campaigns in which
unions use economic weapons to force recognition from an employer regard-
less of the wishes of the majority of his employees." The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that although a majority of employees in the present case wished to
" Teamsters Local 344, 288 N.L.R.B. 1379, 95 L.R.R.M. 1568 (1977) (Mem-
bers Pencil() and Walther: Chairman Murphy dissenting).
'" 568 F.2d at 17, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2116. The union also contended that, de-
spite the Board's statutory inability to certify the union as a bargaining representative,
the Board should have conducted an election and certified the arithmetic results. Id. at
16, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2115. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the Board does have
apparent authority to conduct such an election. The Board has exercised this authority
when an outside union sought to usurp a union which was ineligible for certification
under § 9(b)(3). Id. at 17, 97 L.R.R. M. at 2115 (citing Burns Intl Detective Agency.
Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 449, 51 L.R.R.M. 1067 (1962) and Rock-Hills-Uris, Inc. v. McLeod,
236 F. Supp. 395, 398, 58 L.R.R.M. 2107. 2109, aff'd per curiarn, 344 F.2d 697, 59
L.R.R.M. 2064 (2d Cir. 1965)). The court noted, however, that the decision whether
to hold such an election is a matter of discretion with the Board. Where, as in
Purolator, an election would entail a heavy expense to both the Board and the
employer, the court decided that the Board's refusal to hold an election was not an
abuse of discretion. 568 F.2d at 17, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2116.
" the court of appeals easily dismissed the union's contention that Purolato•'s
driver-guards were not covered by § 9(b)(3). The court noted that since 1953 the
Board has considered driver-guards of armored trucks as guards within the meaning
of § 9(b)(3). 568 F.2d at l5, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2114. See Armored Motor Serv. Co., 106
N.L.R.B. 1139, 32 L.R.R.M. 1628 (1953), overruling, Brinks, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1182, 22
L.R,R.M. 1133 (1948); Drivers Local 639, 211 N.L.R.B. 687, 86 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1974);
Drivers Local 71, 212 N.L.R.B. 1240, 91 L.R,R.M. 1109, enforced, 553 F.2d 1368, 94
L.R.R.M. 3167 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Seventh Circuit determined that Congress
enacted § 9(b)(3) out of concern for divided loyalties among employees who are given
the sensitive task of protecting the employer's property. In the court's view, the
Board's decision that driver-guards are subject to the problem of divided loyalties and,
thus, covered by 9(b)(3) was a reasonable one. 568 F.2d at 16, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2115.
12 568 F.2(1 at 18, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2116. The Seventh Circuit's decision is con-
sistent with the District. of Columbia Circuit's decision in Drivers Local 71 v. NLRB,
553 F.2d 1368, 1374-77, 94 L.R.R.M. 3167, 3170-72 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
13 568 F.2d at 18, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2117,
14
 Id. Sec also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421
U.S. 616, 632 (1975).
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be represented by the union, the court could not blind itself "to the possibility
that some other union seeking to organize guards in the future might attempt
to force itself on an employer and its employees ...."'r' The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the Board was correct in holding that the union's pick-
eting of Purolator constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of section
8(b)(7)(C)."
By prohibiting noncertifiable unions from picketing to obtain employer
recognition, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Purolator reduces the chances
that a union representing both guards and nonguards will secure employer
recognition. After Purolator, an integrated union will be guilty of an unfair
labor practice if it continues to picket after the Board refuses to order an
election. It remains unclear, however', whether a noncertifiable union commits
an unfair labor practice by picketing before the Board officially refuses to
order an election. The only clear course open to nonguard unions to secure
employer recognition is a request fOr voluntary recognition based on either
signed authorization cards from a majority of the employees or a privately
conducted election.
2. Hospital Picketing: Laborers' Local 1057; District 1199, RWDSU
Section 8(g) of the National Labor Relations Act,' enacted in 1974 as part.
of the health care amendments to the Act, 2 requires that a ten day notice be
filed by "IaJ labor organization ... engaging in any strike, picketing or other
concerted refusal to work at any health care institution ."" Two separate
issues regarding the scope of section 8(g) were the subject of Survey year deci-
sions. In Laborers' Local 1057 v. NLRB (Mercy Hospital of Laredo), 4 the District
of Columbia Circuit addressed the issue whether the provisions of section 8(g)
apply to picketing on hospital premises by non-hospital employees. In District
1199, RWDSU (United Hospitals),'' the National Labor Relations Board dealt
with the issue as to what activities constitute picketing within the meaning of
section 8(g). Since section 8(g) does not speak clearly to either of these issues,
both the District of Columbia Circuit in Merry Hospital of Laredo and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board in United Hospitals were required to ascertain
congressional intent in order to interpret section 8(g). The approaches taken
by these two bodies reflect differing perceptions as to the scope of section 8(g)
and its proper relationship to the other provisions of the N LRA.
15 568 F.2d at 19, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2117.
'"
	' 29	 § 158(g) (1976).
2 Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, §§ 1(a)-(c), 88 Stat. 395 (1976)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152(14), 158(d), 158(g) (1976)).
a 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1976). Section 8(g) provides in pertinent part: ''A labor
organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to
work at any health care institution shall, not less than ten days prior to such action,
notify the institution in writing and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of
that intention ."
Laborer's Local 1057 v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 1006, 1007, 96 L.R.R.M. 3160,
3160-61 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
232 N.L.R.13. No. 67, 96 L.R.R.N.1. 1404 (Sept, 28, 1977).
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a. Picketing by Non-Health Care Employees—The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Mercy Hospital of Laredo considered two cases involving nearly identical
factual situations and similar disputes. In both cases, local unions representing
non-health care construction workers set up reserved gate picketing on hospi-
tal premises.`' Neither union gave the ten day notice to the hospital or the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) as detailed in section
8(g). 7 In unfair labor practice proceedings brought by the non-health care
contractors," the Board held 9 that the locals had violated section 8(g) by pick-
eting at the hospital jobsites without giving the required notice." The Board
found section 8(g) applicable to all strikes and picketing conducted on the
premises of a health care institution even when hospital employees and pa-
tient care are unaffected." The unions petititioned the circuit court for re-
view and the Board applied for enforcement of its order."
One case involved picketing by the plumbers union against a non-union
subcontractor which was engaged in the remodeling and expansion of Martin Memo-
rial Hospital in Stuart, Florida. The picketing took place at the subcontractor's re-
served gate and the union's signs indicated that the dispute was only with the subcon-
tractor and not with the hospital or prime contractor. No hospital employees were
required to use the reserved gate to enter the hospital nor were any required to cross
the picket line. Hospital employees did not honor the picket line and hospital services
were not disrupted. Employees of the prime contractor and other subcontractors,
however, occasionally honored the picket line. Plumbers Local 630 (Lein-Steenberg),
219 N.L.R.B. 837, 838, 89 L.R.R.M. 1770, 1771 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lein-
Steenberg].
The other case, involving the laborers union, concerned recognitional picket-
ing of a general contractor which was engaged in expansion and renovation projects at
the Mercy Hospital of Laredo. Though the picketing of the general contractor took
place on hospital premises, no hospital employees ceased work and the picketing had
no adverse impact on patient care. Laborers' Local 1(157 (Mercy Hosp. of Laredo), 219
N.L.R.B. 846, 847, 89 L.R.R.10. 1777, 1778 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mercy Hosp. of
Laredo]. Although the union alleged that the general contractor selected a reserved
gate adjacent to the hospital's emergency room in order to entangle ; the hospital in the
dispute, id. at 848, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1778-79 (dissenting opinion of Members Fanning
and Jenkins), this allegation was immaterial to the circuit court's decision. 567 F.2d at
1008 n.7, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3161 11.7.
567 F.2d at 1008, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3161.
8 In Mercy Hosp. of Laredo, the hospital also filed a charge. Id. at 1008 n.8, 96
L.R.R.M. at 3161 n.8.
9 The Board decided Mercy Hosp. of Laredo and Lein-Steenberg by identical 3-2
votes.
'" Lein-Steenberg, 219 N.L.R.B. 837, 840, 89 L.R.R.M. 1770, 1771 (1975); Mercy
Hosp. of Laredo, 219 N.L.R.B. 846, 847, 89 L.R.R.M. 1777, 1778 (1975).
" Id. In Mercy Hosp. of Laredo, the Board adopted its earlier findings in Lein-
Steenberg. Id. For a discussion of the Board's decisions in Lein-Sleenberg and Mercy Hosp.
of Laredo, see 1975-1976 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination
Law, 17 B.C. IND. & Corr. L. REv. 1041, 1068 (1976).
12 567 F.2d at 1008, 96 L.R.R.M. at '3162. After oral argument of these cases,
but prior to the court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided
NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 388, 548 F.2d 704, 94 L.R.R.M. 2536 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977), in which the interpretation of 8(g) in a situation similar to
that in Mercy Hasp. of Laredo was at issue. The Seventh Circuit held that 8(g) notice was
required only when the proposed labor activity was planned "on behalf of employees
of the institution" and not when union activity was conducted by non-health care
employees. Id. at 711, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2542.
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The court of appeals reversed the Board's decision in Mercy Hospital of
Laredo, and held that the picketing by non-health care employees did not fall
within the scope of section 8(g). 1 " In reaching this result, the court initially
faced two questions concerning the scope of section 8(g): first, whether Con-
gress intended the statute's reference to "a labor organization" to include all
labor organizations or just those representing health care employees;" sec-
ond, whether Congress, in referring to activities "at any health care institu-
tion," intended the preposition "at" to denote merely the location of the pick-
eting, or rather, to indicate that some relationship must exist between the
health care institution and the employees involved in the labor dispute." Be-
cause the phrasing of the statute was ambiguous, and because of an absence
of legislative discussion as to the impact of section 8(g) on non-health care
employees, the circuit court found it necessary to reconstruct "how the leg-
islature would have decided the specific issue if it had been specifically
addressed by the legislature."" The court scrutinized the legislative history
of section 8(g) and the 1974 amendments to ascertain some indication of con-
gressional intent regarding the application of section 8(g) to non-health care
employees." The court, however, found only legislative silence." Clearly
the purpose of the ten clay notice provision of section 8(g) was to insure con-
tinuity of health care to patients and the community." Nevertheless, the
court reasoned that Congress, by enacting section 8(g), "could not have in-
tended to intercept every conceivable threat to uninterrupted patient care." 20
In interpreting section 8(g) to pertain only to labor. activity of hospital
employees, the circuit court found three factors influential. First, the court
noted that section 8(g) must be read in light of section 13 of the NLRA 2 '
which commands that doubts or ambiguities in the statute he resolved to
safeguard the right to strike." The court determined that the right to strike
13
 567 E.2d at 1009, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3162.
14 Id.
15 Id. See also NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 388, 548 F.2d 704, 707-08, 94
L.R.R.M. 2536, 2539 (7th Cir. 1977).
'I' 567 F.2d at 1010, 96 1...R.R.N1. at 3163. See "Thompson, The View From the
House of Representatives, in LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HosPrrALs AND THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 142 (A. Knapp ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH CARE
PROBLEMS].
17
 567 F.2d at 1010-15, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3163-67.
1" Id. at 1012, 96. L.R.R.M. at 3165.
I" Id. at 1010, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3163. See also S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3946, 3949.
2" 567 F.2d at 1012, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3164. The Board had asserted that strikes
by employees of a hospital subcontractor, such as a food service, could imperil the
well-being of patients. The unions countered by pointing out that life-endangering
strikes by subcontractors, such as suppliers of blood or drugs, were most likely to take
place oil hospital premises. See id. at 1011 - 12, 96 I.. R.R.M. at 3164.
21
 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976). Section 13 provides: "Nothing in this [Act], except
as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qual-
ifications on that right."
" See 567 F.2d at 1013, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3165. As the Supreme Court has
noted, " [section] 13 declares a rule of construction which cautions against an expan-
sive reading of that section which would adversely affect the right to strike, unless the
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must be given a generous interpretation within the scope of the Act." Sec-
ond, the court observed that the reason for the lack of legislative comment on
the effect of section 8(g) vis-a-vis non-health care employees was simply that
Congress never intended the section to apply to such employees. 24
 In fact, the
court noted, most congressional discussion of section 8(g) was tied to refer-
ences to health care employees. 25
 In this regard, the court found significant
the Senate report's statement that section 8(g) "generally prohibits a labor or-
ganization from striking or picketing a health care institution without first
giving 10 days' notice."'" The use of "a-
 rather than the preposition "at"
seemed to indicate that. Congress did not intend a locational interpretation of
section 8(g); rather, Congress required a relationship between the pickets or
strikers and the health care institution." Third, the court noted the relation-
ship between section 8(g) and other provisions of the NLRA." Specifically,
the court looked to section 8(d) which describes the duties of the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service after notice is given under section 8(g): 29
Under section 8(d), the FMCS has no power to require meetings between
disputing parties unless "employees of a health care institution" are in-
volved." Section 8(g)'s requirement of notice to the FMCS makes sense, the
court reasoned, only if the provisions of the section are directed solely at.
health care employees.'" Thus, the court concluded that section 13's protec-
tion of the right to strike, the absence of legislative comment on the effect of
congressional purpose to give it that meaning persuasively appears either from the
structure or history of the statute.'' NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 282
(1960), quoted in Mercy Hosp. of Laredo, 567 E.2c1 at 1013, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3165.
23 567 F.2d at 1013, & n.43, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3165, & n.43: see NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 234-35 (1963).
2 ' 567 F.2d at 1014, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3166.
25 Id.
2E;
	 (quoting S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U. S.
Conf. Cove. & An. NEWS 3946, 3949 (emphasis added)). It might also be noted that
the Conference Report spoke in terms directed at "employees of all health care institu-
tions." See CONF. , REP. No. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Cone
CONG. & An. NEWS 3959, 3959.
27 See 567 F.2d at 1014, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3166.
2 " Id. at 1014-15, 96 I.„R.R.M. at 3166-67.
`2 " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Section 8(d) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever collective bargaining involves employees of a health care institu-
tion, the provisions of this subsection shall be modified as follows:
(C) After notice is given to the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service under either clause (A) or (B) of this sentence, the Service
shall promptly communicate with the parties and use its best efforts,
by mediation and conciliation, to bring them to agreement. The parties
shall participate fully and promptly in such meetings as may be under-
taken by the Service for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the
dispute.
Id. (emphasis addled).
'" See N.L.R.B. v. Electrical Workers Local 388, 548 F.2d 704, 711, 94
L.R.R.M. 2536, 2542 (7th Cir. 1977).
:" 567 F.2d at 1015, 96 L.R.R.M. at 3167.
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section 8(g) on non-health care employees, and the limitation of the FMCS's
jurisdiction to disputes involving employees of health care institutions rein-
forced its conclusion that Congress did not intend the notice provisions of
section 8(g) to extend to employees of other than health care institutions.
It is submitted that the District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation of
section 8(g) as inapplicable to non-health care employees is correct. The
Board's decisions in the two cases reviewed in Mercy Hospital of Laredo had
been criticized by commentators as inaccurate interpretations of section 8(g). 32
Moreover, the congressional authors of section 8(g) themselves had indicated
that the Board did not accurately follow legislative intent." One further con-
sideration reinforces the correctness of the court's decision. Under the provi-
sions of section 8(d), 34
 an employee who engages in a strike in violation of
section 8(g) loses his status as an employee under the Act and consequently
loses his protection under sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Act. An employee may
thus become ineligible to vote in a Board election." 5
 It would be a particu-
larly harsh result for an employee to lose his "employee status" because of the
union's Failure to give notice in an evidently unclear situation.
To date, the District of Columbia Circuit and the Seventh Circuit are the
only federal courts to address the issue of the relation of section 8(g) to
non-health care employees. In NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 388, 36 cited
approvingly by the court in Mercy Hospital of Laredo, 37
 the Seventh Circuit also
interpreted section 8(g) as inapplicable to non-health care employees." The
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Mercy Hospital of Laredo, follow-
ing in the tracks of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Electrical Workers, enun-
ciates a sound interpretation of section 8(g) in accord with both the national
labor policy and the purpose of the health care amendments of 1974. It is
hoped that other courts and the Board will follow the lead of these two courts
in future decisions concerning section 8(g).
" 2 See, e.g., D'Alba, Health Care Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board
Since the 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relation.s . Act in HEALTH CARE
PROBLEMS, supra note 16, at 49; 1975-1976 Ann-rail Survey of Labor Relations and Employ-
ment Discrimination Law, 17 B.C. IND. & Cosy. L. REV. 1041, 1076; contra, King, Legisla-
tive Review: Is Congressional Intent Being Realized—Or Are Significant Changes Needed? in
HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS, .supra note 16, at 161-62.
"" 121 CoNc. REC. 37448 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("This interpreta-
tion is entirely incorrect since it was not the intention of the 1974 amendments to
change the law with respect to the relationship between employers who were previ-
ously covered by the act and their employees and unions representing or seeking to
represent those employees. -) 121 CONG. REC. 37449 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Taft);
Thompson, The Yieur From the House of Representatives in HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS, supra
note 16, at 142. Note, however, that little judicial weight may be ascribed to the post-
passage remarks of legislators. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313
(1960); United States v. Philadelphia Nail Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963).
'0 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
35 See Casey & Glass, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 698, 698, 89 L.R.R.M. 1779, 1779
(1975). In Casey & Glass, the employees lost their jobs and the right to reinstatement.
See D'Alba, supra note 32, at 49.
" 1 ' 548 F.2d 704, 94 L.R.R.M. 2536 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
" 7 567 F.2d at 1009, 96	 at 3162.
"" 548 F.2d at 711, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2542.
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b. Picketing Within the Ambit of Section 8(g)--Further scrutiny of section
8(g) was undertaken by the Board in District 1199, RWDSU (United Hospitals)."
Here, the Board had to discern whether a union's activity constituted "pick-
eting" within the scope of section 8(g). The dispute in United Hospitals arose
when approximately twenty-five Newark Hospital employees, members of the
respondent union, 4° walked in front of the hospital's main entrance carrying
placards indicating the union's contract dispute with the hospital.'" The
employees participated during off-shift hours. During the two and one-half
hour demonstration, the employees neither blocked access to the hospital nor
requested persons not to enter the hospital. 42
 The union gave no notice of
this demonstration to Newark Hospital or FMCS.'" The union contended
that its activity was merely informational and should be characterized as
handbilling instead of picketing; thus, it argued that the activity did not fall
within the purview of section 8(g). 44
 The Board, however, held that the
union's activity was, in fact, picketing and, as such, proscribed by section 8(g)
even though it did not disrupt the operation of the hospital. 45
The Board majority" emphasized several factors in reaching its conclu-
sion that the union's activity did constitute picketing within the meaning of
section 8(g). First, the Board considered the language of section 8(g) which
prohibits "any strike, picketing or other concerted refusal to work" without
proper notice. 47
 The Board read the word "any" as modifying the word
"picketing" and thus implied that section 8(g) prohibited, in the absence of
timely notice, all picketing regardless of whether stoppage or disruption of
work resulted.'" The Board next examined section 8(g) in light of the overall
purposes of the health care amendments. 49 By providing a mechanism for
advanced notice of any attempted strike or picketing, the 1974 amendments
in general, and section 8(g) in particular, were designed to minimize the dis-
ruption of patient care caused by a labor dispute. 5° In the Board's view, the
very act of picketing regardless of whether it actually disrupted delivery of
health care services provided the potential for disruption of the delivery of
such services. 5 ' Thus, there was ample need for prior notice of any picketing
"" 232 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 96 L.R.R.M. 1404 (Sept. 28, 1977).
4 " The ninon was the certified representative for Newark Hospital's technical







 Id. The Board initially found that because of the physical patrolling of the
area the activity differed substantially from handbilling. The key issue thus became
whether this picketing violated section 8(g).
'" The Board majority, in this 3-1 decision, consisted of Chairman Fanning
and Nlenthers Penello and Murphy.
47 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1976) (emphasis added). See note 3 supra.
" 232 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1405-06 & n.8.
49 Id.
5" See S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 3946, 3949; see text and note 19 supra.
51
 232 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1406.
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on hospital premises. Finally, the Board found that section 8(g)'s requirement
of a ten day notice was not an unconstitutional restraint on the protected
freedom of speech. First amendment rights, the Board noted, must be bal-
anced against other public interests. 52 The Board determined that the public
interest in uninterrupted health care justified the restraint of speech resulting
from the ten day notice imposed by section 8(g). Still, the Board was careful
to note that its holding did "not constitute a ban on all picketing per se, but
rather a ban on all picketing which unjustifiably occurs in the absence of a
10-day written notice.'
The United Hospitals case presented the Board with a difficult problem of
statutory interpretation. In resolving this problem, the majority followed
Board precedent in subscribing to a literal interpretation of section 8(g). 54
Such an interpretation finds some support in the underlying purpose of sec-
tion 8(g) to prevent disruption of health care services. If the Board were to
establish a policy whereby some forms of picketing were allowed without
notice while other forms of picketing were not, the Board would be put in the
position of having to review each case to determine whether the picketing in
question posed the potential for disruption of services. Certainly, if Congress
in enacting section 8(g) intended to minimize disruption of health care serv-
ices in the event of a labor dispute, it could not have envisioned an after-the-
fact review of individual labor activities.
It is submitted, however, that the Board's literal interpretation of section
8(g) is excessively restrictive of health care employees' right of expression.
The fundamental right of employees to participate in peaceful expression as a
52 Id.
33 Id.
34 See e.g., District 1199, RWDSU (First Healthcare Corp.), 222 N.L.R.B. 212,
212, 91 L.R.R.M. 1097, 1098 (1976), enforcement denied, No. 76-4073 (2d Cir. Nov. 23,
1976) (unpublished).
In First Healthcare Corp., the Board concluded that a union which did not
represent hospital employees violated section 8(g) when four of its officers joined a
properly noticed picket line in front of the hospital since the union had not given its
own ten day notice. 222 N.L.R.B. at 213, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1098. The Board followed a
literal interpretation of section 8(g) in finding a violation of the statute. In the Board's
opinion, the mandatory language of the section required advance notice of any picket-
ing regardless of its character. Id. at 212, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1098. On petition for en-
forcement, the Second Circuit, without reaching the merits of the case, denied the
Board's petition on the grounds that the activity involved was de minimis. No. 76-4073
(2d Cir. Nov. 23, 1976) (unpublished). Implicit in the circuit court's opinion was a
realization that the picketing involved "had no impact whatsoever on the institution"
and that a finding of a § 8(g) violation would not further the policy of minimizing
disruption of the hospital embodied in the statute. Fanning, Board Decisions and Direc-
tions: Nuances of Yet Uncharted Waters in HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS, supra note 16, at 62.
It is difficult to reconcile the ultimate result of First Healthcare Corp. with the
majority opinion in United Hospitals. Certainly the activity at issue in United Hospitals
could be seen as "de minimis" as the activity in First Healthcare Corp.; the peaceful picket-
ing in question lasted for two and one-half hours, only one more hour than the sym-
pathy picketing in First Healthcare Corp. and had no impact on the hospital's operation,
By proscribing all union activity on hospital premises regardless of whether it disrupts
the delivery of healthcare services, the Board has not given ample weight to the right
of health care employees to engage in modes of peaceful picketing.
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form of labor activity, as specifically echoed in section 13 of the Act, has long
been preserved by the courts and the NLRB. Thus, it is suggested that the
better view of section 8(g) is taken by Member Jenkins in his dissenting opin-
ion in United Hospitals. 55
 The thrust of Member Jenkins' dissent was that the
notice provisions of section 8(g) were not applicable in light of the employees'
right to engage in peaceful picketing. 56
 Member Jenkins argued that the
majority's interpretation of section 8(g) ran contrary to judicially established
rules of statutory construction which warn against restrictions on legitimate
labor activity." In his view, section 13 of the Act mandated a reading of
section 8(g) to allow peaceful picketing." Thus, Member Jenkins concluded
that the majority's ban on peaceful picketing constituted an impermissible re-
straint on free speech.
The Board's literal reading of section 8(g) in United Hospitals is consistent
with its decision in Mercy Hospital of Laredo, where the Board read section 8(g)
to prohibit "any strike or picketing at the premises of a health care institution
... (constituting] sufficient potential for disruption of medical care ...." 5" As
shown by the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Mercy Hospital of-
Laredo, however, the circuit courts will be critical of the Board's failure to
consider the employees' right to engage in peaceful activities. The District of
Columbia Circuit rejected the Board's broad proscription of labor activities
and emphasized that section 8(g) must be read in light of the provisions of the
53 232 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1407.
547 Id., 96 L. R.R. M. at 1408. In his dissent, Member Jenkins first characterized
the picketing involved in this case as purely "informational picketing", and thus, out-
side the scope of § 8(g). Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1407-08; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C)
(1976). Further, Member Jenkins found from his reading of the legislative history that
§ 8(g) was directed at the disruptive impact of picketing rather than picketing per se.
232 N.L.R.B. No. 67. 96 L.R.R.M. at 1408; see note 50 supra. Purely informational
picketing, in Member Jenkins' view, did not pose a threat to the continuity of health
care. Additionally, Member Jenkins pointed to the legislative characterization of § 8(g)
as the "10-day strike notice provision" as indicative of an intent to prevent work stop-
pages or interruptions rather than peaceful picketing. 232 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 96
L.R.R.M. at 1408,
57 232 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1408.
58 See text and notes 21-23 supra. Member Jenkins found support for his posi-
tion in the language of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760 (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964). In Tree Fruits, the Court noted:
Throughout the history of federal regulation of labor relations, Congress
has consistently refused to prohibit peaceful picketing except when it is
used as a means to achieve specific ends which experience has shown are
undesirable.... We ... have not ascribed to Congress a purpose to outlaw
peaceful picketing unless "there is the clearest indication in the legislative
history," that Congress intended to do so as regards the particular ends of
the picketing under review. Both the congressional policy and our adher-
ence to this principle of interpretation reflect concern that a broad ban
against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First
Amendment.
Id, at 62-63 (citations omitted).
Lein -Steenberg, 219 N.L.R.B. 837, 840, 89 L.R.R.M. 1770, 1773 (1975) (em-
phasis in original).
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entire Act which protect employee expression in labor activity. It is hoped that.
the Board will follow the direction charted by the District of Columbia Circuit
in its future interpretations of section 8(g), and accord greater weight to the
protected nature of employee activity at. hospitals.
3. Common Situs Picketing in Disregard of Reserved Gate: Allied Concrete
Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act' prohibits unions
from conducting secondary boycotts. Specifically, a union commits an unfair
labor practice under section 8(h)(4) when it uses direct pressure—strikes, pick-
eting, threats, coercion, or restraint—for the purpose of inducing a neutral,
secondary employer to discontinue dealing with a primary employer with
whom the union has a labor dispute. 2 In order to establish a violation of the
"secondary boycott" ban of section 8(13)(4), it must be shown that a union
deliberately engaged in a strike, picketing, or similar activity to accomplish a
prohibited secondary objective.' Thus, a union may lawfully engage in pri-
mary activity if it does not intentionally create economic hardships for a neu-
tral employer, even though its primary activity incidentally inflicts such
economic hardships. 4
The Board's task of applying the distinction embodied in section 8(b)(4)
between the permissible incidental effects of primary activity on neutral
employers and impermissible secondary activity has proven particularly
troublesome in cases involving "common situs" picketing—picketing at a loca-
tion where both primary and secondary employers are engaged in business.
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
2 Id. Section 8(b)(4) provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry af-
fecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of
his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to
perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in
either case an object thereof is—
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other pro-
ducer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize
or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the rep-
resentative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of
this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be
construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any pri-
mary strike or primary picketing ....
3 See General Teamster Local 126 (Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc.), 200
N.L.R.B. 253, 254, 81 L.R.R.M. 1461, 1464 (1972).
' The proviso to § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), see note 2 supra, was added by the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 to clarify any existing doubt as to the continued legality
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During the Survey Year, in Teamsters Local 83 (Allied Concrete), 5 the Board con-
fronted a common situs picketing situation in which a union chose not to
picket at a reserved gate established for the exclusive use of the primary
employer's employees, and instead picketed at a construction site occupied
jointly by the primary and secondary employer." A divided Board 7 held that
the union's ambulatory common situs picketing in disregard of the primary
employer's reserved gate did not constitute an unfair labor practice within the
purview of section 8(b)(4)!'
The controversy in Allied Concrete started when Allied Concrete, Inc. and
its drivers, represented by Teamsters Local 83, failed to reach a collective
bargaining agreement." As a supplier of ready-mix concrete, Allied had sub-
contracted with Ashton Company, Inc. to furnish concrete for the construc-
tion of a highway overpass.'" Following the parties' failure to reach a con-
tract, the Teamsters called a strike." In response, Allied erected signs on
roads leading to the job site, designating one entrance as a reserved gate for
Allied's employees and suppliers, and two entrances for Ashton and all other
contractors.' 2 In addition, Allied notified the union of its establishment of
the designated entrances.'' On two separate occasions thereafter, when Al-
lied attempted to deliver concrete to the project, vehicles containing picketers
accompanied Allied's truck from the terminal to the construction site, entered
the project area through the reserved gate designated for Allied's employees,
continued to the actual work site, and began picketing Allied's truck." Hon-
oring the Teamsters' picket line, the neutral Ashton employees walked off the
job.' 5 In an attempt to eliminate the work stoppages arising from the re-
peated picketing, Ashton cancelled its contract with Allied.'"
Allied Concrete then filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board
alleging that, by picketing at the actual work site instead of at the reserved
gate, the union violated section 8(b)(4) of the Act.' Because section 8(b)(4)
proscribes only secondary picketing, the Board focused on the question
whether the union's conduct constituted primary or secondary activity. The
Board turned to its guidelines for identifying primary and secondary picket-
ing outlined in Sailors' Union of the Pacific. (Moore Dry Dock)." Under the
of primary activity. National Woodwork Mfrs. Assoc. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 632-33 &
nn.21) & 21 (1967).
5 231 N.L.R.B. No. 181, 96 L.R.R.M. 1165 (Aug. 31, 1977).
Id., 96 I,. R. R.M. at 1166.
Chairman Fanning tind Members Murphy and Jenkins were in the majority,
id., with Members Pencil() and Walther dissenting. Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1168.
8 Id.






1 " Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1168 (Members Pencil() and Walther, dissenting).
17 Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1166.
'" 92 N.L.R. B. 547, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950).
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Moore Dry Dock test, common situs picketing is presumptively lawful r" if it is
strictly limited to those times when the situs of the dispute is located on the
secondary employer's premises,'" occurs only when the primary employer is
engaged in its normal business at the situs, 21
 is conducted reasonably close to
the location of the situs, 22
 and is conducted in a manner which clearly dis-
closes that the dispute is with the primary employer. 2 " There was no dispute
that the union's picketing in Allied Concrete met these four criteria and, there-
fore, was presumptively lawful. 24
 A question arose, however, whether the
union's decision to picket at the pour site, rather than at the reserved gate,
revealed an intent to enmesh a secondary employer in the union's dispute
with Allied,' and thus overcame the presumption of lawfulness.
In assessing the lawfulness of the union's picketing, the Allied Concrete
Board concluded that. its prior decision in Teamsters-
 Local 807 (Schultz Refriger-
ated Service, Inc.)" was dispositive. 27 In Schultz, the Board held that since the
sluts of a transportation company's business is not restricted to its terminal,
but rather, extends to the locations of its customers, picketing around the
company's trucks during customer pickups and deliveries constitutes lawful
I" hi. at 549, 27 L.R.R.M. at 1110. Picketing in bare compliance with the Moore
Dry Dock requirements is not lawful per se. See T.W. HeIgesen, Inc. v. Bridge Workers
Local 498, 548 F.2d 175, 181, 94 L.R.R.M. 2254, 2258 (7th C:ir. 1977); Ramey Constr.
Co. v. Local 544, Painters, 472 F.2d 1127, 1132, 82 L.R.R.M. 2442, 2444 (5th Cir.
1973); NLRB v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Hod Carriers, 389 F.2d 721, 725, 67
I..R.R.M. 2502, 2504 (9th Cir. 1968); General Teamsters Local 126 (Ready Mixed
Concrete, Inc.), 200 N.L.R.B. 253, 254-55, 81 1.. R.R.M. 1461, 1465 (1972); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 861 (Plauche Electric, Inc.), 135 N.L.R.B. 250,
255, 49 L.R.R.M. 1446, 1449 (1962). Rather, satisfaction of these criteria creates a
presumption that the union has not exceeded the permissible bounds of primary ac-
tion by seeking to enmesh a secondary employer in its dispute with the primary
employer. Ramey Constr. Co. v. Local 544, Painters, 472 F.2d at. 1132, 82 L.R.R.M. at.
2444; Vassar Constr., lnc. v. Teamsters Local 445, 436 F. Stipp. 1084, 1088 n.3, 96
L.R.R.M. 2043, 2045-46 11,3 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); NLRB v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of
Hod Carriers, 389 F.2d at 725, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2504. Accordingly, a union's common
situs picketing in compliance with the Moore Dry Dock standards may constitute an
unfair labor practice under 8(b)(4) if direct evidence reveals an unlawful secondary
objective. General Teamsters Local 126 (Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc.), 200 N.L.R.B. at
254-55, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1465.
20
 Moore Dry Dock, 92 N.L.R.B. at 549, 27 L.R.R.M. at 1110,
21 Id.
22 Id .
22 Id. These criteria were designed to ensure that the appeal of the picketing is
directed only to employees of the primary employer. General Teamsters Local 126
(Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc.), 200 N.I.„R.B. 253, 254, 81 L.R.R.M. 1461, 1464 (1972).
2' 231 N.L.R.B. No. 181, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1166.
25 Id.
r«
	 N.L.R.B. 502, 25 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1949). Schultz involved a terminal-based
transportation business operated primarily through a fleet of commercial trucks. Id. at
506, 25 L.R.R.M. at 1124. During a strike by Schultz employees, picketers accom-
panied Schultz' delivery trucks to various locations where pickups and deliveries were
made. Id. at 503, 25 L.R.R.M. at 1123. At each pickup and delivery point, the striking
employees picketed only "between the headlights" of the Schultz trucks. Id.
27 231 N.L.R.B. No. 181, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1167.
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primary activity." Applying the rationale enunciated in Schultz to the situa-
tion in Allied Concrete, the Board noted that Allied conducted business both at
its dispatch terminal and at the pour sites where it delivered concrete." "Thus,
the Board concluded, Local 83 possessed the right to publicize its dispute with
Allied by picketing "between the headlights" of Allied's trucks at the construc-
tion site."
In the Board's view, the mere fact that the primary employer in the case
at hand had established a reserved gate did not serve to distinguish the case
from Schultz and, therefore, did not preclude primary ambulatory picketing at
the construction site."' The Board stressed that lawful primary picketing
does not become unlawful simply because alternative locations exist at which
the picketing may he conducted "out of sight or hearing of, or having other
effects on, neutral employees." Consequently, the Board rejected the con-
tention that the union's decision to picket at the pour site, rather than at the
reserved gate, demonstrated an intent to enmesh a secondary employer in the
union's dispute and thereby rebutted the presumption of lawfulness."
" 87 N.L.R.B. at 506-09, 25 L.R.R.M. at 1124-26. The Schultz Board noted
that such ambulatory picketing was the only effective manner by which the union
could exert direct pressure on the primary employer. Id. at 506, 25 L.R.R.M. at 1124.
As long as the striking employees confined their picketing at the neutral employer's
premises to "between the headlights" of the Schultz trucks, the Board concluded that
the union could effectively communicate its dispute with Schultz to the public while
the neutral employers were free from interference in the conduct of their business. Id.
at 506-07, 25 L.R.R.M. at 1124-25.
29 231 N.L.R.B. No. 181, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1167.
3° Id.
31 Id. The dissenters in Allied Concrete distinguished Schultz by noting that no
reserved gate system or other alternative picketing location had been established at the
premises of any of the neutral employers involved in that case. Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at
1170 (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting). Hence, the dissent concluded, Schultz
does not support the proposition that under all circumstances it is lawful for a union
to picket a primary employer's trucks on the neutral employer's premises if such pick-
eting is conducted "between the headlights." Id.
32 Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1167. The Board majority considered it unimportant
that neutral employees walked off the job as a result of the Teamsters' picket line. Id.
The Board concluded that the union's objective in picketing, if otherwise lawful, is not
rendered unlawful merely because neutral employees elect to respect the picket line.
Id.
In further support of its holding, the Board attached considerable significance to
Allied's initiative in establishing the reserved gates. Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1168. The
Board noted that Allied's action enabled it to make all decisions relating to the place-
ment and wording of the reserved gate signs. The majority found such action on the
part of Allied relevant since sections 8(b)(4)(i) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) were intended to pro-
tect the rights of neutral employers and were not intended to be used as a tool "for
the aid and convenience of primary employers." Id.
33 Id. Members Penello and Walther argued in dissent that under the cir-
cumstances, the union could not ignore with legal impunity the primary employer's
reserved gate and proceed onto the actual worksite in order to picket "between the
headlights." Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1169. The dissent noted that the Moore Dry Dock
criteria are evidentiary in nature and are to be utilized only in the absence of direct
evidence as to the underlying intent of the union. Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1168. Where
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The significance of the decision in Allied Concrete lies with the Board's
refusal to infer a proscribed secondary objective from a union's decision to
picket at a construction site rather than at a primary employer's reserved gate.
The Board's announcement that the presumptive validity of common situs
picketing in compliance with the Moore Dry Dock criteria is not rebutted merely
because alternative locations exist at which the impact of such picketing upon
neutral employees could be minimized," serves to eliminate the concept of
the primary employer's reserved gate as the exclusive site for lawful common
situs picketing. Thus, a union may now engage in common situs picketing
either at . the primary employer's reserved gate or at the construction site it-
self. Without question, the Board's decision adds a potent weapon to the arse-
nal of union strategies.
IV. LMRDA—UNION OFFICIAL'S FREEDOM OF SPEECH
During the Survey year, two circuit court cases considered the extent to
which the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) pro-
tects union officials' right of free speech and right to engage in intraunion
other evidence reveals an unlawful secondary objective, compliance with the Moore Dry
Dock requirements does not establish the lawfulness of the picketing. Id. According to
the dissent, an unlawful secondary objective exists if' a union's picketing can he con-
ducted in a manner which minimizes the impact on neutral employers with no substan-
tial impairment of the effectiveness of the picketing with regard to the primary
employer. Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1169 (quoting Wire Service Guild Local 222, 218
N.L.R.B. 1234, 1238, 89 L.R.R.M. 1397, 1402 (1975) (Members Pencil() and Kennedy,
dissenting)). The dissent reasoned that the union's unwillingness to confine its picket-
ing to the reserved gate was prima facie evidence of the union's unlawful intent. to
enmesh a neutral employer in a labor dispute with a primary employer. Id. Thus, the
dissenters concluded, the Teamsters' ambulatory picketing of Allied's trucks violated
the secondary boycott provisions of the Act. Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1170.
The dissent did not contend, however, that a union is universally precluded from
ambulatory picketing on a neutral employer's premises inside a gate reserved for the
primary employer's employees. Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1169. Rather, the dissent concluded
that such picketing is prohibited only where the union could have effectively com-
municated to the public its dispute with the primary employer without enmeshing the
neutral employer. Id.
It is submitted that the dissent's conclusion incorrectly turned upon the incidental
effect of the ambulatory picketing on neutral employees. Dissenting Members Pencil()
and Walther divined the picketing union's intent from the effect of the picketing upon
the neutral employees. Id. They gave no consideration to the question whether the
neutral employees responded to the incidental pressures of a sister union's primary
picket line or to direct pressures intended to induce their support. In so doing, they
ignored the Supreme Court's admonition in the common situs context: "Picketing
which induces secondary employees to respect a picket line is not the equivalent of
picketing which has the object of inducing those employees to engage in concerted
conduct against their employer in order to force hint to refuse to deal with the struck
employer." Local 761, Intl Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667,
673-74 (1961).
34
 231 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1167.
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political activity.' Both cases involved the dismissal of elected union officials
who had expressed opposition to policies formulated by higher union officials.
The Fourth Circuit., in Bradford v. Textile Workers Local 1093, 2
 held that the
union's action violated section 101(a)(2)" of the LNIRDA; .1 the Second Circuit.,
in Newman v. Local 1101, Communications Workers,' held that it did not.''
The key statutory provision in both Bradford and Newman, section
101(a)(2) of the LIVIRDA, is part. of "the labor hill of rights." Section 10 1(a)(2)
guarantees every union member the right. to express views, arguments, or
opinions, although the union may adopt reasonable rules as to the responsibil-
ity of every member toward the organization, and may prohibit member in-
terference with the union's performance of legal or contractual obligations.'
Like the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution, after which section
101(a)(2) was modeled , "
 its broad, sweeping language has created numerous
judicial headaches. Moreover, because the section was introduced by Senator
McClellan as a floor amendment, the legislative history is sparse and unreveal-
ing." Senator McClellan made one remark, however, that is pertinent. to the
issue of the extent. to which section 101(a)(2) protects onion officials' right of
free speech and right to engage in intraunion political activity. In recom-
mending the adoption of the amendment, he stated that one of the findings
of a 1959 research report was that union officers had "squatters rights" and
union members could not challenge these incumbents without risking disci-
' Bradford v. Textile Workers Local 1093. 563 F.2d 1138. 96 L.R.R.M. 2690
(4th Cir. 1977); Newman v. Local 1101, Communications Workers, 570 F.2d 439, 97
L.R.R.M. 2606 (2d Cir. 1978).
• 563 F.2d 1138, 96 L.R.R.M. 2690 (4th Cir. 1977).
§ 101(x)(2), 29 U.S.C. 	 411(a)(2) (1976). provides in relevant part:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to
meet arid assemble freely with other members; and to express any views,
arguments, or opinions: and to express al meetings of the labor organiza-
tion his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or
upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organiza-
tion's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of !neer-
ings; Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed t4) impair die right
of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as an institu-
tion and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its per-
formance of its legal OF contractual obligations.
The rights contained in § 101(a)(2) are protected by 609 of the EMRDA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 529 (1976), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer,
agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any
employee thereof to fine. suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its
members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provi-
sions of this chapter.
▪ 563 F.2(1 at 1140, 1142, 96 L.R.R.INI. at 2692, 2693.
5 570 F.2d 439. 97 L.R.R.N1. 2606 (2(1 Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 442, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2607.
7
 See note 3 supra.
8 105 CLING. REC. 6478, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (remarks of Sen. McClel-
lan ).
• 105 Cone. REG. 6475, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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One or expulsion. According to Senator McClellan, the amendment was in-
tended to cure abuses of that sort."
Bradford, the first case attempting interpretation of section 101(a)(2) dur-
ing the Survey year, involved an elected union committeeman who criticized
members of the executive board of the local." He vigorously opposed the
local's president and worked actively for his ouster in the upcoming elec-
tion." The executive board, at a hearing held without. notice to Bradford,
suspended him from office.'" Bradford then commenced an action against
the union in federal district court, and the jury returned a verdict in his
favor."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit. upheld the district court's judgment in
favor of Bradford. The circuit court reasoned that a union member does not
forfeit the free speech rights guaranteed him by section 10I(a)(2) of the
LM RDA when he accepts elective office in the union." Pointing to the
union's concession that Bradford's activity was "perfectly permissible," '  and
to evidence that the executive board of the union was openly hostile toward
the plaintiff,'' the court concluded that Bradford's exercise of his free speech
rights was one, if not the primary, reason behind his removal from office."
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the union's removal of Brad-
fOrd was invalid.
In Newman, the Second Circuit considered a similar case involving the
removal of a union official from his elected union position." Newman was a
job steward elected by members of the local." While serving as job steward,
Newman worked vigorously for democratization of the local, thereby oppos-
ing its highest officials.' He published leaflets critical of the local's leader-
ship and policies, and was outspoken on these matters at union meetings."'
Newman advocated lunch hour rallies during the five months immediately
preceding the termination of the existing contract and mobilized opposition to
any management proposals inconsistent with his own position.'" He also
called for a strike to show support for his proposals.24 Newman was sub-
sequently removed from office by the executive committee of the local."
105 Com:. REc.. 6478, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (remarks of Sen. McClel-
Ian).
" 563 F.2(1 at 1139, 96 1...K.R.M. at 2691.
12
 Id. ;it 1143, 96 I..R.R.M. at 2694.
1 " N. at 1139-40, 96 L.R.R.r.11. at 2691. No reason was given for Bradford's
suspension.
14 Id. at 1140, 96 1..R.R.M. an 2691.
L' Id., 96 1..,12..R,M. at 2692.
' 1 ' Id. at 1143, 96 1..R.R.N1. at 2694.
17 Id.
'" Id„ 96 1...R.R.M. at 2694-95.
'" 570 F.24 at 441-43, 97 1..R.R.M. at 2607-08,
211 Id. at 443. 97 1,.R.R.N1. at 2608.
21 Id,
22
 /4., 97 I..R.K.M. at 2608-09.
23 Id., 97 1..K.R.N1. at 2608.
24 Id. at 446, 97 1.. R.R. M. at 2611.
.2 ' Id. at 443, 97 1...R.R.M. at 2608.
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The Second Circuit in Newman noted that the union steward's manual
described a principal function of the job as the explanation and implementa-
tion of union policies and programs so that workers understand and cooper-
ate with these policies."'' The court inquired "whether a member's opposition
to the union's programs or policies may be reasonably viewed as precluding
him from acting effectively as its representative." 27 The court then balanced
this consideration against the question "whether his removal from his official
position would tend to prevent him or others from exercising their rights as
members under Title I of LMRDA." 28
 The court. placed the burden on the
plaintiff to establish the chilling effect on his free speech rights by clear and
convincing proof. 2" Since, in the court's view, Newman failed to meet this
burden, it concluded that Newman's removal was justified. The court em-
phasized that. Newman's conduct precluded him from functioning effectively
as an agent of the local and also that, under all the circumstances, neither the
purpose nor the effect of his removal was to inhibit his free speech as a union
member." The court did not consider, however, whether Newman's removal
had a chilling effect on other members' free speech, even though the balanc-
ing test set forth specifically called for consideration of this factor.'"
While the results in Bradford and Newman appear to conflict, they can be
harmonized. Under the standard of review set out in Newman, 32 if the plain-
tiff can prove that his dismissal or demotion from union office was in retalia-
tion for his exercise of free speech rights protected under section 101(02),
he will prevail. 33 However, if his conduct precludes the effective perfor-
2" hi. at 446, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2611.
" Id. at 445, 97 L.R.R.M. at 21110.
28 Id,
28 Id. at 445-46, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2610-11,
"" hi. at 448, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2611-13.
31 See text at note 27 st4pra.
"" In a case decided prior to the Survey year, the Ninth Circuit employed the
same standard used by the Second Circuit in Newman. Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist.
Council of Painters, 529 F.2d 815, 819, 91 L.R.R.M. 2349, 2352 (9th Cir. 1976). Cooke
involved a charge under § 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976), for
wrongfully transferring a business representative's job to a desert location 167 miles
front his hmtie after the plaintiff had supported the loser for the union position of
executive-secretary. 529 F.2d at 817-18, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2351-52. The court noted
suggestions by commentators Ihat removal or transfer of union officials who have
manifested a policy of disagreement with, or personal disloyalty to, high-level officials
may be necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the union. hi. at 819 n.1, 91
L.R.R.M. at 2351 n.l. After citing the proviso to § 101(a)(2), the Cooke court concluded
that the complaining official bears the burden of demonstrating that the action was
retaliatory and unrelated to a legitimate desire of the high-level official to structure job
assignments in order to manage the union in accordance with his election mandate.
529 F.2c1 at 819-20, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2352.
"Fhe standard used in Cooke and Newman was first suggested for application to
the union officer discipline problem in Beaird & Player, Free Speech and the Landrum-
Griffin Act, 25 M.A. L. REv. 577, 605 (1973),
33 See, e.g., Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2(1 912 (5th Cir. 1976); Cahouet . v. Wood-
cock, 520 F.2d 1084, 89 L.R.R.M. 2961 (8th Cir. 1975), cell. denied, 423 U.S. 1061
(1976): Schoenfeld v. Penza, 177 F.2d 899, 83 L.R.R.M. 2020 (2d Cir. 1973); Retail
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rnance of his function as a union officer or interferes with the operation of
the union as an institution, these factors are balanced against the encroach-
ment upon the official's free speech rights." In so balancing, the presump-
tion appears to be heavily in favor of the union." 5
Using the Newman standard, Newman and Bradford can be harmonized. In
Newman, the court was convinced that Newman's conduct amounted to insub-
ordination, thus undermining the policies of union management. and the best
interests of the union as a whole. 3e The court found that Newman's conduct
precluded his function as the union's agent.'? Moreover, the court deter-
mined that, despite his removal from office, Newman continued to exercise
vigorously his free speech rights." Therefore, the balance in Newman
weighed heavily in the union's favor.'" In Bradford, on the other hand, the
union conceded that Bradford's exercise of his free speech rights was within
permissible limits. 40
 Moreover, there does not appear to have been any ac-
cusation that Bradford's conduct. had impaired his ability to function in his
official capacity. The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that the union's motiva-
tion for removing him from office was sheer retaliation. 4 ' Consequently,
Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks International, 299 F. Stipp. 1012, 70 L.R.R.M. 3366
(D.D.C, 1969); Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340, 37
L.R.R.M. 2639 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964): Salzhandier v. Caputo, 316
F.2d 445, 52 L.R.R.M. 2908 (2c1 Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
Newman, 570 F.2d at 445-46, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2610-11 (2d Cir. 1978). See a ifsi)
Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters, 529 F.2d 815, 91 L.R.R.M. 2349 (9th
Cir. 1976); Gahauer v. Woodcock, 520 F.2d 1084, 89 L.R.R.M. 2961 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976); Sewell v. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,
445 F.2d 545, 77 L.R.R.M. 2916 (5th Cir. 1971). But see Sheridan v. United Bhd. of.
Carpenters, 306 F.2d 152, 50 L.R.R.M. 2637 (3d Cir. 1962).
35 Sonic courts have also made a determination whether the dismissed officer
was essentially a lieutenant to a higher union official. These courts reason that a
higher official is entitled to choose the person who Occupies a subordinate position, or
at least to demand a high degree of loyalty. See Wanibles v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888, 890, 85 L.R.R.M. 2328, 2329 (5th Cir. 1974); Cooke v.
Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters, 529 F.2d 815, 819 11.1, 91 L.R.R.M. 2349, 2351
n.1 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Beaird & Player, Free Speech and the Lamb -ton-Griffin Art, 25
ALA. L. Rev. 577, 587 (1973); Kroner, Title I of the LMRDA: Some Problems of Legal
Method and Mythology, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 280. 293-95 (1968).
as 570 F.2d at 443, 449, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2608, 2613. It should be noted that.
the only indication the Newman court gave regarding the required degree of interfer-
ence with the union is that the conduct of the official, in the view of' the local's elected
officers, is not in the best interest of the membership as a whole. This standard seems
singularly weak considering free speech rights are at stake. However, since the decision
rested upon a finding that. Newman's activities precluded his functioning as a job stew-
ard, the court's discussion of the degree of interference required is merely dicta.
37
 Id. at 447, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2612,
38 Id. at 448, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2613.
39 However, the court neglected to analyze the possibility that Newman's re-
moval would have a chilling effect upon other members' or officials' exercise of free
speech rights. See text at note 31 supra. As the test specifically called for this analysis,
id. at 445, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2610, its absence constitutes a major oversight in the deci-
sion's reasoning.
4 " 563 F.2d at 1143, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2694.
Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 2694-95.
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there was no need fiff the Bradford court to apply a balancing test, and, de-
spite the seeming discrepancy between Bradford and Newman, nothing in Brad-
ford suggests that the Fourth Circuit has repudiated either the balancing test
or the principles behind it.
The standard of review espoused by the Second Circuit in Newman may
be a reaction to criticism of the earliest decisions involving union officials dis-
missed for exercise of their free speech rights:" In these decisions, the
courts held that union officials were protected against removal for exercise of'
their free speech rights, without considering whether the union officials' con-
duct had impeded their funct.ion or undermined the effectiveness of the
union as an institution. The critics protested that such decisions ignored the
importance of' loyalty to the smooth functioning of top union management,
and suggested that a union be allowed to dismiss officials who disagree with
high level policy when those officials occupy key confidential or decision in-
fluencing positions. 4 "
The Newman standard may result in a serious chilling of union officials'
free speech rights. Under the Newman standard, officials in subordinate
elected or appointed positions and those in policy-making roles risk removal
from office when they speak out against the incumbent union management. If'
they are demoted or removed from office and seek reinstatement, they bear a
heavy burden of proving that their own interest. in free expression outweighs
the union's interest in effective operation. This burden undermines the put'-
pose of the statute which was to define the rights of union members as they
are defined in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution."
I. PROCEDURAL l)•vEt.oProEN -rs
A. Continuing Tide VII Violation as Basis
for EEOC Cluitge: United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans
Section 71)6(e)' of Title VII requires discriminatees to file charges with
the EEOC within a specified number of days from the date of an alleged Title
4 ' E.g., Grand Lodge of Intl Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2(1 340, 56
1..R.R,NI. 2639 (9th Cir.), cot denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964); Salzhandler v. Caputo, 3I6
F,2(1 445, 52 L.R.R.M. 2909 (2(1 Cir,), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963). King held
simply that successful candidates do not have the right to discharge appointed officials
because they expressed support for opponents. 335 F.2d at 346, 56 L.R.R.M. at 2642-
43. Salz.hundler- held that an elected official cannot be stripped of his office even for
libelously accusing the union president of thievery. 3l6 F.2d at 451, 52 I..R.R.M. at
291 9 .
4 " See Beaird & Player, Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 25 Al.A. I.. REV.
577, 585-87, 605 (1973); kroner. Title I of the LMRLM. Some Problems of Legal Method
and Mythology, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 280, 293-95 (1968).
" See discussion in text at notes 8-10
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976), Prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VI1,
the timely filing requirements now contained in § 706(e) were contained in § 706(d),
Civil Rights Act ()I' 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, 706(d), 78 Stat. 259 (1961).
Section 706(d) was renumbered as § 706(c) following the 1972 amendments. Equal
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VII violation as a jurisdictional prerequisite 10 bringing suit in federal
court. 3
 In the case of an isolated violation, failure to file an EE0C, charge
within the specified period results in the dismissal of any suit based upon that
violation. Iii the case of a continuing Title VII violation, by contrast, an
EEOC charge is timely at any tune during the continuation. of the dis-
criminatory practice, and, after its cessation, if filed within the time period
specified by section 706(e). 4
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court, held in United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Evans :" that a refusal to credit a rehired employee—whose original dis-
charge was discriminatory—with seniority for prior service does not constitute
a present, continuing violation of Title VII." The respondent in Evans had
been employed by United Air Lines (United) as a stewardess from November,
1966 until February, 1968, when she involuntarily resigned under United's
"no-marriage -
 policy.' This policy required female, but not male, flight at-
tendants to resign immediately upon marriage, or face termination." Al-
though several other female flight attendants successfully challenged Ihe
"no-marriage -
 policy as a violation of Title VII," respondent. Evans failed to
file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC at the time of her 1968 resigna-
lion.'" On February 16, 1972, United rehired Evans as a flight attendant."
For seniority purposes, however, she was treated as though she had no prior
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-201, § 4(e), 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
This chapter will consistently refer to the timely Filing requirements as
	 706(c).
Prior to the 1972 itmendments, Title VII required charges to be filed with
the EEOC within 90 days of an alleged violation. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. 1.. No.
88-352, tide VII, § 706(d), 78 Stat. 259 (1964). The 1972 amendments extended this
time limit to 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
" See, e.g.. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); Choate
v. Caterpillar Co., .102 F.2d 357, 359, 1 FEP Gas, 431. 433 (7th Cir. 1968).
E.g., Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 552, F.2d 333. 348 & n.14, 11 FEP Gas.
211. 223, 223 & n.14 (10th Cir. 1975). Legislative history indicates that Congress in-
tended 10 recognize continuing violations under the 1972 amendments. 118 Como.
REC. 7107 (1972) (Section by Section Analysis of Senate Rill 2515 submitted to the
Senate on March 43, 1972); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 501 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
431 U.S. 553 (1977).
'' M. at 558.
' Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 12.2d 1247, 1247, 12 FEP Cas. 1105,




 policy was successfully challenged in Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 3 FEP Cas. 621 (7th Cir.), ow. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971), and in Romasama v. United Air Lines, Inc., 537 F.2c1 915, I3 FEP Cas.
1437 (7th Cir. 1976), affil sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S.
385 (1977).
i" 534 F.2d at. 1248, 12 FEP Gas. at 1105. United, by November 7, 1968 letter
agreement with a collective bargaining agent. agreed to drop its "no -marriage' rule
and to reinstate flight attendants who had been ierminated under the rule and who
had filed charges. Evans did not qualify for reinstatement under this agreement be-
cause of her failure to file a prior charge of discrimination with the EEOC or under
collective bargaining procedures. Id. at 1248 11.2, 12 FEP Gas. at 1105 n.2.
" Id. at 1248, 12 FEP Gas. at 1105.
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service with United.'" In February of 1973, Evans filed charges with the
EEOC asserting that United's refusal to credit her with seniority perpetuated
the adverse effects of her original discriminatory termination, thereby result-
ing in a current. and continuing violation of' Title VII.'" Subsequently, Evans
filed a Title VII suit in federal district court seeking seniority credit for her
previous service and a hack pay award representing the loss in salary and
benefits attributable to her lower seniority) Since the time period within
which Evans could have filed a timely EEOC charge based on her original
discharge had passed,''' her allegation of a continuing violation was necessary
to meet the jurisdictional filing requirements of' section 706(e)."'
In support of her continuing violation theory, Evans maintained that al-
though United's present seniority policy was facially neutral as to sex, it
nevertheless violated Title VII by perpetuating the effects of her prior dis-
criminatory resignation.' 7 Accordingly, Evans argued, the current operation
of United's Facially neutral seniority policy constituted a current and continu-
ing unlawful employment practice such that an EEOC charge tiled at any time
during the continuation of the policy would be timely."' United countered
with the assertion that its only violation of Title VII took place upon Evans'
original termination." Any disadvantage now accruing to Evans was related
to the 1968 termination, with the result that her suit was time-barred under
section 706(e).'"
The district court rejected Evans' continuing violation theory, concluding
that Evans' failure to file a charge within 90 days of her 1968 resignation
caused her complaint to he time-harred. 21 The United States Court of Ap-
12 431 U.S. at 555. United used two seniority rolls with regard to flight atten-
dants. "Company" or "system" seniority accrued from the date of hire. "Stewardess" or
"pay" seniority accrued from the completion of flight attendant training. One or both
types of seniority determined a flight attendant's wages, the duration and timing of
vacations, rights to retention in the event of layoffs and to re-employment thereafter,
and rights to preferential selection ()I' flight assignments. Id. at 555 n.5. In addition,
United's seniority policy credited only continuous time-in-service. Thus any employee,
male or female, who resigned or was terminated and subsequently rehired received no
seniority credit for prior service. Id. at 557.
543 F.2d at 1247, 12 FEP Cas. at 1105,
14 Id.
15
 Evans could have filed a timely charge within 90 days of her involuntary
resignation in February, 1968. Asa result of her failure to do so, a claim based upon
her termination was time-barred when she ultimately filed with the EEOC in 1973.
I" Evans conceded that her charge would be untimely and that the jurisdic-
tional prerequisites of Title VII would not be fulfilled unless her theory of a continu-
ing violation was valid. 534 F.2d at 1249, 12 FEP Cas. at 1106.
" Id. at 1248-49, 12 FEP Cas. at 1106.
" Id. at 1248, 12 FEP Cas. at 1106,
" Id. at 1249, 12 FEP Cas, at 1106.
211 Id.
21 12 FEP Cas. 287, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1975). In dismissing Evans' claim of' a con-
tinuing violation, the district court stated:
Plaintiff, however, has not been suffering from any "continuing" violation.
She is seeking to have this court merely reinstate her November, 1966
seniority date which was lost solely by reason of her February, 1968 resig-
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peals for the Seventh Circuit unanimously reversed. 22 Ihe circuit court con-
sidered United's argument that no present Title VII violation existed to be
based, "sub silenlio," on the exception from the Act's definition of unlawful
employment practices for certain bona fide seniority systems contained in sec-
tion 703(h)." In determining whether United's seniority policies qualified
under section 703(h), the circuit court turned to Franks v. Bowman Transporta-
tion Co.," the Supreme Court's then most recent decision addressing the
scope of section 703(h). 25 In Franks, the Supreme Court held that section
703(h) does not proscribe awards of retroactive seniority to remedy the effects
of employment discrimination occuring after the effective date of Title
VII. 26 The Supreme Court's opinion in Franks contained broad language
stating that
the thrust of [section 703(h)1 is directed toward defining what is and
what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which the
post-Act operation of a seniority system is challenged as perpetuating
the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of
the Act.27
Relying on this broad language, the circuit court read Franks to hold that
section 703(h) was intended to protect only those facially neutral seniority sys-
tems which perpetuated the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the
effective date of Title VII. 28
 Since Evans contended that. United's facially
neutral seniority system perpetuated the effects of post - Act discrimination, 29
the court held that United's seniority policy was not a bona fide system under
nation. The fact that that resignation was the result of an unlawful
employment practice is irrelevant f o r purposes of these proceedings be-
cause plaintiff lost her opportunity to redress that grievance when she
failed to file a charge within ninety clays of February, 1968. United's sub-
sequent employment of plaintiff cannot operate to resuscitate such a time-
barred claim.
Id. at 288.
22 534 F.2d 1247, 1251, 12 FEP Cas. 1105, 1108 (7th Cir. 1976). A divided
panel of the court of appeals originally affirmed the district court's decision. 12 FEP
Cas. 288 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). After the Supreme Court's decision in Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), the same panel granted Evans' petition for
rehearing and reversed. 534 F.2d at 1251, 12 FE!' Cas. at 1108.
23
	
F.2d at 1249, 12 FEP Cas. at 1106. Section 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1976) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different stan-
dards of compensation, or different terms, conditions or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system ....
24 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
23
 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). a
more recent case addressing the scope of section 703(h), was decided on the same day
as Evans. See text at notes 50-58 infra.
" 424 U.S. at 757-62.
27 Id. at 763.
" 534 F.2d at 1249-51, 12 FEP Cas. at 1107.
29 Id. at 1250-51, 12 FE? Cas. at 1107-08.
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section 703(h), and consequently that the policy violated Tide VII." As a
result, the present operation of United's seniority policy constituted a continu-
ing Title VII violation. Evans' EEOC charge, having been filed during the
pendency of the alleged discrimination, therefore was not time-barred."
The Supreme Court., in a seven to two decision."' reversed and held that
in the absence of proof that a seniority system is not bona fide, an employer
does not commit a present and continuing Title VII violation by refusing to
credit a rehired employee—whose original discharge was discriminatory—
with seniority for prior service." The Court acknowledged the accuracy of
Evans' contention that United's seniority system gave present. effect to a past.
act of discrimination." The dispositive question for the Court, however, was
whether the present operation of United's seniority plan violated Title VII,
not whether any disadvantage remained from a past 'ride VII violation."' The
Court concluded that since United's seniority policy was facially neutral in its
treatment of existing male and female employees and of male and female
employees with prior service, the operation of the seniority system did not
constitute a present. and continuing violation of Title VII."" Since Evans had
failed to file a timely EEOC charge concerning her 1968 termination, the
Court reasoned that discriminatory discharge had no cont inuing legal signifi-
cance.' A discriminatory act, not made the basis of a timely charge, be-
comes, in the eyes of the Court, analogous to pre-Act. discrimination for the
purpose of determining its present. day effects." Accordingly, Evans' failure
to file an EEOC charge at the time United forced her resignation rendered
United's unlawful act.—Evans' resignation—and the consequences of that
act—her subsequently reduced pay and benefits—the legal equivalent of a
discriminatory act occurring before the passage of Title VII."
In reaching its decision that. United's failure to credit Evans with prior
seniority did not constitute a continuing Title VII violation, the Supreme
Court distinguished its earlier decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co." Franks, the Court observed, addressed only the question whether sec-
tion 703(h) barred an award of retroactive seniority after a Title VII violation
had been found," not questions of the timeliness of EEOC charges or the
existence of violations.'" Evans failed to show that United's seniority policy
presently violated Title VII.'" Without a present violation—a violation other
" Id. at 1251, 12 FE1' Gas. at 1108.
31 Id .
"" justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Marshall, joined by
Justice Brennan, dissented. 431 U.S. at 560.
"" Id. at 557-58.
34 Id. at 558.
35 id.
" Id. at 557-58.
37 id. at 558.
:1 	 fit
39 Id-
;" 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
41 431 U.S at 558-59. See text to notes 24-28 supra.
431 U.S. at 559.
43 Id. at 559 & n.13.
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than her original termination—no continuing violation existed. Consequently,
the Court reasoned, Evans' claim was time-barred by her failure to file an
EEOC charge in 1968, and her complaint against United properly dis-
missed." The Court concluded by noting that acceptance of Evans' claim of a
continuing violation would permit the substitution of a claim for seniority
credit whenever an otherwise valid charge was lime-barred." The Court was
unwilling to grant such present legal significance to time-barred claims. 4 "
It is submitted that the Court reached a fair result in refusing to accept
Evans' theory of a continuing violation. As the Evans Court suggested," al-
lowing complainants to base timely EEOC charges upon an allegation that the
continuing impact of a discriminatory act constitutes an independent Title VII
violation would substitute a continuing violation claim whenever a charge
based upon the discriminatory act itself is time-barred. If a discriminatory act.
is considered to continue for as long as some lingering impact remains, every
post-Act violation would provide the basis for at timely continuing violation
charge." Such a result would appear contrary to the time limitation set out
in section 706(0. 4 "
The Court's handling of the procedural question raised in Evans—the
viability of basing a claim of continuing Title VII violation upon the operation
of seniority systems—mirrors the Cou rt's decision the same clay in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States:'t Iti Teamsiers, the Court was
Faced with a Title VII challenge to a facially neutral seniority system which
allegedly prolonged the effects of post-Act and pre-Act hiring discrimina-
tion." As to victims of post-Act discrimination, the Teamsters Court. held that
14 111. at 557.
" ht. at. 560.
48 In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by justice Brennan, argued that absent
section 703(h), the operation of United's seniority system indisputably would constitute
an unlawful employment practice by virtue of 
-awarding the choicest jobs to those
possessing a credential married women were unlawfully prevented from acquiring:
continuous tenure 431 U.S, at 560-61. He argued, as he had in Teamslers. , 431
U.S. 324, 377-94 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), that
section 703(h) does not protect seniority' systems that perpetuate post-Act discrimina-
tion. 431 U.S. at 561, 562 n.2. In addition, justice Marshall world have accepted
Evans' theory of the continuing nature of United's violation, arguing that in such in-
stances a discrimininee's charge would be timely at any time up until 180 clays after the
alleged continuing violation ceased. N. at 561-62.
" 431 U.S. at 560.
48
 /(/. Evans' case illustrates the potential for extended lingering effects. Not
only did she wait live years to act upon United's alleged discriminatory requirement
that she resign, but she failed to file charges until one year after United's allegedly
discriminatory recompwation of her seniority status. /4. at 557 11.9.
1 " See notes 1 and 2 supra,
431 U.S. 32-1 (1977). Teamslen and Evans both were decided on May 31,
1977.
5 ' Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 347-48. Teems(ers involved two alleged violations of .
Title VII. First, the Government alleged a pattern and practice of racially discrimina-
tory hiring, assignment and promotion policies. /d. at 329, Second, the Government
argued that the present seniority system perpetuated the effects of pre- and post-Act
discrimination and as such could never he bona fide under § 703(h). /t/. The Teamsters
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under Franks such discriminatees could obtain full retroactive seniority relief
as a remedy For the discriminatory hiring practices without attacking the legal-
ity of the seniority system itself. 52 As to victims of pre-Act discrimination, ' 3
the Teamsters Court. held that the availability of seniority relief depended upon
whether the seniority system itself violated Title VII." In determining
whether section 703(h) protected this "otherwise bona fide seniority system"
from a direct challenge by pre-Act discriminatees, the Court reviewed the
legislative history of section 703(h) 55 and concluded that "an otherwise neu-
tral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII
simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination.""
The Evans Court, by characterizing a past discriminatory act not made
the subject. of a timely charge as the "legal equivalent" of pre-Act discrimina-
tion, 57
 brought Evans' claim of a continuing violation squarely within the
parameters of Teamsters. The operation of United's neutral seniority system,
despite its perpetuation of prior post-Act discrimination, would not constitute
a present Title VII violation under the Teamsters holding. Since the operation
of United's system was not a present continuing Title VII violation, Evans'
original discharge in 1968 was the only violation capable of sustaining a timely
charge under the requirements of section 706(e).
Under Teamsters and Evans, the operation of a facially neutral seniority
system, which perpetuates the effect of a pre-Act or a time-barred post-Act
discriminatory employment practice, no longer constitutes a violation of Title
VII. Since an EEOC charge must be based upon a present violation, a charge
based solely upon the continuing operation of such a neutral seniority system,
despite the system's perpetuation of prior discrimination, will no longer fulfill
the timely filing requirements of section 706(e)."
Court sustained the lower courts' findings of an unlawful pattern and practice of racial
discrimination. Id. at 342-43. The Court, however, found the seniority system to be
bona fide under 703(h) and reversed! the lower courts' finding that the system vio-
lated Title VII. Id. at 355-56.
52 1(1. at 347-48 & n.30. Nevertheless, the Teamsters Court, relying on Evans,
appeared to uphold the legality of the seniority system even though it perpetuated the
effects ()I' post-Act discrimination. Id. at 358 11.30. The Court characterized Evans as
holding "that the operation of a seniority system is not unlawful under Title VII even
though it perpetuates post-Act discrimination that has not been the subject of a timely
charge by the discriminatee." Id. in Teamsters, the Court took Evans one step further
and indicated that the mere fact that it seniority system perpetuates post-Act discrim-
ination, without more, does not violate Title VII. Specifically, the Court noted that
703(b) "immunizes all bona fide seniority systems, and does not distinguish between
the perpetuation of pre- and post-Act discrimination." Id.
5" Id. at. 348.
54 Id. at 353-54.
5' Id. at 350-52. See 110 CONC. REC. 7207, 7213, 7217 (1964).
5" 431 U.S. at 353-54.
" 431 U.S. at 558.
" Cf. Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556 F.2d 1219. 1222-23, 15 FVP Cas. 374,
375-76 (5th Cir. 1977), eert. denied, 411 U.S.1..W. 3518 (1978) (distinguishing Evans, and
holding that a present and continuing Title VII violation, as opposed to claim based
on the continuing effects of a past violation. sustains a timely charge).
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B. Necessity for Individual EEOC Charge — Retroactivity qf
Extended 180-Day Filing Limit: Incla v. United Airlines, Inc.
In order to bring suit in federal district court under Title VII, a victim of
employment discrimination must fulfill two statutory requirements.' First,
under the 1972 amendment extending the time limit for filing with the
EEOC, 2 a discriminatee must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of
the alleged Title VII violation in accordance with section 706(e)." Second, a
discriminatee must obtain a right to sue letter from the EEOC upon the un-
successful completion of conciliation negotiations by the•Commission, in ac-
cordance with section 706(1). 4 Two aspects of compliance with these re-
quirements for filing suit under Title VII arose before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit this Survey year in Inda v. United Air
Lines, Inc.' The circuit court held that the 1972 amendment extending from
90 to 180 days the time within which to file an EEOC charge under section
706(e), 6 was meant to apply to any claim pending with the EEOC on the
amendment's effective date,' regardless of whether the claim alleged viola-
1 E.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (compliance with
the procedural requirements of Title VII is a jurisdicitional prerequisite to sustain a
civil suit).
2
 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(e), 86
Stat. 103 (1972).
3
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). This section provides, in pertinent part, that
"1 a] charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty clays after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ... Id.
4
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976). This section provides, in pertinent part:
If a charge tiled with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission,
or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge
... the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section or the
Attorney General has not filed a civil action in a case involving the gov-
ernment, governmental agency, or political subdivision, or the Commission
has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person ag-
grieved is a party, the Commission ... shall so notify the person aggrieved
and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be
brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person
claiming to be aggrieved .
5
 565 F.2d 554, 16 HP Gas. 251 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W.
3676 (1978).
8
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). Prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII,
the timely filing requirements now contained in § 706(e) were contained in § 706(d),
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, § 706(d), 78 Stat. 259 (1964).
Section 706(d) was renumbered as § 706(e) following the 1972 amendments. Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(e), 86 Slat. 103 (1972).
This chapter will consistently refer to the timely filing requirements as § 706(e).
Prior to the 1972 amendments, Title VII required charges to he filed with the
EEOC within 90 days of an alleged violation. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, title VII, § 706(d), 78 Stat. 259 (1964). The 1972 amendments extended this
time limit to 180 clays. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
The effective date of' the 1972 amendment extending the time period for
filing EEOC charges was March 24, 1972. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of'
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 14, 86 Stat. 113. (1972).
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lions occurring more than 180 days before the effective date or, within 180
clays of that date." The court also held that the time limit within which an
individual employee must file an EEOC charge—a prerequisite to bringing a
Title VII suit—is not tolled by the timely filing of separate charges by fellow
employees, even if the charges are based upon similar events."
The plaintiff in Inda alleged that United Air Lines (United) had violated
Title VII by requiring her resignation from a position as a flight attendant on
June 15, 1968 because of her marriage plans.'" When United later dropped
this "no-marriage" policy on November 7, 1968, 11 Inda requested and was
denied reinstatement on November 14, 1 968. 12 On November 18, 1968,
Inda filed a complaint with the EEOC." At that time, Title VII required an
aggrieved person to file a charge with the EEOC within 90 days of the alleged
violation." Although Inda had filed within four days of United's refusal to
reinstate her, she had not filed within 90 days of her forced resignation. Ac-
cordingly, in the subsequently filed civil suit, United contended that lnda's
claims were time-barred.'s The district court considered Inda's forced resig-
nation and the denial of reinstatement to he separate violations of Title VII."
Since Inda had Filed with the EEOC four days after United's denial of
reinstatement, the district court found her charge to have been filed within
the requisite 90 days," and denied United's motion to dismiss the complaint
as time-barred."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disapproved the district court's character-
ization of the refusal to reinstate as a separate Title VII violation." In so
doing, the circuit court relied upon its earlier decision in Collins v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 2 " which held that a denial of reinstatement does not give rise to a
Title VII violation separate from the original discharge. 2 ' The court next
8 565 F.2d at 560-61, 16 FEP Cas. at 255-56.
9 Id. at 558-59, 16 FEP Cas. at 254-55.
i " Id. at 556, 16 FEP Cas. at 253. Inda was told by United supervisors that as a
consequence of her marriage plans she would be fired and that fired personnel were
not rehired. Those who resigned, she was assured, would have preference in being
rehired if United dropped its "no-marriage" rule. Id. at 557 & n.1, 16 FEP Cas. at 253
& n. t .
" United, by a November 7, 1968 letter agreement with a collective bargaining
agent, agreed to drop its "no-marriage" rule and to reinstate those flight attendants
who had been terminated under the rule and who had filed charges or grievances.
Since I nda had resigned voluntarily and had failed to file charges, she did not qualify
for reinstatement under the agreement. 565 F.2d at 557-58 & n.2, 16 FEP Cas. at 253
& n.2.
12 405 F. Supp. 426, 429, 13 FEP Cas. 1229, 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
'" 565 F.2d at 558, 16 HIP Cas. at 253.
" See note 6 supra.
15 565 F.2d at 557, 16 FEP Cas. at 253.
1 " 405 F. Supp. at 433, 13 FEP Cas. at 1235.
17 Id.
" 565 F.2d at 556-57, 16 FEP Cas. at 252-53. There is no published opinion
with regard to the denial of United's motion to dismiss.
le Id. at 561, 16 FEP Cas. at 256-57.
I" 514 F.2d 594, 10 FEP Cas. 728 (9th Cir. 1975).
21 Id. at 596-97, 10 FEP Cas. at 730.
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considered and rebutted arguments that the filing requirements of section
706(e) could be tolled or waived. The plaintiff, joined by the EEOC as amicus
curiae, maintained that her EEOC charge was timely because other United
employees already had filed timely charges with the EEOC challenging the
same "no-marriage" policy. 22
 The charges of these employees," she argued,
"made the filing of additional complaints by other aggrieved United steward-
esses unnecessary and redundant." 24
 Inda relied upon the case of Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 25 in which the Supreme Court held that back pay could be
awarded under Title VII on a class basis to unnamed plaintiffs who had not
themselves filed charges with the EEOC. 26 Albemarle, the plaintiff' main-
tained, supported either an argument that if a charge based on the same
violation already had been filed a discriminatee need not file a charge with the
EEOC to obtain a right to sue on her own behalf, or an argument that the
time within which an EEOC charge must be filed is tolled by the filing of a
similar charge by another party. 27
The court emphatically declared that neither of the premises advocated
by the plaintiff rationally followed from Albemarle." It noted that Albemarle
held only that once the class representative complied with EEOC procedural
requirements, compliance by individual class members was not a prerequisite
to obtaining Title VII relief on a class basis. 29 The plaintiff sought a right to
sue, not class membership. The court reasoned that nothing in Albemarle or in
the legislative history of Title VII suggested that a right. to sue letter would he
available to persons who had not conformed to the EEOC filing requirements
contained in section 706(e)."" Likewise, the court observed that the plaintiff's
second argument—that the filing of one EEOC charge tolls the statutory time
period for other victims of the same discrimination—did not follow from Al-
bemarle." Albemarle, according to the circuit court, addressed only the ques-
tion whether an individual must file an EEOC charge in order to enjoy class
membership, not the question whether the filing limitations of section 706(e)
can be tolled. 32
22 565 F.2d at 558, 16 FEP Cas. at 254.
23 Mary Sprogis filed a charge with the EEOC in August, 1966 and success-
fully challenged United's "no-marriage" policy. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F.2d 1194, 1196, 3 FEY Cas. 621, 624 (7th Cir.)("no-marriage" rule for flight atten-
dants discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII and not justified as a
bona fide occupational qualification), cerl. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). Carol
Romasanta filed with the EEOC in 1967 and successfully intervened in a suit finding
the "no-marriage" policy violative of Title VII. Romansanta v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
537 F.2d 915, 917, 13 FEP Gas, 1437, 1438 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd soh nom. United Air
Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
21 565 F.2d at 558, 16 FEP Cas. at 254.
25 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
2" Id. at 414 n.8.
27 565 F.2d at 558, 16 FEP Cas. at 254.
28 Id.
29 Id. (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 414).
3" 565 F.2d at 558, 16 FEP Cas. at 254.
3 ' Id. at 558-59, 16 FEP Cas. at 254.
32 Id. at 558, 16 FEP Cas. at 254.
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The circuit court, in dismissing 'the plaintiff's analysis, acknowledged that
some Title VII cases supported the notion that the filing of an EEOC charge
by one employee would toll the statutory filing period for other victims of the
same discriminatory practice until the EEOC had completed its efforts to ob-
tain voluntary compliance, and had either issued a right to sue letter or dis-
missed the charge." The court observed that these Title VII cases often
relied upon an analogy to American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah," a Su-
preme Court decision holding a class action bought for an anti-trust violation
tolls the statute of limitations for all class members until class certification is
denied, 35
 to support their tolling analysis." The ludo court particularly
noted, however, that no analogous administrative proceedings preceded the
suit in American Pipe.' The theory of American Pipe was that the filing of a
class action notifies defendants both of the substantive claims and "of the
number and generic identities of the potential plaintiff's who may participate
in the judgment." t° In contrast, the hula court reasoned, an employee who
files an individual administrative charge with the EEOC might. never bring a
class action. 3" Consequently, unlike the filing of a class action suit, the filing
of an individual EEOC charge does not adequately inform an employer of the
substance and number of claims potentially present in an adverse action."
The liula court thus held that unless an EEOC charge was brought on behalf
of a class of discriminatees—such as when charges are brought by EEOC
Commissioners under section 706(0(1) 41
—the plaintiff could not allege that
Title VII filing requirements had been fulfilled. As a result, the 90 clay filing
requirement had not been eliminated or tolled by the filing of individual
EEOC charges by other United eniployees. 42
The rejection of Inda's tolling arguments did not end the court's consid-
eration of the timeliness of her EEOC charge. 43
 The court noted that under
the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the 90 day filing period had been ex-
tended to 180 days for those charges pending with the EEOC on the effective
date of the amendment, and for all charges filed thereafter." Inda's EEOC
33
 The circuit court cited United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.24 906,
925, 5 FEP Gas. 587, 600-01 (5th Cir. 1973), as an example of such a case.
34
 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
75
 565 F.2c1 at 559, 16 FEP Cas. at 254-55 (citing American Pipe, 414 U.S. at
561).
" 565 F.2d at 559, 16 FEP Cas. at 254.
"7 Id., 16 FEP Gas. at 254-55.
" Id., 16 FEP Cas. at 255 (citing American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 555).




 42 U.S.G. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
42
 565 F.2d at 559, 16 FEP Gas, at 255.
as Id. at 560, 16 FEP Cas. at 255.
44
 Section 14 of the 1972 amendments made § 706(e) applicable to all charges
pending with the EEOC on the effective date of the amendments, March 24, 1972,
and to all charges filed thereafter. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-261, § 14, 86 Stat. 113 (1972).
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charge had been filed within 180 days of her resignation in 1968, 45
 This fact
raised the question whether Inda's charge was pending before the EEOC on
the effective date of the amendment. The Inda court reasoned that if final
action had not been taken on Indies claim by March 24, 1972, the effective
date of the amendment extending the filing limits, 4 r' her charge "was pending
in the sense in which that term is commonly used 47
 even though the viola-
tion alleged took place more than 180 days before that date. Without refer-
ence to the amendment's legislative history, the court attributed this "com-
mon" meaning to the term pending and concluded that Inda's charge was still
pending before the EEOC on the effective date of the 1972 amendment." As
a result, the charge was considered to be timely despite her failure to file
within the applicable period and the district court's judgment in her favor was
sustained.'"
The hula court's holding that the timely filing requirements contained in
section 706(e) of Title VII are not. waived or tolled for individuals seeking a
right to sue on their own behalf by the filing of charges by others is correct
for several reasons. First, nothing in the legislative history of section 706(e)
indicates that the timely filing requirement should be waived under ordinary
circumstances for those seeking a right to sue on their own behalf.`'" Second,
allowing non-filing discriminatees to join in a class action suit where the class
representative has filed a timely EEOC charge, as in Albemarle," is not.
analogous to allowing non-filing discriminatees to sue individually. Class
membership does not permit non-filing individuals to represent the class or to
commence suit on their own behalf. 52
 If the class fails to be certified or is
decertified," the timely filing of the former class representative does not
waive the filing requirements of section 706(e) for those discriminatees who
wish to sue on their own behalf. This result comports with Title VII's policy
" Inda resigned from service as a flight attendant on June 15, 1968. She filed
charges with the EEOC on November 18, 1968. See text at notes 10-14 supra.
4" See note 7 supra.
42 565 F.2d at 561, 16 FEP Cas. at 256.
4"
 Accord, Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358.64 (1977);
Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 890, 1 FEP Cas. 861, 8(i2 (9th Cir. 1969).
4" 565 F.2d at 563, 16 FEP Cas. at 256.
5° 118 CONC. REC. 7167 (1972) (Section by Section Analysis of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 706(e)). Although the legislative history indi-
cates approval of court decisions which have shown an inclination to interpret the
filing time limits to give aggrieved persons the maximum benefit of the law, particu-
larly when the lateness of filing is clue to government inadvertence, delay or error, the
history in no way advocates waiver of such filing requirements. Id.
5 ' 422 U.S. at 414 n.8. Accord, Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239,
246, 9 FEP Cas. 211, 215 (3d Cir.) (class representative in class action may represent
all persons who could have filed charges with the EEOC as of the date of the rep-
resentative's filing), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
52 See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720, 2 FEP Cas. 121, 126
(7th Cir. 1969); Otitis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498, I FEP Cas. 328.
329 (5th Cir. 1968).
53 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h). See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc., v. McDonald, 432
U.S. 385, 389-9(} (1977) (class decertified for lack of nu ► erosity).
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of attempting settlement of employment discrimination disputes before the
initiation of private civil suits." Once a class action has begun, EEOC concili-
ation efforts concerning individual charges tiled by the class representative
have ended. At this point, no procedural or conciliatory purpose is served by
requiring each potential class member to file EEOC charges." In contrast,
allowing the timely charge of one employee to waive the procedural require-
ments for other employees who seek the right. to bring separate suits effec-
tively circumvents the conciliation policy of Title VII and encourages ag-
grieved parties to substitute private suits for EEOC statutory procedures and
remedies. This result plainly is contrary to the legislative intent behind Title
VII. 56
 Accordingly, the /Hilo court. properly disapproved plaintiff's arguments
that section 706(e)'s Filing requirements might he waived or tolled.
• The Inda court's disapproval of these arguments is correct for an addi-
tional reason. As the court noted, the filing of an individual EEOC charge
does not provide an employer with the same information as the tiling of a
class action suit." While an individual charge filed with the EEOC may
plicate a uniform company-wide policy," the individual charge, unlike the
class action, does not notify the employer of the imminence of a suit poten-
tially involving many plaintiffs, substantial judgments, and practical conse-
quences extending far beyond the defense of a single suit.'''' Consequently, if
the hida court had accepted the plaintiff's argument. that a tolling of secti011
706(e)'s requirements results from the filing of similar charges by other indi-
vidual employees, an important avenue by which an employer could be in-
formed of additional claims and by which the EEOC could mount conciliation
attempts would be impeded.
The circuit court. also correctly held that the 180 day limitation period
applies to all claims pending before the EEOC on the effective date of the
1972 amendment, regardless of whether the alleged violation occurred within
180 days of that. date." The retroactivity of the amendment. extending the
filing period for EEOC charges from 90 to 180 days was addressed previously
in International Union of Electrical Workers ri. I?obbins & Myers, Inc.," where the
54
 Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d at 719, 2 FEP Gas. at 126-27; Oatis
v. Grown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d at 498-99, 1 FEP Gas. at 329. See also 118 Com:.
Ria;. 7167 (1972).
55
 Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d at 720-21, 2 FF.P Gas. at 126-27;
Miller v. International Paper Go., 408 17.2d 283, 284-85, 1 HP Gas. 1147, 648 (5th Cir.
1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d at 498, I FEP Gas, at 329.
5" See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 11972) U.S. Corr:
Coxc. & An. NEWS 2136. 2143-45.
57
 565 F.2d at 559, 16 FEP Gas. al 254.
" United's "no-marriage" policy was certainly an example of such a uniform
company-wide policy. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 393 11.13.
59
 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e) (1976) provides only that notice of each individual
charge tiled shall be served upon the employer against whom such a charge is made,
within 11) days of the filing.
"" Accord, Crook v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 427 F. Stipp. 95(1. 958-59, 14 FEP
Gas. 1349, 1396 (N.D. III. 1977); Dickerson v. United States Steel Co., 439 F. Stipp. 55,
63 n.11, 15 FF.P Cas. 752, 766 11.11 (EA). Pa. 1977).
"' 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
November 19781
	
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 151
Supreme Court held that Congress intended the 180 day limitations period to
apply 10 charges pending with the EEOC at the time of the amendment, but
alleging violation within 180 days of the amendment's effective date." 2 The
Ninth Circuit in Inda responded to a question unresolved by the Supreme
Court in Electrical Workers—whether the extended 180 day limitations period
applied to pending EEOC charges alleging violations more than 180 clays be-
fore the effective date of 1972 amendments."'
The text of the 1972 amendments supports the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of their retroactivity. Section 14 of the 1972 Act provided that "[t]he
amendments made by this Act to section 706 of the Civil Rights Act shall, be
applicable with respect to charges pending with the Commission on the date
of enactment of this'Act and all charges filed thereafter."' Congress, while
aware of the expanded limitations period, did not. limit the sweeping language
of section 14.'3 Indeed, the language of section 14 affirmatively suggests an
intention to encompass claims of discriminatory conduct that occurred before
passage of the 1972 Act, as long as the Commission retained jurisdiction over
such claims. Moreover, nothing in the legislative history of section 14 indicates
that. Congress intended to distinguish between pending claims alleging viola-
tion within 180 clays of March 24, 1972 and pending claims alleging violation
more than 180 days before March 24, 1972. Accordingly, the Inda court cor-




" 3 429 U.S. at 243 & 11.17. The Court in Electrical Workers specifically limited its
holding to the facts of the case before it. There, the plaintiff, 1)ortha Guy, had filed
charges with the EEOC on February 10, 1972, alleging a violation of Title VII which
had occurred 108 days previously on October 25, 1971. Id. at 231-32. She alleged that
the expanded 180 days limitations period provided on March 24, 1972 by the 1972
amendments should apply to make her charge timely, "as the occurrence she was
complaining of took place within 180 clays of the enactment of the 1972 amendments."
Id. at 241. On that limited basis the Court agreed with Guy and held her charge to be
timely filed, stating:
Accordingly, we need riot decide whether the enlarged limitation period
also redounds to the benefit of persons who filed a charge more than 90,
but less that) 180 days from the date of alleged "occurrence," where the
180 days had run prior to March 24, 1972.
Id. at 243 & 11,17.
" 1 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. I.. No. 92 7 261, § 14, 86
Stat. 113 (1972). Congress had originally provided that the amendments io 706
would not apply to charges liied prior to the effective date of the 1972 amendments.
II. R. 1746, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., § 10 (1972): S. 2515, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1972);
For the text of these proposed amendments see Proposed Amendments to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: Hearings on S. 2515 Be/ore the Senate Committee on Labor & Public
Welfare, 92d Cong.. 2d Sess. 409 (1972), reprinted in LEGISLAT/VE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL. EMPLOYMENT Ot•PoRTuNrn. Act- or 1972, at 58,409 (1972). Davis v. Valley Dis-
trib. Co., 5'22 F.2d 827, 831, 10 FEP Cas. 1473, 1474 (9th Cir. 1975): EEOC v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp.. 511 F.2d 1352, 1355, 10 FEP Cas. 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1975): huger
v. Ball, -197 F.2d 702, 708, 7 FEP Cas. 1111,1114-15 (4th Cir. 1974).
"5 118 Cost:. REC. 4816 (1972).
"" United's petition fint certiorari to review the court's interpretation of the
retroactivity of the 1972 amendments was denied. 46 U.S.L.W. 3676 (1978).
152	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:61
1972—filed within 180 clays of the alleged Title VII violation—is sufficient
for the charge to retroactively qualify as timely under the extended limitations
of the 1972 Act."'
C. Determination of the Relevant Labor Market
in Pattern or Practice Snits
- 1 -o establish a prima facie "pattern or practice- case under Title VII,' the
EEOC must demonstrate that the defendant, whether employer or union, has
consistently treated minorities less favorably than others, and that such dispa-
rate treatment has been racially motivated. 2 Proof of discriminatory motive,
therefore, is critical in a pattern or practice case. In order to establish dis-
criminatory motive, the EEOC usually introduces two types of evidence: ( 1 )
direct. evidence of motive, such as individual instances of discrimination," and
(2) circumstantial evidence of motive, such as statistics showing the degree of
disparate treatment..` These statistics demonstrate disparate treatment
through a comparison of the percentage of minorities in the employer's or
union's work force with the percentage of qualified minority workers in the
relevant labor market. 5 The Supreme Court considers such statistical work
force comparisons to be an important source of proof in an employment. dis-
crimination case, and has stated that "[w]here gross statistical disparities can
be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a
pattern or practice of discrimination."
' Section 707(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorized the United States
Attorney General to institute civil proceedings whenever he had "reasonable cause to
believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of"
discrimination in violation of Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. I.,. No. 88-352,
title VII, 707(a), 78 Stat. 261 (1964). Section 707 was amended in 1972 to give the
EEOC: rather than the Attorney General the authority to institute pattern or practice
suits. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(c) (1976).
2 I nternational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).
In Teamsters, the Supreme Court stated that the Government in a pattern or practice
case must "prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic
discriminatory acts. It [has] to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial
discrimination was the [defendant's] standard operating procedure—the regular
rather than the unusual practice." Id.
See, e.g., International BM. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
338 (1977). I n Teamsters, the Government 'bolstered its statistical evidence with the
testimony of individuals who recounted over 40 specific instances of discrimination. -
Id.
4 See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 305 (1977);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-38 (1977). For a
more in-depth analysis of Hazelwood see Edwards, The Coming of Age of the Burger Court:
Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court During the 1976 Term, 19 B.C. L. REv. 1, 9
(1977); Note, The Role of Statistical Evidence in Title VII Cases, 19 B.C. L. REv. 881
(1978). For a more in depth discussion of Teamsters, see Edwards, supra,, at 5; this
Survey at 169.
5 Id.
" Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977). The
Supreme Court stated in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
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Since the Supreme Court attaches high probative value to statistical work
force comparisons in establishing employment discrimination, it is important.
to understand the considerations which underlie the selection of the relevant
labor market. The term "relevant labor market" refers to a geographic area
whose population make-up a court deems relevant for purposes of compari-
son to an employer's or union's work force.' The relevant labor market gen-
erally corresponds to the geographic areas from which employees or union
members have been drawn in the past,' but other considerations may dictate
that such a labor market is not relevant.' Once a specific geographic area has
324 (1977), that statistical work force comparisons are probative of discriminatory mo-
tive because
it. is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in
time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and
ethnic composition of the population in the community from which
employees are hired. Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity between
the composition of a work force and that of the general population thus
may be significant even though ... Title VII imposes no requirement that
a work force mirror the general population.
Id. at 340 n.20.
7 Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977).
EEOC v. International Union of Operating Engineers Locals 14 & 15, 553
F.2d 251, 254, 14 FE!' Cas. 870, 872 (2c1 Cir. 1977); United States v. Hazelwood
School Dist., 534 F.2d 805, 811 n.7, 12 MP' Cas. 1161, 1166 n.7 (8th Cir. 1976).
See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311-12
(1977). Hazelwood was a pattern or practice suit brought by the United States Attorney
General charging the suburban St. Louis school district with discrimination in the hir-
ing of teachers. Id. at 301. The Eighth Circuit in Hazelwood based the relevant labor
market on the area from which the Hazelwood School District drew its employees, and
on this basis, included the nearby city of St. Louis. United States v. Hazelwood School
Dist., 534 F,2d 805, 811 n.7, 12 FE1) Cas. 1161, 1166 n.7 (8th Cir. 1976).
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Hazelwood School District contended
that even though the city of St. Louis was within the geographic area from which it
drew teachers, that city should not he included in the relevant labor market because
the St. Louis School District had a policy of maintaining a 50% minority teaching staff.
433 U.S. at 310-11. Therefore, Hazelwood argued, the inclusion of St. Louis in the
relevant labor market distorted the statistical work force comparison, and the relevant
labor market should include only the suburbs in which the Hazelwood School District.
was located. Id. The Supreme Court did not resolve this issue, but instead remanded
the case of the district court to determine which market provided the most accurate
basis for comparison with Hazelwood's teaching staff. Id. at 311-12. The Supreme
Court listed live factors to aid the lower court in making its determination:
(l) whether the racially based hiring policies of-the St. Louis City School
District were in effect as far back as 1970, the year in which the census
figures were taken;
(2) to what extent those policies have changed the racial composition of
that district's teaching staff from what it would otherwise have been;
(3) to what extent St. Louis' recruitment policies have diverted to the city
teachers who might otherwise have applied to Hazelwood;
(4) to what extent Negro teachers employed hy•the city would prefer
employment in other districts such as Hazelwood; and
(5) what the experience in other school districts in St. Louis County indi-
cates about the validity of excluding the City School District from the
relevant labor market.
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been selected, the court uses census and other data to determine the percen-
tage of qualified minority workers in the relevant labor market. This percen-
tage is then compared to the percentage of minority workers in the
employer's or union's work force in order to demonstrate disparate treatment
of minorities. A more minority intensive labor market results in a more dispa-
rate statistical work force comparison. Accordingly, a court is more likely to
find that the statistical comparison buttresses, or even establishes, the EEOC's
pattern or practice case.
The selection of the relevant labor market assumes an even more impor-
tant role after the court makes a finding of discrimination. Once a Title VII
violation has been established, the court uses the percentage of qualified
minority workers in the relevant labor market to set a remedial hiring goal
designed to compensate minority workers for the effects of past disparate
treatment.'" Thus, the selection of a more minority intensive area as the
relevant labor market not only makes a Finding of discrimination inure proba-
ble, but also may result in the imposition of a more severe judgment against
an employer or union.
In most Title VII cases, the selection of the relevant labor market is of
little importance because the racial composition of an employer's or union's
work force is glaringly deficient regardless of the labor market to which it is
compared." However, in those Title VII cases where a disparity in racial
con position is not readily apparent, the selection of the relevant labor market
assumes crucial importance. In those cases, a finding of discrimination hinges
on which labor market is chosen for purposes of comparison to the
employer's or union's work force." This Survey year, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was presented with such a case in EEOC 1),
International Union of Operating Engineers, Locals 14 & 15.' 3 In Local 14 & 15,
the EEOC alleged that Local 15 of the International Union of Operating En-
gineers (Local 15) engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination against
minorities in recruiting new members." The district court found that only
Hazelwood is thus an example of a case in which the area from which an employer
drew its employees did not necessarily constitute the revevant labor market.
10 See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467, 492-93, 12 FEP Cas. 712,
732-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1020
n.4, 8 FEP Cas. 855, 858 n.4 (1st. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); United
States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012, 1016,
13 FEP Cas. 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1976).
12 See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977);
EEOC v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Locals 14 & 15, 553 F.2d 251,
14 FEP Cas, 870 (2d Cir. 1977).
" 553 F.2d 251, 14 FEP Gas. 870 (2d Cir. 1977).
' 4 Id. at 253, 14 FEP Cas. at 871. Both Locals 14 and 15 of the International
Union of Operating Engineers were defendants in Locals 14 & 15. However, because
the finding of liability on the part of Local 14 was not contingent on which labor
market was selected For comparison to the racial composition of its membership, id. at
256, 14 FEP Cas. at 873, this discussion will focus only on the Title VII claims against
Local 15.
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6.5% of Local 15's membership were minorities," and further determined
that the union's jurisdiction, New York City, was the relevant labor market."'
Finding that 36.4% of the qualified union candidates in this labor market
were minorities," the district court held that the disparity between 36.4% and
6.5% established a prima facie Title VII violation. ] '
Local 15 appealed the district court's finding of discrimination to the Sec-
ond Circuit on two grounds. First, Local 15 claimed that the union's New
York City jurisdiction was not the relevant labor market because a significant
number of its members resided outside the city." Local 15 argued that if the
relevant labor market was expanded to include the area in which union mem-
bers actually resided, minorities would constitute only 16.2% of the qualified
union candidates as opposed to 36.4%." Second, Local 15 challenged the
district court's failure to consider the increase in the union's minority mem-
bership since the effective date of Title V1I. 2 ' Local 15 contended that al-
though minorities made up only 6.5% of its present membership, approxi-
mately 20% of union members recruited since Title VII's effective date had
been minorities. 22
 Since minorities constituted 20% of members recruited
after Title VII became effective, and since this recruiting took place in a rele-
vant labor market with a minority population of only 16.2%, the union ar-
gued that the district court's finding of discrimination had no statistical
basis. 23
The Second Circuit agreed with Local 15 on both grounds. As to which
geographic area constituted the relevant labor market, the court reasoned that
[w]here a union draws its membership almost entirely from within its
geographic jurisdiction, it may be convenient to accept this area as
the source of its labor pool.... However, where a significant
number of union members come from outside the union's geo-
graphic jurisdiction, the court must widen its sights; the appropriate
reference area then should be that region from which the union
draws its members."
Because Local 15 drew a significant number of its members from outside New
York City, the court indicated that the relevant labor market was not limited
to the union's geographic jurisdiction. 25
 Nevertheless, on the basis of the
union's own calculation that minorities constituted only 16.2% of the reiveant
labor market, the court concluded that the disparity between 16.2% and the
15 415 F. Supp. 1155, 1163, 12 FEP Cas. 1671, 1678 (S.D.N.Y. 1976):
16 Id. at 1170-71, 12 FEP Cas. at 1684-85.
" Id. at 1164, 12 FEP Cas. at 1678.
18 Id. at 1170, 12 FEP Cas. at 1684.
29
 553 F.2d 251, 254, 14 FEP Cas. at 870, 871-72 (2d Cir. 1977).
20 Id. at•254, 14 FEP Cas. at 872.
21 Id. at 254-55, 14 FEP Cas. at 872.
22 Id. Title VII became effective on July 2, 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 254, 14 FEP Cas. at 872.
25 Id.
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union's 6.5% minority membership, without more, was still sufficient. to create
an inference of discrimination. 26
The Second Circuit also agreed with the union's second ground of
appeal—that the district court had erred in failing to consider the increase in
the union's minority membership since the effective date of Title VII. 27 The
court held that the relevant statistic was not the percentage of minorities in
the union's present membership, but the percentage of minorities recruited
since Title VII became effective." If the union's calculation that minorities
constituted 20% of members recruited since Title VII became effective was
correct, the court concluded that no statistically supported inference of dis-
crimination could exist because the union had recruited a greater percentage
of minority members since the effective date of Title VII than resided in the
relevant labor market." Accordingly, the court reversed the district court
finding'of discrimination, and remanded the case for further fact findings on
the validity of the union's calculation."
In Local 14 & 15, the Second Circuit held that the relevant labor market
should he based on the geographic area from which a union draws its meni-
hers when a significant number of union members come from areas outside
the union's jurisdiction."' Shortly after Local 14 & 15, the Second Circuit was
presented with a second pattern or practice case against a union raising the
issue whether the same considerations underlie the selection of the relevant
labor market when it is used to set a remedial membership goal as when it is
used to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. This case, EEOC v. Local
638 , 32 was a pattern or practice suit brought against Local 28 of the Sheet
Metal Workers' International Association (Local 28), a union whose geo-
graphic jurisdiction is New York City. 3 " On the basis of direct evidence of
disCriminatory practices, the district court determined that Local 28 had dis-
criminated against minorities in recruiting new members. 3 " Since the district
20 id .
27 Id. at 255, 14 FEP Gas. at 872.
" ht. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court also held that liability under Title
VII can attach only for hiring practices after the effective date of Title VII. Interna-
tional lihd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977).
29 hi .
" Id. at 355, 14 FEN Gas. at 873.
31
 hi. in 254, 14 FEN Cas. at 872.
•2 565 F.2d 31, 15 FEP Cas. 1618 (2c1 Cir. 1977). This case represents the
second challenge by the union to an affrimative action plan fashioned by the district
court after it determined that the union had discriminated. The report of the first
appeal by the union from the district court's finding of liability and first affirmative
action plan can he found al. 532 F.2d 821, 12 FEN Cas. 755 (2d Cir. 1976). The district
court's findings and conclusions of law 'are reported at 401 F. Supp. 467, 12 FEP Gas.
712 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); the district court's first affirmative action plan is reported at 421
F. Supp. 603, 12 FEN Gas. 742 . (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
33 401 F. Supp. 467, 470, 12 FEN Gas. 712, 714-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This case
was originally part of a larger action against four unions of which Local 28 was one.
Separate trials were ordered for each union. Id.
" 4 Id. at 487, 12 FEP Cas. at 728.
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court relied on direct evidence of discrimination, unlike the court in Local 14
& 15, the selection of a relevant labor market for statistical work force com-
parisons was unnecessary to establish a Title VII violation. The court, how-
ever, did select a relevant. labor market in fashioning a remedial membership
goal to counteract the union's discriminatory practices."' The district court
based the remedial membership goal on the percentage of minorities in the
union's New York City jurisdiction,"" and justified the selection of the union's
jurisdiction as the relevant labor market for determining the scope of the
remedy by noting that
[Ole purpose of setting a remedial goal is to place eligible non-
whites in the position they would have enjoyed had there been no
discrimination. ... The best available measure of that ... is the per-
centage of non-whites in the relevant labor force existing today
within New York City."
In selecting the union's New York City jurisdiction as the relevant labor mar-
ket for determining the remedial membership goal, the district court did not
consider whether union members in fact resided outside the city. The court's
failure to do so was significant because, as in Local 14 & 15, the percentage of
minorities in the suburban population was significantly lower than in the New
York City population. Accordingly, if the remedial goal had been based on
the suburban population, the number of minority union members to be re-
cruited under the court's plan would have been lower. In contrast, when the
court fashioned an affirmative action program to implement the remedial
goal, it did consider whether union members resided outside New York
City." The district court noted that many of the union's members actually
resided in areas outside the union's New York City jurisdiction," and there-
fore permitted the union to draw new members from those areas in carrying
out the affirmative action program:41
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the union attacked the district court's
selection of the union's New York City jurisdiction as the relevant labor mar-
ket for determining the remedial membership The union argued that
if the district court was justified in permitting the union to draw new mem-
bers from areas outside its jurisdiction to implement the remedial member-
ship goal, then the court had erred in selecting the union's jurisdiction as the
relevant labor market to calculate the scope of the remedial goal. 42 The in-
clusion of areas outside the union's jurisdiction, in which present union mem-
bers resided, the union maintained, would have resulted in a lower remedial
membership goal.'" The court of appeals rejected the union's contention that.
as Id. at 488, 12 FEY Gas. at 729.
:Ili Id .
37 Id.
39 421 F. Supp. 603, 618, 12 FEP Gas. 742, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
39 Id.
4" Id. at 608-09, 12 FEP Cas. at 747-48.
" 565 F.2d 31, 35.36, 14 EFT Gas. 1618, 1622 (2d Cir. 1977).
22
43 id
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the relevant labor market should have included areas outside the union's
jurisdiction, and upheld the district court ruling:" While the court acknowl-
edged its recent. holding in Local 14 & 15 that "where a significant number of
union members come from outside the union's geographic jurisdiction, ...
the appropriate reference area then should be that region from which the
union draws its members," 45 the court distinguished Local 14 & 15 as involv-
ing the use of statistics to find discrimination, not to set a remedial goal."
The court further attempted to distinguish Local 14 & 15 by noting that a
significant number of union members in that case resided outside the union's
jurisdiction, while only an insignificant number of Local 638's members resided
outside the union's jurisdiction. 47 Thus, the court did not find determinative
the district court's earlier finding that many of the union's members resided
outside New York City. However, the circuit court did indicate that if the
evidence had shown that a significant number of union members resided out-
side New York City, a redefinition of the labor market used to fashion the
remedial goal might have been necessary."
The dissenting opinion in Local 638 rejected the majority's suggestion that
distinction may exist between the relevant labor market used to find discrimi-
nation and that used to set a remedial goal." In so doing, the dissent found
unpersuasive the majority's characterization of Local 14 & 15 as precedent
only for the use of statistics to find discrimination, and reasoned that Local 14
& 15 was direct authority for the proposition that the relevant labor market
for all ,purposes must be based on the geographic area in which the union
members actually reside.'" Pointing to the district court's finding that many of
the present union members actually resided outside New York City, the dis-
sent in Local 638 concluded that the district court had erred in looking solely
to the union's jurisdiction in setting the remedial goal: In addition, the
dissent. maintained that any inconsistency between the labor market used to
find discrimination and that used to set remedial goals would he contrary to
the well established Title VII principle that the remedy must fit the wrong. 52
The dissent chided the majority for ignoring this principle, and characterized
it as holding, in effect, that "once fa district court] has made a finding of




' 5 Id. at 36, 15 FEP Cas. at 1622 Ntiming F.E0C. v. international Union of
Operating- Engineers, Locals 14 & 15, 553 F.2d 251, 254, 14 FEP Cas. 870, 1472 (2d
Cir. 1977).
'" 565 F.2d at 36, 15 EH' Gas. at 1622.
" hi.
" hi. at 36 & n.7, 15 FEP Gas. at 1623 & 11.7.
'" Id. at 40-41, 15 FEN Cas. at 1626 (Meskill, j., dissenting).
au Id.
51 a
52 hi. at 41-42, 15 FEP Gas. at 1627. See Athermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); Franks v. Bowman Trans!). Co., 424 U.S. 747, 762-70 (1976),
565 F.2d at. 41-42, 15 FEP Gas. at 1627.
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The dissent is correct in concluding that any distinction between the rel-
evant labor market used to find discrimination and that used to set remedial
goals is contrary to Title VII. As the Supreme Court explained in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody,'"
Hite general rule is, that when a wrong has been done, and the law
gives a remedy, the compensation shall be equal to the injury. The
latter is the standard by which the former is to he measured. The
injured party is to he placed, as near as may be, in the situation he
would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed.'"
Under the principle set out in Albermarle, the labor market used to set a re-
medial goal must be the same as the labor market. used to find discrimination.
Otherwise, a district court could, after finding discrimination, choose to
punish a union by setting a remedial goal based on a minority intensive labor
market. Not only is such inconsistency between labor markets used to find
discrimination and to set remedial goals contrary to established Title VII
principles, but it also introduces unnecessary confusion to a developing area
of Title VII law. Therefore, it is submitted that the same considerations must
underlie the selection of the relevant labor market in an EEOC pattern or
practice suit whether the relevant labor market is used to find discrimination
or to set remedial goals.
D. Role of Intent in Establishing a Prima Facie
Case: Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty
In 1976 the Supreme Court, by a sharply divided vote, ruled in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert' that the exclusion of pregnancy from a private
employer's (Usability insurance program does not constitute sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII.' Perhaps the most disturbing element of the deci-
sion• for both the concurring and dissenting members of the Court, was the
suggestion in justice Rehnquist's majority opinion that, the standard of proof
previously used in Title VII cases—whereby plaintiffs can establish a prima
facie case by demonstrating that an employment policy has a disparate impact.
on a protected class—would be replaced by the more stringent. standard of
proof applicable in equal protection cases—under which plaintiffs must prove
a discriminatory intent in addition to a disparate impact.' Iwo decisions by
" 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
'' Id. at 4 I 8-19.
' 429 U.S. 125 (1976),
2 Id. at 145-46. 42 U.S.C.	 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1976).
3 429 U.S. at 146 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 160-61 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); id. at 153 -55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined in Justice
Brelltlan'S dissenting opinion. In a concurring opinion, justice Stewart suited that he
did not read the Court's opinion as questioning the significance of the disparate nit-
pact theory in Title VII cases. Id. at. 146 (Stewart, J., concurring). See text at dotes
3 I -37 infra.
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the Supreme Court during the Survey year, Dothard v. Rawlinson 4 and Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 5
 indicate that although justice Rehnquist's intimation as to the
requirement of proof of discriminatory intent under Title VII does not pres-
ently enjoy the support of a majority of the Court, the reasoning of his Gil-
bert opinion continues to threaten the viability of the disparate impact theory
under Title VII.
Prior to Gilbert, the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis (' that
proof of discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a prima fade case of
discrimination under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' The Court specifically noted in Davis, however, that the constitutional
requirement of intent does not extend to Title VII cases and that plaintiffs
proceeding thereunder may instead "focus solely on the [sexually] differential
impact of the challenged hiring or promotion practices." 8 Accordingly, the
Court reiterated that under the disparate impact theory announced in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.," a prima facie case of discrimination may be established
under Title VII by proof that a facially neutral employment policy has a sig-
nificantly disparate impact on a protected class."' Once a significantly dispar-
ate impact is established, the Title VII defendant may rebut the plaintiff's
case only by proving that the challenged employment policy is justified on the
basis of business necessity."
The possibility that the disparate impact theory articulated in Griggs
might soon be replaced by the requirement that Title VII . plaintiffs dem-
onstrate not only a disparate impact but also a discriminatory intent was
raised in Gilbert due to the method of analysis adopted by Justice Rehnquist.
In examining the plaintiff's claim that exclusion of pregnancy from the
employer's disability insurance program constituted illegal sex discrimination,
Justice Rehnquist first considered which subsection of section 703(a),' 2 the
4 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
434 U.S. 136 (1977).
" 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 	 •
Id. at 238-39, 247-48.
" Id. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Although proof of discriminatory intent
is not an essential element of the disparate impact theory under Title VII, it is relevant
in Title VII cases premised on the claim that an employer engaged in acts of purpose-
ful discrimination in violation of the statute. However, even in such cases, the Court
has ruled that discriminatory intent may be inferred from the circumstances surround-
ing the act in question. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
" 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (educational and testing requirements which have a
disparate impact on black .013 applicants violate Title VII absent proof of job-
relatedness).
'" 426 U.S. at 238-39. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32.
" Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs, 401 U.S.
424, 431-32 (1971). If the defendant establishes that a business necessity justifies the
employment policy in question, the plaintiff may then attempt to prove that the policy
is a mere pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the plaintiff.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
12
 42 U.S.C.	 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1976).
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general antidiscrimination provision of Title VII, encompassed the plaintiff's
claim." Section 703(a)(1) declares it to be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's ... sex ... .,,14 Section 703(a)(2) declares it to be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex
...."" Since the disability insurance program in Gilbert was essentially com-
pensatory in nature, and since section 703(a)(1) expressly prohibits discrim-
ination with respect to compensation, Justice Rehnquist. determined that the
legality of the program was to be determined according to the standards
established under section 703(a)(1).'"
Having determined that section 703(a)(1) was the appropriate section
under which to analyze the disability insurance program, Justice Rehnquist
next examined the standards governing the finding of a Title VII viola-
tion) ? In this regard, Justice Rehnquist noted that Congress nowhere
defined "discrimination" in Title VII and concluded that it was therefore
appropriate to look to fourteenth amendment decisions which "afford an
existing body of law _analyzing and discussing that term in a legal context not
wholly dissimilar to the concerns which Congress manifested in enacting Title
VII."" From this existing body of law, Justice Rehnquist drew upon the
Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello.' 9 In Geduldig, the Court ruled that the
exclusion of pregnancy from the otherwise inclusive coverage of a disability
insurance program does not violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment because such a program does not discriminate on the basis
of sex." The exclusion of pregnancy does not constitute sex-based discrimi-
nation, the Geduldig Court reasoned, because "[t]here is no risk from which
men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which
women are protected and men are not." 21 Accordingly, the Geduldig Court
found the disability insurance program to be merely underinclusive, creating
a distinction not between men and women but between "pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons."" Applying the constitutional analysis of Geduldig to
the Title VII claim in Gilbert, the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion
of pregnancy from General Electric's disability program did not violate Title
13 429 U.S. at 133.
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
16 429 U.S. at 138-40.
17 Id. at 133.
18 Id.
19 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
2° Id. at 496-97 & n.20.
21 Id. at 496-97.
22 Id. at 496 n.20.
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VII since, as in Gerlublig, the program discriminated on the basis of pregnancy
rather than on the basis of sex.'"
Although application of Geduldig's constitutional analysis mandated a find-
ing that the exclusion of pregnancy from General Electric's disability insur-
ance program did not constitute sex-based discrimination, Justice Rehnquist
recognized that the Court's decision in Griggs required consideration whether
the program nevertheless had a discriminatory effect on women in violation
of Title km.24
 Justice Rehnquist noted in this regard that Griggs was decided
under section 703(a)(2) which, unlike section 703(a)(I), does not contain the
word "discriminate. -25
 Justice Rehnquist then implied that proof of dis-
criminatory intent is required under section 703(a)(I), although not under
section 703(a)(2), and thus that the disparate impact theory is unavailable
under section 703(a)(1)."" This question whether the disparate impact theory
is available under section 703(a)(I) was not answered in Gilbert, however, since
the Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove the disability insurance pro-
gram was in fact worth more to men than to women, and therefore had a
disparate impact. in violation of the Griggs standard." Since the disability
insurance program neither classified employees on the basis of sex nor had a
disparate impact on female employees, the Court determined that no Title
VII violation had been established:"
Justice Rehnquist's reliance in Gilbert on the constitutional analysis of
Geduldig to define sex discrimination under Title VII raised the question
whether in a future case the Court might. also require proof of discriminatory
intent in Tide VII cases, thereby vitiating the disparate impact theory an-
nounced in Griggs. The Gilbert Court's willingness to apply the fourteenth
amendment definition of discrimination to a Title VII claim was, however,
only the first indication in Justice Rehnquist's opinion that the requirement of
discriminatory intent. would be incorporated into Title VII. The Gilbert
Court's interpretation of Title VII itself also cast doubt on the continued va-
lidity of the disparate impact theory, at least with respect to section 703(a)(1).
Prior to Gilbert, courts applied the same standard of proof regardless of
whether the Title VII claim arose under section 703(a)(I) or section
703(a)(2). 2  Indeed, courts seldom identified one subsection or the other as
2" 429 U.S. at 145-46.
" Jr1. at 136 - 37.
Id. at 137. For text of § 703(a)(1), (2), see text at notes 14-15 ru/ira.
2r;
	 U.S. at 137.
27 Id. at 138-39,
28 Id. at 145-46.
2•  Different standards of woof are, however, applied by the courts depending
on whether the Title VII plaintiff proceeds under a disparate impact theory or under
a purposeful discrimination theory. international Blid. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Compare Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact)
with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (purposeful discrimina-
tiqn). While certain policies are more appropriately challenged under one theory or
the other, this choice is entirely unrelated to which subsection of .§ 703(a) encompasses
the claim.
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providing the basis for its decision.'" In Gilbert, however, Justice Rehnquist
suggested that a different standard of proof applies depending on whether a
claim of discrimination is encompassed by section 703(a)( I) or by section
703(a)(2).
Although Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Gilbert seriously questioned the
future of the disparate impact theory under Title VII, his reference to the
requirement of intent as an essential element of a prima facie case under
section 703(a)(I) was not joined by a majority of the Court. Only three mem-
bers, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White and Powell, joined Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in its entirety. 3 ' Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment
of the Court, but wrote separately to state that he did not read the opinion as
questioning either the validity of Griggs or the importance of discriminatory
impact in Title VII cases.' Justice Blackmun wrote separately and dissented
from any implication in the opinion that discriminatory impact may never be
a controlling factor in a Title VII case or that Griggs is no longer good law."
In separate dissenting opinions, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
and Justice Stevens both stated their disagreement with the Court's use of
constitutional analysis in a Title VII case. 34
 Justice Brennan also expressed
the view that "Inktwithstanding unexplained and inexplicable implications to
the contrary." 35
 it is well established that disparate impact establishes a prima
facie case under either section 703(a)(I) or section 703(a)(2). 3" Although Jus-
tice Stevens objected to the Court's use of constitutional analysis, he did not.
specifically address the issue whether disparate impact is sufficient to establish
a prima facie case under section 703(a)(I) since he was of the opinion that the
disability insurance program discriminated on the basis of sex and therefore
should have been found per se violative of Title VII." Thus, while Justice
Rehnquist's Gilbert opinion seriously threatened the future of the disparate
impact theory, it is not clear that Justice Rehnquist would ever receive support'
from a majority of the Court.
The spectre raised in Gilbert by Justice Rehnquist that discriminatory in-
tent might be an essential element of proof under section 703(0(1) did not.
immediately reappear in the Court's Title VII opinions. In Dothard v. Rawlin-
" See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31 & n.10 (1977); Yuhas
v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 496, 16 FEP Cas. 891, 891 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 55{) F.2(1 364, 370, 14
FEP Gas. 687, 691 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977); Rowe v. General Motors
Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 350, 4 FEP Cas. 445, 446 (5th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 248, 250, 2 FEP Cas. 895, 897, 899 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
31
 It is not clear, however, that these three Justices would vote affirmatively on
the express question whether discriminatory intent is an essential element of proof in a
Title VII case. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 152 n.6 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
32 429 U.S. at 146 (Stewart, J., concurring).
33
 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
31 Id. at 153 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 160-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 153 (Brennan, J.. dissenting).
3a
	 at 153-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 160-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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son," a case decided subsequent. to Gilbert, the Court expressly reaffirmed the
validity of the disparate' impact. theory." The plaintiff in Dothard contended
that Alabama's statutory minimum height and weight requirements for
employment as a state correctional counselor violated Title VII because they
had a disparate impact on female applicants.'" Writing for the Court, justice
Stewart expressly recognized that discriminatory intent is not an essential ele-
ment. of a prima facie case under Title VII, stating that "a plaintiff need only
show that the facially neutral standards in question select. applicants for hire
in a significantly discriminatory pattern."'" Without distinguishing between
the subsections of section 703(a), the Court found the statistical evidence in-
troduced by the plaintiff sufficient to establish a prima Facie case under the
disparate impact theory, 42
 and concurred in the district court's ruling that the
state failed to satisfy its burden of proving joh-relatedness." Consequently,
the Court. held that the height and weight requirements violated Title VII."
The Supreme Court's decision in Dothard is significant in two respects.
First, it is noteworthy that the opinion makes no reference to the particular
subsection of section 703(a) under which the plaintiff's claim most appro-
priately fits.' It therefore appears that Justice Stewart considers the dispa-
rate impact theory equally applicable under both sections 703(a)(1) and
703(a)(2). 4
 Second, the absence of disagreement with Justice Stewart's invo-
cation of the disparate impact theory is significant because it may indicate that
3K
 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
"" hi. at 328-29,
1 " hi. at 324. The plaintiff also challenged Alabama's Administrative Regula-
tion 204 establishing gender-based criteria for assigning correctional counselors to
maximum security prisons in contact positimrs. Id, at 325. The Court found that the
regulation explicitly discriminates against women on the basis of their sex by excluding
women from approximately 75% of the jobs in the state correctional system. Id. at 332
& n.16. The Court, however•, upheld the defendant's claim that sex was a bona fide
occupational requirement under § 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
Id. at 336-37. The Court determined that. the ''employee's very womanhood'' would
render her unable to effectively perform her ditties in the violent environment of
Alabama prisons. Id. at 336.
at Id. at 329. Justice Stewart made no distinction between subsections (1) and
(2) of 703(a) as regards the availability of the disparate impact theory to Title VII
plaintiffs. hi. indeed, nowhere in Justice Stewart's opinion is one subsection or the
other of § 703(a) noted as providing the basis for the plaintiff's case. But see id. at 338
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (agreeing that plaintiff established a prima facie case under
§ 703(0(2)).
"2 Id. at 330.
.1 " Id. at 332. For a discussion of the use Of statistics in /Mbar(' see Note, The
Role fy .
 Statistical Evidence in Title VII Cases, 19 B.C. 1.. REv. 881 (1978),
" 433 U.S. at 332. Justice White dissented on the ground that the statistical
evidence presented by the plaintiff was insufficient to establish a prima facie case. Id.
at 347-49 (White, J., dissenting).
. 15
 Id. at 323.
1 " See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977).
November 1978]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 165
Justice Rehnquist is singularly responsible For mounting the challenge to the
disparate impact theory. 47
Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that discriminatory intent is an essential
element of a prima facie case under section 703(a)(I) reappeared this Survey
year when Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court in Nashville Gas
Co. v. Salty." In Salty, the Court considered whether two separate employ-
ment policies discriminated against women in violation of Title VII. 49
 One of
the challenged employment policies required pregnant women to take a man-
datory maternity leave without accumulated sick pay. 5 " The other policy
provided that women returning to work from a maternity leave had to hid
competitively for positions without the benefit of their accumulated job senior-
ity." Sally is significant because Justice Rehnquist chose to analyze the two
challenged employment policies under the two different subsections of section
703(a), 52
 and because he suggested again that all challenges to employment
policies under section 703(a)(1) must he accompanied by proof of discrimina-
tory intent.'" Although, as in Gilbert, Justice Rehnquist did not find it neces-
sary to decide this issue," his Salty opinion represents yet another attack on
the continued viability of the disparate impact theory under section 703(a)(1).
The Salty Court first considered the plaintiff's challenge to the seniority
retention policy. 55
 Under this policy, an employee's seniority was suspended
during the period of her mandatory maternity leave." Employees returning
from maternity leave were not automatically reinstated but, rather, had to hid
competitively for a permanent position without the benefit. of their accumu-
lated seniority." If an employee did secure a permanent position subsequent
to her maternity leave she regained her accumulated seniority for the pur-
poses of vacation and pension rights, but not for the purposes of future job
bidding." In the plaintiff's case, the seniority retention policy operated to
prevent her return to the company's wOrkfOrce. 5 "
Justice Rehnquist first determined that, as in Gedaldig and Gilbert, the
company's decision not to treat pregnancy as a disease or disability for the
purpose of seniority retention was facially neutral since the policy classified on
" Although stone of the Justices disagreed with Justice Stewart's analysis of
the disparate impact theory, Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion, stated his
agreement with the conclusion that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case un-
der § 703(a)(2). 433 U.S. at 338 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
" 434 U.S. 136 (1977).




Id. at 139-40, 144-45.
" 14. at 144-45.
" Id.
55 M. at 138-43.
sh Id. at 138-39.
." M. at 139.
5 1d.
59 jrd.
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the basis of pregnancy and not sex." The Court, nevertheless, recognized
that employment policies "neutral on their face but having a discriminatory
effect may run afoul of § 703(a)(2).""' Thus, Justice Rehnquist expressly
condoned the use of the disparate impact test under section 703(a)(2). Justice
Rehnquist further determined that section 703(a)(2) was the proper section
under which to analyze the seniority policy because, according to the language
of section 703(a)(2), it operated to "deprive [employees] of employment op-
portunities" and to "adversely affect [their] status as art employee."" 2
 The
seniority policy operated in this fashion, the Court reasoned, because a female
employee could he permanently relegated to lower paying and less desirable
positions as the result of her loss of seniority upon taking a mandatory
maternity leave."'
Having determined that section 703(a)(2) was the proper section under
which to analyze the seniority policy, the Supreme Court proceeded to
examine whether the facially neutral policy had a discriminatory effect." In
so doing, the Court distinguished its earlier decision in Gilbert by way of a
burden and benefit analysis. 65 The Sally Court viewed the disability program
in Gilbert as being merely underinclusive, involving only a decision not to ex-
tend the additional benefit of insurance coverage to pregnant employees."" So
understood, the disability policy did not burden women and therefore had no
disparate impact on them in violation of section 703(a)(1)." 7
 By comparison,
the Court considered the effect of the seniority retention policy in Salty to be
the imposition on women of a substantial burden that men did not have to
suffer.''" The Court determined that "[t]he distinction between benefits and
burdens is more than one of semantics."" Thus, whereas employees could
be denied additional benefits for pregnancy under an otherwise inclusive dis-
ability program consistent with the provisions of section 703(a)(1), the Salty
Court read section 703(a)(2) as prohibiting employers from burdening female
employees in ways which deprive them of employment Opportunities." The
"" hl. at 110. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White and Blackmun
joined in Justice Rehnquist's opinion. justice Powell, with whom Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined. concurred in the result, but wrote separately to state his view that, on
remand, the district court should determine whether the compensation package of-
fered by the employer was worth more to men than to women. Id. at 151 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens also concurred in a separate opinion stating what he con-









 Id. at 112.
14.
Ii5)
Id. As noted by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Salty, the
Court's burden and benefit analysis is illusory since the characterization is, in fact, a
matter of.semantics. Id. at 154 & n.4. Thus, in both Gilbert and Salty, denying women
at 141.
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Court's finding that the seniority policy burdened women but not men, neces-
sarily determined that the policy had a disparate impact on women. This dis-
parate impact violated section 703(a)(2) unless shown to be job-related!'
Since the defendant had offered no proof of job-relatedness to justify its
seniority retention policy, the Court concluded that there had been a Title
VII violation. 72
The Satty Court next considered the legality of the defendant's sick pay
policy. 73 Under the terms of this policy, employees absent from work for any
reason other than pregnancy were entitled to receive sick pay. 74
 Pregnant.
employees, however, were denied sick pay benefits during their mandatory
maternity leave. 75
 The Court premised its analysis of the sick pay policy on
its finding that the policy was legally indistinguishable from the disability in-
surance program upheld in Gilbert. 71' Accordingly, the company's sick pay
policy discriminated on the basis of pregnancy and not sex, and was facially
neutral."
Upon concluding that the employer's sick pay policy was facially neutral,
the Supreme Court examined whether the policy nevertheless had a dis-
criminatory effect on women in violation of Title VII. 78
 The Court first de-
termined that section 703(a)(2) was not the proper section under which to
analyze the employer's sick pay policy since
it is difficult to perceive how the exclusion of pregnancy from a dis-
ability insurance plan or sick leave compensation program 'deprives
an indiVidual of employment opportunities' or 'otherwise adversely
affects his status as an employee' in violation of § 703(a)(2). The
direct effect of the exclusion is merely a loss of income for the
period the employee is not at work: such an exclusion has no direct
effect upon either employment opportunities or job status.'"
The Court therefore concluded that section 703(a)(1), the section under which
Gilbert was decided, was the appropriate section under which to test the valid-
ity of the sick pay policy. 80
 At this point in his analysis, Justice Rehnquist.
disability or sick pay benefits fOr pregnancy while .extending benefits to men' for sex
specific conditions imposes a burden on women which men need not bear. Similarly, if'
insurance coverage for pregnancy is desired, women must bear the burden of its addi-
tional cost whereas men need not seek independent coverage for any disability which
they may suffer. Although the denial of accumulated seniority in Sauey may present a
more serious instance of employment discrimination than did the denial of sick pay or




73 Id. at 143-46.
" Id. at 138.
75
 Id. at 143.
71i Id .
" Id. at 143-44.
m Id. at 144-45.
79 Id.
"" Id. at 195.
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again questioned the continued viability of the disparate impact test under
section 703(a)(1)." Justice Rehnquist. did not resolve this issue, however,
since as in Gilbert the plaintiff had failed to prove that the denial of sick pay
benefits had a discriminatory effect on women." Accordingly, Justice
"' Id. at 144.
Hi Id. at 145. While the plaintiff in Salty failed to establish a prima facie case
under Title VII through proof of disparate impact, the Court stated that the plaintiff
was not necessarily precluded from proving that the sick leave policy was a mere pre-
text designed to discriminate against women. Id. With respect to . proof of pretext, the
Court stated that the discrimination inherent in the seniority retention policy might be
relevant to the inquiry. Id. Since the district court had made no findings on the (pies-
(ion of pretext, the Court vacated the decision of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the
case to the district court for a determination whether the plaintiff had adequately
preserved the right to proceed on a theory of pretext. Id. at 146.
Despite the remand ordered in Saar on the issue of pretext with regard to the sick
leave policy, it is unclear whether the plaintiff will succeed in proving a Title VII
violation on this theory. In Gilbert, the Court ignored General Electric's long history of
sex discrimination. see 429 U.S. at 150 (Brennan. J. dissenting), and confined its
analysis on the question of pretext to the risks covered by the plan. 434 U.S. at 136.
Since the Court considered pregnancy to be "significantly different from the typical
covered disease or disability," the exclusion ()I' pregnancy from the disability plan was
1101 seen as an attempt to accomplish an invidious discrimination against women. Id.
Under this analysis, there could be no finding of pretext in Sativ since the sick pay
policy was found to he legally indistinguishable from that in Gilbert. If the district court
considers the other discriminatory practices by the employer relevant in determining
whether the sick leave plan is pretextual, as was suggested by the Salty Court, the
plaintiff might succeed in proving a Title VII violation. However, in light of the
Court's more explicit treatment of the pretext issue in Gilbert, it is unclear how much
weight the district court will actually accord the Salty Court's recognition of the poten-
tial relevance of other discriminatory practices by the employer. Indeed, prior to Salty,
lower federal courts had almost unanimously ruled that Gilbert precludes proof of a
Tide VII violation in the areas of disability insurance and sick pay programs. See, e.g.,
Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 563 12 .2d 537, 15 HP Cas. 1358 (2d
Cir. 1977) (disability insurance and sick pay); EEOC v. Children's Hospital of
Pittsburgh, 566 F.2d 222, 14 EEP Cas. 1821 (3d Cir. 1977), COL denied, 434 U.S. 1009
(1978) (sick pay); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961, 11 EEP Cas.
161 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded Jitr reconsideration in light of Gilbert, 429 U.S.
1033 (1977), vacated and remanded with insirachon.s. to dismix.s . . 558 F.2d 1037, 15 FEP Gas.
1370 (9th Cir. 1977) (sick pay); McCarthy v. Burkholder, 15 FEP Gas. 682 (D. Kan.
1977) (sick pay): Tawney v. Board of Educ. of Boone, 426 F. Stipp. 528 (S.D. W. Va.
1977) (sick pay); Madrid v. Board of Ethic. of Gilroy, 429 F. Supp. 816, 14 FEP Gas.
816 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (sick pay): Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp.
413, 15 FEP Gas. 1(563 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (sick pay; disability insurance). ifnt .s-re Guise v.
J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 562 F.2d 6, 15 1:111) Gas. 484 (7th Cir. 1977) (Gilbert allows proof
of disparate impact with respect to disability insurance and sick pay bin plaintiff can-
not raise that claim for the first time on appeal); Love v. Waukesha Joint School Dist.,
5(10 F.2(1 285, 15 FEP Cas. 1128 (7th Cir. 1977) (if sick pay 'for pregnancy is not an
-additional cost" there is no rational basis for exclusion from policy); Liss v. School
Dist. of Ladue, 548 F.2d 751, 14 IFEP Cas. 771 (8th Cir. 1977) (mutuality of included
risks not present in sick leave policy for personal illness, proof of pretext therefore not
precluded by Gilbert). It seems probable that in light of these decisions, few women will
be able to successfully challenge the exclusion of pregnancy from disability insurance
and sick leave plans.
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Rehnquist's opinion in Satty once again raised without deciding the question
whether discriminatory intent is an essential element of a prima facie case
under section 703(a)(1).
It. is submitted that the distinction drawn by Justice Rehnquist in Salty
between sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2) is illusory. Although the language of
the two sections does support Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the sick pay
policy at issue in Salty was encompassed by section 703(a)(1), whereas the
seniority retention policy fell within he ambit of section 703(a)(2)," the lan-
guage of the two sections does not support Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that
different standards of proof govern each section. It is true that section
703(a)(1) contains the word "discriminate" and that section 703(a)(2) does
not." However, as Justice Stevens stressed in his concurring opinion in Salty,
"[t]his [difference] is not significant since a violation of § 703(a)(2) occurs
when a facially neutral policy has a 'discriminatory effect: "85 It thus appears
that the language of the statute affords no rational basis for applying differ-
ent standards of proof under sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2)." Nor does
the difference between employment policies which compensate, and therefore
fit. under section 703(a)(I), and employment policies which affect job oppor-
tunities and job status, and thus fit under section 703(a)(2), provide any ra-
tional basis for applying different standards of proof under each subsection of
section 703(a).
Although neither the language of section 703(a) nor the nature of the
employment policies challenged support Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that
discriminatory intent is an essential element of proof under section 703(a)(1),
the reappearance of this proposition in Salty cannot be ignored. However,
since six members of the Court indicated in either Sally or Gilbert that they
disagreed with his challenge to the disparate impact theory," it seems unlikely
that a majority of the Supreme Court would ever join Justice Rehnquist on
this point.
II. DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
A. Seniority Systems . : Teamsters
This Survey year, the Supreme Court, in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States,' considered the applicability of Title V11 2 to senior-
For text of §§ 703(a)(1), (2), see text at notes 14-15 supra.
" ' Id.
85 434 U.S. at 154 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8 " See Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F.Supp. 413, 429 n.26, 15
FEP Cas. 1663, 1676 n.26 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (no distinction between subsections (1) and
(2) of § 703(a)).
87 See Satty, 434 U.S. at 151 (Powell, J., concurring); Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 146 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 160-62 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); id. at 153-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion in Gilbert.
' 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17
(1976).
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ity systems which perpetuate the effects of past discrimination in hiring. Since
seniority rights are earned either on the basis of length of service with an
employer (plant seniority) or in a particular department (departmental senior-
ity), they provide an objective means for granting transfers and promotions,
and for establishing an order during lay-offs and re-calls." Difficulties arise,
however, when prior discriminatory hiring practices by an employer leave
minorities with less seniority than they might otherwise have earned. At each
promotion or lay-off, the effects of the prior discrimination are felt by indi-
vidual discriminatees, and serious economic hardships may result.'
Prior to Teamsters, the Supreme Court, noted the discriminatory impact of
seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of an employer's past hiring
practices in Franks V. Bowman Transportation Co.' In Franks, individuals who
had been the victims of hiring discrimination sought an award of seniority
dating back to the original discrimination." The employer claimed that sec-
tion 703(h) of Title VII bars such an award of retroactive seniority. Section
703(h) provides that
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice For an employer to
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona tide seniority
or merit system ... provided that such differences are not the result
of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.'
The Franks Court found no indication that section 703(h) was intended by
Congress to preclude an award of retroactive seniority once post-Act dis-
crimination has been proved!' The Court stated that section 703(h) is only
"directed toward defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory
practice in instances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority system is
challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the
effective date of the Act."" Relying upon the broad make-whole objectives of
Title VII, the Court concluded that an award of retroactive seniority was
necessary in order to place individuals who had been the victims of post-Act
discrimination in their rightful positions." Franks was thus limited to the
3 See generally Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority
Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1962).
See generally Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Prob-
lem, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 177 (1975); Comment, Last Hired, First Fired, Seniority Layoffs,
and Title VII: Questions al Liability and Remedy, 11 CoLum. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 343,
343-46 (1975); Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of
Hope, 23 RUTGERS L. Rem. 268 (1969); Cooper & Sobel, Seniority and Testing Under Fair
Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969).
424 U.S. 747 (1976). For a discussion of Franks, see 1975-1976 Annual Sur-
vey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 17 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV.
1041, 1140 (1976).
6 424 U.S. at 758.
42 U.S.C.	 2000e-2(h) (1976).
8 424 U.S. at 762-63.
" Id. at 762.
1 ° Id. at 767-68,
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remedial aspects of the Act, and the Supreme Court. did not consider the
question whether section 703(h) immunizes from Title VII liability seniority
systems which perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.
The question left open in Franies regarding the substantive reach of sec-
tion 703(h) was specifically addressed by the Court in Teamsters." Teamsters
arose as a pattern or practice suit initiated by the Government on behalf of all
black and Spanish-surnamed incumbent employees of Inc.
(TIME), a nationwide common carrier of motor freight.''' Members of the
affected class encompassed two distinct groups: the first included those hired
prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII (pre-Act victims of dis-
crimination); the second encompassed those hired after that date (post-Act
victims of discrimination). The Government's complaint alleged two separate
grounds for imposing liability under Title VII. First, the Government main-
tained that TIME had engaged in a pattern or practice of systematically hir-
ing minorities for the lower paying, less prestigious position of city driver.'"
Second, the Government challenged the seniority system established by the
collective bargaining agreement between TIME and the Teamsters union on
the ground that it effectively precluded minorities in city-driver positions
from transferring to higher paying, more prestigious jobs as line drivers."
The structure of the seniority system challenged by the Government in
Teamsters is similar to those used throughout the trucking industry.'' An
employee's right to compete against fellow employees for particular trucking
runs, for protection from lay-offs, and for re-call to work after lay-offs is
determined by departmental seniority." A ' transfer from a city-driver de-
partment to a line-driver department. results in the loss of all departmental
seniority.' By contrast, noncompetitive benefits such as vacation time are
determined by the length of time an employee has worked in a particular
plant. This plant seniority is not affected by transfers between departments."
The Govehment conceded that the departmental seniority system was
neutral on its face and applied equally to minority and nonminority
employees. Nevertheless, the Government challenged the system since it oper-
ated as a deterrent to transfers out of city-driving positions and thereby con-
tinued the effects of prior discrimination in hiring for line-driver positions)"
" 431 U.S. at 346-47.
12 Id. at 328.
13
 id. at 329.
at 329 -30. City drivers generally earn substantially less per year than do
line drivers. Line drivers also have the advantage of not being required to load and
unload their trucks, as are city drivers. hi. at. 369 n.55. City drivers, however, have
regular working hours and arc able to spend more time at home arid with family. Id.
'' Id. at 356 & n.42.
11i Id. at 343-44.
' 7 Id.. at 344. This policy explains why it is more common for line driver Va-
cancies to he filled by new employees oil the street than by city drivers already in
T1ME's employ. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.G., Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 305, 11 PEI' Gas.
66, 69 (5th Cir. 1975).
18
 431 U.S. at. 343.
it' Id. at 346.
172
	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:61
The Government therefore sought an injunction to allow individual dis-
criminatees 1.at transfer to line-driver positions with retroactive seniority.`"
Both the district court' ) and the Fifth Circuit 22 held that TIME had engaged
in a pattern or practice of discrimination in hiring line drivers. Both courts
also found the departmental seniority system unlawfu l since it perpetuated
the effects of T1ME's unlawful hiring practices.'"
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the district.
court and the cAnirt. of appeals.' While agreeing that the Government had
established a pattern or practice of hiring discrimination by the company," ;
the Court nevertheless refused to strike clown the seniority system as violative
of Title V11.2" The'Court held that section 703(h) immunizes all bona fide
seniority systems which are not intentionally discriminatory, regardless of the
adverse impact that such systems may have on minorities."' As to those
employees who were the victims of post-Act. discrimination, the Court
reasoned that, since they had already established a Title VII violation in the
company's hiring practices, they were entitled to retroactive seniority under
FrattL and thus need not attack the validity of' the seniority system itself." As
to victims of pre-Act discrimination, the Court agreed that the seniority sys-
tem perpetuated the effects of T1ME's discriminatory hiring practices. The
Court noted that any seniority system which deters transfers between depart-
ments will necessarily have a disparate impact on minorities who have been
precluded from working in the more desirable departments."" Even if the
minority employee is willing to sacrifice all earned seniority to transfer to a
line-driver position, he will nevertheless remain junior to employees with less
plant seniority who were hired as line drivers before him." The Court con-
" /d. at. 330.
21 United States v. 'F. L.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 6 F1.11' Gas. 690 (N.W Tex. 1972).
22 U nited Stares v. T.I.M.E.-D.G., Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 11 HI' Gas. 66 (5th Gil.
1975).
23 United States v. T.1.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 6 FEI) Gas. 690. 694 (N.D. Tex. 1972):
517 F.2d 299, 315, 11 FE1) Gas, 66, 77 (5th Cir. 1975). The two courts differed, how-
ever, as to the appropriate remedy. The district court had permitted only those mem-
bers of the class of minority city drivers who could produce sufficient evidence that
they were actually victims of discrimination to transfer with full retroactive seniority. 6
FEP Gas. at 694-95. The court of appeals declined to place this burden of proving
individual harm on class members and instead held that all class members were pre-
sumptively entitled to retroactive seniority. 517 F.2d at 321, 11 FEI' Gas. at 82.
24 431 U.S. at 356.
2:" Id. at 337. The Teamsters Court broadly endorsed the use of statistics to
establish a prima facie pattern or practice case under Title VII. Id. at 334-43. For
in-depth discussion of the use of statistics in pattern or practice cases, see Note, The
Role of Statistical Lenience in Title fill Cases, 19 B.C. 1,, RE v. 881 (1978).
2" 431 U.S. at 352-54.
27 Id.
2 " Id. at 3•I7-•8. The Court added that, in any event, the seniority system was
lawful with respect to victims ()I' post-Act discrimination. Id. at 3-18 ri,30.
2" Id. at 349-50.
is Id. See generally Gould. Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles
and Its Implications, •17 Ti:x. 1.. REV. 1039 (1969); Note, Title VII„Settiority Discrimination,
and the Incumbent Negro, 80 H ARV. 1.. REV. 1260 (1967).
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eluded that, absent section 703(h), the seniority system would clearly violate
Title VII because of its disparate impact on minorities.'"
Despite the obviously discriminatory impact of TIME's seniority system,
the Teamsters Court determined that Congress deliberately chose to insulate
such systems from the coverage of Title VII. 32 The Court based its conclu-
sion on both the language of section 703(h) and the legislative history oP Title
VII. Section 703(h) states that it is not an unlawful employment practice to
treat employees differently pursuant to a "bona fide" seniority system.33 The
Teamsters Court defined the term "bona fide" broadly to include any seniority
system which is neutral on its face and which does not have its "genesis in
racial discrimination." 34 The Court thus rejected the Government's contention
that the term "bona fide" definitionally excludes any seniority system main-
tained by an employer who has a history of discriminatory hiring practices.
The Court determined that such an interpretation is a "perversion of congres-
sional purpose." 5 Instead, the Court interpreted the bona fide seniority sys-
tem exemption contained in section 703(h) to apply so long as a seniority
system affects minority and nonminority employees equally and is negotiated
in a nondiscriminatory atmosphere." A seniority system meeting these re-
quirements is bona fide regardless of any disparate impact resulting from its
operation.
The Teamsters Court again focused on the technical operation of the
seniority system rather than on its impact in construing the proviso to section
703(h) proscribing differences in terms or conditions of employment arising
from an intention to discriminate. The Government argued that this proviso
excluded the seniority system from the immunity of section 703(h) because of
TIME's prior discrimination.37 The Court held, however, that the seniority
system itself', rather than the employer's conduct, must he discriminatory and
that no liability ensues because the system merely perpetuates the effects of
the employer's prior unlawful activity." Since the Government conceded that
the seniority system was facially neutral and that there was no present intent
to discriminate against the minority employees of TIME, the Court concluded
that section 703(h) clearly immunized the seniority system. 39
The Court found support in the legislative history of Title VII for its
construction of section 703(h) as a broad exemption for seniority systems."
3 ' 431 U.S. at 349. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971), the
Court stated that "practices, procedures or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral
in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices." See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S, 125, 137 (1976); Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229. 246-47 (1976).
32 431 U.S. at 350.
33 See text at note 7 supra.
34 431 U.S. at 355-56.
" 5 Id. at 353.
" 6 Id. at 355-56.
" 7 Id. at 353 n.38.
39 Id. at 356.
" Id. at 352. Section 703(h) was enacted during cloture and thus there is very
little legislative history. See Vitas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Cost. L.
REV. 431, 449 (1966); 110 CONC., REC. 13327 (1964).
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Although the relevant legislative history was limited to two memorandums
interpreting Title VII before section 703(h) had been introduced," the Court
found that they supported a conclusion that Congress, by adding section
703(h), intended to immunize seniority systems such as the one maintained in
Teamsters. 12 These memorandums, the Court determined, indicated a clear
legislative intent not to provide seniority relief to minority employees who had
been denied jobs prior to the effective date of Title VII and thus had less
plant seniority than they otherwise would have had. 43 While recognizing that
the legislative materials did not discuss specifically the situation in Teamsters —
incumbent employees who were victims of pre-Act discrimination seeking to
transfer within a departmental seniority system—the Court held that there is
no rational basis for distinguishing the claims of incumbent employees from
those who were denied jobs entirely. 44 The Court thus concluded that the
legislative intent was to include both plant and departmental seniority systems
within the section 703(h) exemption. 45
Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which he strongly disagreed
with the Court's interpretation of section 703(h) and the insulation of senior-
ity systems from Title VII liability." Justice Marshall maintained that an
exemption from a broad, remedial statute such as Title VII should be con-
strued narrowly and, "[u]nlcss a seniority system that perpetuates discrimina-
tion falls plainly and unmistakably within [the] terms and spirit of § 703(h),
the system should be deemed unprotected."'" I-le argued that, whatever the
significance of section 703(11), its application to seniority systems which per-
petuate past discrimination is far from "plainly and unmistakably clear." 48
Justice Marshall based his claim that section 703(h) does not plainly apply
to seniority systems which perpetuate past discrimination on two grounds.
First, the proviso IU section 703(11) slaws that. only thuse differences Iii the
privilegm of employment which arc not the result of if prim' intention to dis-
criminate are exempted." In this case, Justice Marshall reasoned, die differ-
'" One memorandum was submitted by the justice Department, the other by
Senators Clark and Case. These memorandums are recorded a( 110 Conn;. REC. 7207
(1904).
42
 431 U.S. at 352-55.
" Id. at 354-55.
44 Id .
45 Id. Regarding the appropriate remedy, the Court stated that only those
employees who suffered post-Act discrimination were entitled to relief, and that "no
person may be given retroactive seniority to a date earlier than the effective date of
the Act." Id. at 356-57. Furthermore, the Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's con-
clusion that all minority city drivers, whether or not they actually had applied for a
line-driver position, were entitled to retroactive seniority. See note 23 supra. Instead,
the Court held that a minority city driver must either demonstrate that he actually
applied for a line-driver position after the effective date of the Act, 431 U.S. at 362, or
that he was deterred from applying for a line-driver job by the employer's dis-
criminatory practices. Id. at 368.
46 Id. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 381 (quoting A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)).
4"
 431 U.S. at 381.
46 See text at note 7 supra.
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ences in seniority were "precisely the result of prior, intentional discrimination
in assigning jobs." 5 ° Therefore, the company's seniority system fell squarely
within the literal terms of the proviso to section 703(h). Second, Justice Mar-
shall found no explicit statements in the legislative history of Title VII which
warrant a different construction of the proviso. 5 ' Justice Marshall noted that
the interpretive memorandums relied on by the majority had been prepared
many weeks before section 703(h) was introduced, and thus did not discuss
the meaning of the proviso. 52 Furthermore, neither of the memorandums
specifically considered the problem of seniority systems which perpetuate dis-
crimination." Thus, Justice Marshall concluded, neither the language of sec-
tion 703(h) nor the legislative history of Title VII explicitly supports the
majority's conclusion that seniority systems which perpetuate past discrimina-
tion are exempted by section 703(h). 54
Even assuming that the case at hand could be decided by less than
explicit indications of congressional intent, Justice Marshall still found the
legislative history of Title VII unsupportive of a desire to immunize seniority
systems which perpetuate past discrimination. 55 As to victims of post-Act dis-
crimination, Justice Marshall found section 703(h) irrelevant. In his view, the
legislative history showed congressional concern only for those seniority rights
existing at the time Title VII became effective, and, therefore, section 703(h)
extends no protection to seniority systems which perpetuate post-Act dis-
crimination. 56 As to victims of pre-Act discrimination, however, Justice Mar-
shall recognized that the legislative history provides stronger support for up-
holding seniority systems which perpetuate such discrimination." Neverthe-
less, he asserted, Congress intended to immunize only limited forms of per-
petuation. Justice Marshall determined that Congress passed section 703(h)
because it
did not want minority group members who were hired after the of-.
fective date of the Act to be given super-seniority simply because
they were members of minority groups, nor did it want the use of
seniority to be invalidated whenever it had a disparate impact on
newly hired minority employees: These are the evils—and the only
evils—that the opponents of Title VII raised ...."
Finding no indication that Congress intended to go further and validate de-
partmental seniority systems which perpetuate pre-Act discrimination, Justice
Marshall concluded that the company's seniority system was not within the
coverage of section 703(h). 59 To hold otherwise, Justice Marshall cautioned,
5° 431 U.S. at 382.
Id.
52 Id,
33 Id. at 383.
54 Id.
35 Id.
56 Id. at 384.
57 Id. at 385.
58 Id. at 385-86.
59 Id. at 388-90.
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wotild result in. freezing "an entire generation of Negro employees into dis-
criminatory patterns that existed before the Act.""
Justice Marshall also found the exclusion of departmental seniority sys-
tems from the scope of section 703(h) consistent with the opinion of the
EEOC." In a long line of cases, the Commission consistently had held that
departmental seniority systems violate Title VII where there has been a his-
tory of pre-Act discrimination on the part of the employer." Justice Mar-
shall believed that the EEOC position is entitled to great deference and that it
should be upheld unless clearly erroneous." Finding no indication in the
majority opinion that the EEOC's position was indeed clearly erroneous, Jus-
tice Marshall would have upheld it." 4
The critical question in Teamsters was whether there should be a distinc-
tion between plant and departmental seniority systems which perpetuate prior
discrimination. For both the majority and the dissent, the resolution of this
question was founded on the "interpretation" of legislative silence. The inher-
ent uncertainties of such an endeavor are, by themselves; sufficient to cast
doubt on the Court's assertion that section 703(h) was clearly applicable. 65
Since there was such limited support for the majority decision, Justice Mar-
shall was at least correct in expanding the inquiry beyond the mere language
and legislative history of the Act.
The legislative history of Title VII dealt almost exclusively with the effect
on minorities of a plant seniority system requiring employees last hired to be
first fired. Congress recognized that such a seniority system would have a
disproportionate impact. on minorities in the event of an economic downturn,
since the dictates of Title VII would make many minorities•the last hired."
Nevertheless, by enacting section 703(h), Congress apparently chose to permit
the maintenance of plant seniority systems. Although a plant seniority system
perpetuates the effects of an employer's pre-Act practices, there are reasons
why Congress might have desired to protect such systems from the general
dictates of the Act. Immunization of plant seniority systems would maintain
the existing seniority rights of incumbent employees without any devastating
effects upon newly hired minorities. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his
" Id. at 390.
'' Id. at 390-91.
"2 E.g., [1976] EMI'L. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 	 6481, 6448, 6441, 6440, 6399,
6395, 6382; Empl. Prac. Dec. VI 6373, 6370, 6366, 6365, 6355, 6334, 6313, 6272, 6223
(1973).
63 .131 U.S. at 391.
" 1 Id. justice Marshall also relied upon the 1972 amendments to Title VII to
support his contention that section 703(h) does not immunize seniority systems such as
the one in Teamsters. While Congress in 1972 did not. expressly deal with the problem
of seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of past discrimination, Justice Mar-
shall discerned several indications of congressional approval for lower court decisions
finding such seniority systems violative of Title VII. Id. at 391-94.
" 5 Id. at 352.
"" 110 CoNG. REC. 7207 (1964). See generally Cooper & Sobel, .vu/Ira note 4, at.
1611-14; Comment, supra note 4, at 370; Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Stipp.
505, 516, 1 ETA' Cas. 260, 269 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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dissent, although the denial of constructive seniority to newly hired minorities
"will prevent them from assuming the position they would have occupied but
for the pre-Act discrimination, it will not deter them from moving into higher
paying jobs."" By immunizing plant seniority systems, therefore, Congress
could avoid disrupting the entire work force without precluding dis-
criminatees from eventually taking their rightful place." Such a balance be-
tween the competing interests of incumbent employees and newly hired
minorities is absent in the immunization of departmental seniority systems.
For the individual unlawfully assigned to an inferior department, the passage
of time only exacerbates the effects of that initial assignment. As competitive
seniority in the inferior department increases, the sacrifice when transfering
out becomes much greater, until the point is eventually reached where the
loss of seniority far outweighs the benefits of' higher pay and prestige.`'`' This
"lock in" effect of departmental seniority systems is absent in plant seniority
systems and was not specifically considered by Congress before the enactment
of section 703(h). It seems unlikely, however, that Congress would consider an
employee who is locked into an inferior position to be better off than one
initially denied any job, but later hired into a more desirable position.
It seems clear that a more extensive analysis of the dynamics of de-
partmental seniority systems by the Teamsters Court would have resulted in an
entirely different view of the scope of section 703(h). The Court, instead of
examining the operation of departmental seniority systems to determine
whether they are sufficiently similar to the "last hired-first fired" provisions of
the plant seniority systems within the contemplation of Congress, simply held
that those who received some job are better off than those who were denied
any job and then were hired after Title VII became effective." As discussed
above, this conclusion is not borne out when the actual operation of a de-
partmental system is considered. Thus, while the Teamsters Court is probably
correct in holding that section 703(h) immunizes certain seniority systems
which perpetuate past discrimination, it does not follow that Congress in-
tended to protect the departmental seniority system at issue in Teamsters.
Prior to Teamsters, a long line of lower court decisions had overturned
departmental seniority systems which tended to lock minorities into dis-
criminatory job assignments!' The leading case in this line, Quarles v. Philip
"' hi. at 387 n.14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" 8 The "rightful place
-
 approach to Title VII remedies arose from a law re-
view Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1260 (1967), and was relied upon heavily by the courts in Quarles v. Philip Morris,
inc.. 279 F. Stipp. 505, 510, 1 FEY Cas. 260. 265 (EA). Va. 1968) and Local 189,
Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 983, 1 FEP Cas. 875, 876 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). The Harvard Note stated that the rightful place ap-
proach would require that minorities by permitted to transfer between departments
with full seniority carryover. 80 HAttv. I.. REV. at 1268.
'' See 431 U.S. at 344-45.
7 " Id. at 355.
7 ' E.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 13 FEP Cas. 1808
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d
1251, II FEP Cas. 98 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nnm. Teamsters Local
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Morris, Inc., 72 took a broad approach—focusing on the discriminatory impact
of a departmental seniority system—as opposed to the narrow approach
taken by the Teamsters Court—concentrating instead on the bona fides of a
system's operation. The Quarks decision received the unanimous support of
all the courts of appeals which had occasion to consider the problem of
seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of past discrimination."
Recent cases involving departmental seniority systems reveal the drastic
turnabout which the lower courts have taken since Teamsters." The pre-Act
practices of the employer and the perpetuating effects of the seniority system
have become irrelevant. Instead, courts are considering the neutrality of the
system's terms and the atmosphere in which it was negotiated. For example,
in Swint v. Pullman-Standard," the Teamsters guidelines were followed in testing
the bona fides of a departmental seniority system. The factors considered by
the court were whether the seniority system was maintained free of racial
purpose, was neutral in form, applied equally to all, was consistent with indus-
try practice, and was generally rational.'" Thus, it appears that the lower
courts have recognized the clear implication of the Teamsters decision—that
section 703(h) is a very broad exemption for seniority systems and that plain-
tiffs bear a heavy burden in having such systems overturned.
B. Pension Benefits: Manhart
Employee pension plans traditionally have either required females to
make higher contributions than males for equivalent benefits upon retirement
or, if exacting equal contributions from both sexes; returned lower benefits to
female retirees: The justification for this disparate treatment of men and
women is that women as a class live an average of five years longer than
men.2 Disparate contribution or benefit levels, therefore, reflect the addi-
988 v. Sahala, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d
40, 8 FE!' Cas. 1246 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 3 FEP Cats. 589 (2d Cir. 1971); Robin-
son v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 3 FEP Cas. 653 (4th Cir. 1971); Bing v. Roadway
Express, Inc.. 444 F.2d 687, 3 FEP Cas. 616 (5th Cir. 1971). The Teamsters Court
dismissed these cases in a single footnote. 431 U.S. at 346 n.28.
72 279 F. Supp. 505, 1 FEP Cas. 260 (E.D. Va. 1968). The seniority system in
Quarles was similar to that in Teamsters, but the collective bargaining agreement ex-
pressly limited the number of blacks who would be entitled to transfer to two every six
months. 279 F. Supp. at 513, 1 FEP Cas. at 267.
73 See cases cited at 431 U.S. 378 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74 Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 15 FEP Cas. 680 (5th Cir.
1977); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 15 FEP Cas. 822 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Croker v. Boe-
ing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 15 FEP Cas. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Swint v. Pullman-
Standard, 15 FEP Cas. 144 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
73 15 FEP Cas. 144 (N.D. Ala, 1977).
76 Id. at 147.
' Gold, Equality of Opportunity in Retirement Funds, 9 LOY. L.A.L. REv, 596,
596-97 (1976).
2
 Id. at 597 n.5. This statistic is derived from sex-segregated actuarial tables.
Id.
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tional cost of providing pension benefits to female employees." Population
statistics demonstrate, however, that only sixteen percent of female retirees in
fact live longer than males. 4 Thus, although most women do not live longer
than men, as a class they have been forced to support that small percentage of
women who outlive the majority of both male and female employees.
The legality of employee pension plans which treat women differently
from men is governed by both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 5 and
the Equal Pay Act of 1963. 6
 Employee pension plans potentially violate Title
V1I's prohibition against sex discrimination if they either require women to
make higher contributions than men or provide women with lower benefits
upon retirement. While the Equal Pay Act similarly prohibits the payment of
different wages to male and female employees,' the Act contains an exception
permitting wage discrimination when it is based on a "factor other than
sex."' This exception was expressly incorporated into the original statutory
scheme of Title VII in 1964 by the Bennett Amendment." The purpose of
the Bennett Amendment was to ensure that employment practices which are
legal under the Equal Pay Act because they are based on factors other than
sex are also permissible under Title VII.'° Thus, although it may be
discriminatory for a pension plan to use sex-segregated actuarial tables in
computing contribution or benefit levels, the plan may be immunized from
Title VII liability if this practice can be justified as based on a factor other
than sex.
This Survey year, the Supreme Court, in City of Los Angeles, Department of
Water and Power v. Manhart," held that an employee pension plan which re-
quires females to make higher contributions than males, while providing equal
retirement benefits to both sexes, violates Title VII." The Manhart Court
emphasized that an employment practice which discriminates against indi-
viduals, although based on statistically valid generalizations about the class to
which the individuals belong, nevertheless violates Title VII.'" In determin-
ing that the employee pension plan was discriminatory, the Court relied ex-
3 Id. at 597.
Id. at 619.
5
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1976).
6 The Equal Pay Act of 1963 amended § 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976), by adding subsection (d), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
8 Id.
a 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The Bennett Amendment provides in rele-
vant part that:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchap-
ter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in deter-
mining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid
to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized
by the provisions of section 206(d) of tide 29.
1 ° See 110 CONC. REC. 13663-64 (1964).
" 98 S. Ct. 1370 (1978).
12 Id. at 1377-80.
13 Id. at 1375.
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elusively on the language and purpose of Title VI I,' 4 and thus did not engage
in equal protection analysis as it had done previously in General Electric Co. a.
Gilbert." Although the Manhart Court determined that the employee pension
plan violated Title VII, it overturned the district. court's backpay award as
inappropriate." The Court thus refused to give retroactive effect to its hold-
ing that the use of sex-segregated actuarial tables to calculate contributions to
a pension plan violates Title VII. Nevertheless, Manhart does apply prospec-
tively and may be extended to invalidate other uses of sex-segregated actuarial
tables in the employment, context."
The suit in Manhart was instituted on behalf of all current and former
female employees of the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power, alleging that the higher pension plan contributions exacted from
females constituted unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII." Pursuant
to the Department's mandatory pension plan, contributions were deducted
from the employees' paychecks and matched 110% by the Depart ment.' 9
Since the Department used sex-segregated actuarial tables to calculate
employee contributions, women were required to contribute approximately
fifteen percent more than similarly situated men, and therefore received
lower take-home pay. 2" The monthly benefits received by male and female
employees upon retirement were, however, equal. 21
 The plaintiffs sought an
injunction against the continued use of separate actuarial tables and backpay
amounting to the difference between their contributions and those made by
male employees. 22
Both the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California 23
 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"
ruled that the Department's use of separate actuarial tables for men and
women constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VI1. 25 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that Title VII prohibits the attribution of' group characteris-
" See text at notes 36-40 /Ow.
15
 429 U.S. 125 (1976). For a discussion of the Gilbert decision, see 1976-1977
Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 18 li.C. IND, & Cont.
L. RKv. 1045, 1118-34 (1977).
1 " See text at notes 66-73 infra.
17 See text at notes 93-96 ityi .n.
" 98 S. Ct. at 1373-74,
1" Id. at 1374 & n.4.
2" Id. at 1374. The impact on female employees is illustrated by the case of
one woman who paid over $5,000 more to the fund than a similarly situated male. Id.
at 1374 n.5.
2 ' Id. at 1373.
22
 Id. at 1374. The remedy requested extended only up to .January I, 1975
when the Department amended its plan by requiring equal contributions. Id.
2 " 13 FEP Cas. 1622 (C.D. Cal. 1975). The district court had earlier granted
the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. 387 F. Stipp. 980, 10 FE!' Gas. 101
(C.D. Cal. 1975).
2.1
 553 F.2(1 581, 13 FEP Cas. 1625 (9th Cir. 1976), rehearing denied, 553 F.2d
592, 14 FEP Cas. 1233 (9th Cir. 1977).
25 553 F.2d at. 590-91, 13 FEP Cas. at 1632.
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tics such as longevity, even if proven by statistics, to individual group mem-
bers." The circuit court further held that the Equal Pay Act exception sanc-
tioning wage discrimination based on factors other than sex was not applicable
because sex was the only factor considered by the Department in establishing
the different rates of contribution. 27 Since the Department presented no
valid defense for the use of sex-segregated actuarial tables, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the injunctive and backpay relief awarded by the district court."
The circuit court rendered this decision, however, prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. 29 Following Gilbert, the De-
partment requested a rehearing to consider the applicability of the holding
and reasoning of that case to the pension plan in Manhart. The Ninth Circuit
denied the petition for rehearing, concluding that Gilbert was distinguishable
and did not require reversal of its earlier decision." The Supreme Court
subsequently granted the Department's petition for a writ of certiorari."
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court endorsed the circuit
court's Title VII analysis but concluded that the award of backpay was in
error." The Court first addressed the question whether the pension plan
discriminated on the basis of sex. The critical determination, the Court pos-
tulated, is "whether the existence or nonexistence of 'discrimination' is to he
determined by comparison of class characteristics or individual characteris-
tics." 33 If the former, then there was no discrimination since the plan treated
gender groups equally. Members of each group made contributions sufficient
to provide benefits for the retirement period projected by sex-segregated
actuarial tables." If, on the other hand, discrimination is determined on the
basis of individual characteristics, then there was discrimination since the plan
treated individual men and women unequally. A female employee made
larger contributions than her male counterpart although it was unlikely that
she would actually outlive him."
In resolving the question whether individuals or classes must be com-
pared, the Supreme Court first consulted the language of Title VII. Section
703(a)(1) of Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against "any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's ... sex ......... Finding that sec-
tion's focus on the individual unambiguous, the Court held that individuals,
rather than classes, must be compared even where a generalization about a
26 Id. at 586, 13 FEP Cas. at 1629.
27 Id. at 588, 13 FEP Cas. at 1630.
26 Id. at 592, 13 FEP Cas. at 1634.
29 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
3° 553 F.2d 592, 14 FEP Cas. 1233 (9th Cir. 1977).
31 98 S. Ct. at 1383.
32 Id. at 1374. The Court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded
the case for further proceedings. Id. at 1383.
33 Id. at 1375.
34 Id.
3° Id.
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
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class is statistically valid. 37 The Court found Further support for its holding
in the policy underlying Title VII, which the Court characterized as "fairness
to individuals rather than fairness to classes. "" 8 In addition, the Manhart
Court found no indication that Congress had intended a special definition of
discrimination in the context of employee pension plans.'" Since the De-
partment's pension plan required individual women to contribute more for
equal benefits than similarly situated men, the Court ruled that the plan dis-
criminated against women in violation of Title V11. 4 "
While concluding that the Department's plan discriminated against
women, the Court recognized that such discrimination nevertheless may he
immunized by the Equal Pay Act.' As incorporated into Title VII by the
Bennett Amendment, the Equal Pay Act required the Manharl Court to de-
termine whether the Department's practice of calculating contribution rates
using sex-segregated actuarial tables was based on a factor other than sex. 42
In so doing, the Court rejected the Department's argument that longevity,
rather than sex, was the classifying factor, pointing out that no characteristics
other than sex were taken into account in calculating the fifteen percent dif-
ferential in contribution rates between men and women. 4 " The Court thus
ruled that the actuarial distinction contained in the Department's pension plan
was based entirely on sex."
The Manhari Court was similarly unpersuaded by the Department's ar-
gument that the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment controlled the
application of the Equal Pay Act to pension plans." The Department relied
primarily upon the assertion of Senator Humphrey, a sponsor of Title VII,
that pension plans which distinguish between employees on the basis of sex
would not violate Title VII because of the Bennett Amendment." Senator
37 98 S. Cu. at 1375.
38 Id. at 1376.
3" Id. In so ruling, the Court maintained that defining discrimination under
Title VII by reference to the effect on individuals did not conflict with the insurance
practice of generalizing about group characteristics to define risk pools. Id. In support
of this contention, the Court noted that insurance traditionally involves the subsidiza-
tion of poor risks by better risks, and that "nothing more than habit makes one 'sub-
sidy' seem less fair than [another]." Id. The Court thus concluded that it was not un-
fair to require men as well as women to subsidize the small percentage of women who
outlive most men and women.
'" Id. at 1377.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
" 98 S. Ct. at 1377.
43 Id.
44 id
" 5 Id. at 1378. For text of the Bennett Amendment, see note 9 supra.
1" 98 S. Ct. at 1378. The legislative history reports the following exchange
between Senators Randolph and Humphrey:
MR. RANDOLPH. Am I correct, 1 ask the Senator from Minnesota, in
assuming that similar differences of treatment in industrial benefit plans,
including earlier retirement options for women, may continue in operation
under this bill, if it becomes law?
MR. HUMPHREY. Yes. That point was made unmistakably clear earlier
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Humphrey apparently concluded that the Equal Pay Act already exempted
such plans from liability. Since the Bennett Amendment incorporated the
Equal Pay Act into Title VII, Senator Humphrey felt that such plans would
likewise be unaffected by Title VII." The Court discounted Senator Hum-
phrey's statement on the grounds that it was an isolated interpretation of the
Equal Pay Act one year subsequent to its enactment and that it conflicted with
the express language of the Equal Pay Act." Since the different contribution
rates in Manhart were based exclusively on sex, and since the remarks of one
senator could not alter the statutory provision, the Manhart Court ruled that
the Equal Pay Act exception was unavailable to the Department as a defense
for its program.
Having concluded that the language and purpose of Title VII required a
finding of' sex discrimination and that the Equal Pay Act exception liar factors
other than sex did not apply, the Supreme Court considered whether its re-
cent decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 4 " nevertheless required the con-
clusion that the pension plan did not violate Title VII." In Gilbert, the Court
concluded that the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's disability in-
surance plan does not, on its lace, constitute sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII.'` In so deciding, the Gilbert Court relied heavily on the constitu-
tional analysis of Geduldig v. Aiello, 52 an equal protection case which held that
a pregnancy classification identical to the one in Gilbert was not based on sex
and, therefore, was not violative of the fourteenth amendment.'" The Man-
hart Court distinguished Gilbert on the ground that the benefit plans involved
in each case created significantly different classifications.' While the disabil-
ity plan in Gilbert distinguished between pregnant and nonpregnant persons,
the pension plan in Manhart distinguished between men and women." As
the Manbart Court stated: "tome its face, this plan discriminates on the basis of
sex whereas the General Electric plan discriminated on the basis of a special
physical disability."''" Since the Department's pension plan was facially dis-
today by the adoption of the Bennett amendment; so there can he no
doubt about it.
110 CoNG. REC. %663-6-1 (106-1).
' 7
 See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Art of I96-1, 84 MARY. 4.. REY. 1109, 1173 n.37 (1971).
• 111
 98 S. Ct. at 1378. Chief Justice Burger argued in dissent that the majority
offered little explanation lcir discounting Senator Humphrey's comment that Title VII
would not affect the use of separate actuarial tables in pension plans. Id. at 1385. It is
submitted, however, that the majority's adherence to the language of the•mattite rather
than to an isolated comment on the effect of the Equal Pay Act was correct.. See De-
velopments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of .
1964, 81 HARy. L. REv. 1109, 1173 n.57 (1071) (commenting that "Senator Hum-
phrey's interpretation is quite puzzling. - ).
1 " 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
" 98 S. Ct. at 1378.
'' -129 U.S. at 136-38.
.117 U.S. -181 (1074).
53 Id. at 196-97 & n.214
" 4
 08 S. Ct. at 1370.
55 Id
.7,4;
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criminatory whereas the disability plan in Gilbert was not, the Manhart Court
Found Gilbert I -actually distinguishable. 57
The Supreme Court next considered the Department's contention that its
pension plan, although facially discriminatory, was legitimate since the plan
did not have a discriminatory effect on women as a class. The Department
relied on the Gilbert Court's conclusion that a plan which actually provides
more benefits to women as a class than to men has no discriminatory effect on
women." The Manhart Court again distinguished Gilbert, noting that it was
necessary in Gilbert to inquire into the effect of the disability plan on women
as a class only because the challenged plan was not facially discriminatory."
In contrast, since the pension plan in Manhart was discriminatory on its face,
the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the challenged pension
plan had a discriminatory effect on the class as a whole." Thus, the Court
refused to extend Gilbert to hold that a pension plan which is facially dis-
criminatory satisfies the demands of Title VII if it has no discriminatory ef-
fect on women as a class."' In so doing, the Court noted that the substance
of the Department's argument was that the prima facie showing of discrimi-
nation based on evidence of different contributions for the respective sexes is
rebutted by its demonstration that there is a like difference in the cost of
providing benefits for the respective classes." 2 Since Title VII does not
exempt from liability discriminatory employment practices which are based on
a difference in the cost of serving men and women, the Manhart Court re-
jected the Department's argument."
The Court concluded its discussion of the validity of the Department's
pension plan by commenting on the limits of its decision. Since Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act apply only to the employment relationship," 4 the Court
indicated that: •
Nothing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful for an
employer to set aside equal retirement contributions for each
employee and let each retiree purchase the largest benefit which his
or her accumulated contributions could command in the open mar-
ket. Nor does it call into question the insurance industry practice Of
considering the composition of an employer's work force in deter-
mining the probable cost of a retirement or death benefit plan. 1i5
Thus, in the Court's view, neither Title VII nor the holding in Manhart will
alter certain insurance industry practices which ultimately affect employees
but which are beyond the scope of the employment_relationship and therefore
are not governed by the statute.
57 Ir1. at 1378-79.





61 Id. at I 378.
112 hi. at 1379.
" 3 Id. at 1379-80.
" 1 Id. at 1380 n.33.
"' Id. al 1380.
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Having articulated the limits of its decision, the Manhart Court next con-
sidered the propriety of the district court's award of monetary relief." The
district court's backpay award, as affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, would have
reimbursed female employees for that portion of their pension plan contribu-
tions paid in violation of Title VI l." 7 The effect of the judgment would have
been to' institute sex-neutral contribution rates retroactively. Although the
Court recognized that its decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 68 established
,a presumption in favor of awarding backpay in Title VII cases, it nevertheless
vacated the award of backpay." In so ruling, the Court balanced the equities
in favor of the Department, asserting that the district court failed to accord
sufficient weight to the uncertainty of the Department's position.'" The
Court stated that "[the Department] could reasonably have thought it
unfair—or even illegal—to make -male employees shoulder more than their
'actuarial share' of the pension burden." 7 ' In addition, the Court noted that
the backpay award would be inappropriate since it could adversely affect the
financial position of existing pension funds 72 and endanger the rights of
other employees to pension benefits. 73 Thus, while the Supreme Court de-
termined that the calculation of contributions to a pension plan based on
separate actuarial tables for men and women violated Title VII, the Court
denied an award of damages to remedy this violation.
The primary significance of the Manhart decision is the Court's focus on
the explicit language of Title VII in determining whether the Department's
pension plan violated the statute's antidiscrimination mandate. The language
of section 703(a)(l) of Title VII firmly supports the Court's holding that treat-
ing individual employees differently because of their sex constitutes a dis-
criminatory employment practice. 74 The Court's strict adherence to the lan-
guage of Title VII is also evident in its refusal to hold that the absence of a
discriminatory effect on women as a class negates a finding of facial discrimi-
nation. Since cost is not a defense under Title VII, the Court correctly re-
jected the Department's argument that the use of sex-segregated actuarial
tables could be justified by a difference in the cost of providing retirement
benefits to men and women. The Manhart Court thus recognized that Title
VII imposes liability for practices which are discriminatory under section
703(a)(I) unless a statutory defense is available.
The Manhart Court's strict adherence to the language of Title VII pro-
vides a striking contrast to the Gilbert Court's reliance on the equal protection
analysis of Geduldig v. Aiello 75 in deciding a Title VII claim. In Geduldig, the
66 Id.
67 13 FEP Cas. 1622, 1624 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
" 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
" 98 S. Ct. at 1383.
" Id. at 1381.
71 Id. at 1381-82.
72 Id. at 1382-83.
73 Id. at 1382.
" See text at note 36 MOM.
75 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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Court concluded that the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's disabil-
ity insurance plan did not constitute a classification based on sex and, there-
fore, did not violate the fourteenth amendment." Relying on Geduldig, the
Gilbert Court ruled that an identical pregnancy exclusion from a disability in-
surance plan was not sex-related and, consequently, was not discrimination in
violation of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII." In Manhart, the pension plan's
requirement that female employees make higher contributions than their male
counterparts ostensibly constituted a longevity rather than a sex classification.
In contrast to the Gilbert Court, however, the Manhart Court had no parallel
equal protection case on which to rely in determining whether longevity or
sex was the classifying factor since the Supreme Court has not considered the
validity of a Manhart-type pension plan under the fourteenth amendment.
Geduldig is the equal protection case most similar to Manhart, but Manhart is
distinguishable from Geduldig because the pension plan specifically set higher
contribution rates for women than for men whereas the disability insurance
plan in Geduldig discriminated only against pregnant persons by excluding
pregnancy disability from coverage." In the absence of an equal protection
case with facts similar to those of Manhart, the Court was free to analyze the
case solely on the basis of Title VII law. Although Gilbert is part of Title VII
law, its conclusion was not controlling in Manhart because the two cases are
distinguishable in the same manner as ate Geduldig and Manhart."
Although Gilbert was factually. distinguishable from Manhart, the Gilbert
Court's reliance on the reasoning of Geduldig suggested that equal protection
analysis might have been appropriate in Manhart. Equal protection analysis
would balance the overinclusiveness of a challenged classification against its
purposes and practicality." If the Manhart Court had employed this analysis,
it might have concluded that the overinclusiveness of the contribution differ-
ential at issue was justified since there. is no way to measure the risks as-
sociated with a pension plan on an individual basis and, therefore, that group
estimates based on sex-segregated actuarial tables constitute the most practical
alternative." The use of sex-segregated actuarial tables by pension plans
7 " Id. at 496-97 & n.20.
" 429 U.S. at 136-38.
" In Manhart, the differential in take-home pay provided striking evidence of
the disparate treatment based solely on sex. 98 S. Ct. at 1375. See aim) id. at 1385
(Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78 See text at notes 49-57 supra.
" See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971).
8 ' This constitutional argument was potentially applicable both in determining
whether the pension plan was discriminatory under Title VII and in deciding whether
the Equal Pay Act exception was available as a defense. The result would be the same
regardless of the stage at which equal protection analysis is employed. The distinction
is critical, however, as a procedural matter since the burden of proof would differ
depending on whether the Court viewed the argument as part of the prima facie case
or as a defense. Support for the latter interpretation is found in Chief justice Burger's
opinion in Manhart in which be agreed with the majority that the Department's pen-
sion plan was facially discriminatory but relied on equal protection analysis in conclud-
ing that the Equal Pay Act exception immunized the plan from liability. 98 S. Ct. at
1385 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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would thus escape Title VII liability. However, the Manhart Court held that
the provisions of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act must be applied literally
and do not encompass a balancing test. The Court did not state explicitly that
this constituted a rejection of the use of equal protection reasoning in a Title
VII case. Nevertheless, the conspicuous absence of such an analysis suggests
that, despite the Gilbert Court's reliance on Geduldig, the Supreme Court may
be reluctant to incorporate the entire set of equal protection standards into
Title VII. Therefore, Manhart provides support for the proposition that Title
VII's antidiscrimination mandate is indeed independent from the equal pro-
tection balancing test.
While the Manhart Court carefully followed the language of Title VII in
determining the legality of the pension plan, it departed from Title VII prin-
ciples and prior case law in reviewing and vacating the district court's backpay
award. Section 706(g) of Title VII provides that a remedy for past discrimina-
tion "may include ... back pay .. or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate."" In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody," the Supreme Court
created a strong presumption in favor of awarding backpay to Title VII plain-
tiffs." The Albemarle Court stated that "[Oven a finding of unlawful dis-
crimination, backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied gen-
erally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating dis-
crimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries
suffered through past discrimination." "5
 The Albemarle Court also ruled that
an award of backpay rests with the district court's discretion, to be reversed
only upon a determination that the court abused its discretion or that its find-
ings of fact were clearly erroneous." The presumption in favor of backpay
awards, as delineated in Albemarle, thus works to afford Title VII plaintiffs
monetary relief in most cases." Further, the stringent standards imposed to
reverse the exercise of a district court's discretion in granting such an award
limits the role of the appellate courts in this area.
Although the Manhart Court purported to adhere to the principles estab-
lished in Albemarle," it examined the facts relevant to the backpay issue with-
out first ruling that the district court had either abused its discretion or made
erroneous findings of fact.'" Since it disregarded the broad discretion vested
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
83 422 U.S. 105 (1975).
84
 98 S. Ct. at 1383.
85 422 U.S. at 421.
" Id. at 415-16, 424-25.
" See 1975-1976 Annual Survey of Labor Relations. and Employment Discrimination
Law, 17 B.C. INn. & Cott. L. Rrv. 1041, H 39 (1976).
" 98 S. Ct.. at 1380-81, 1383.
8 " Id. at 1386 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Marshal] noted that the majority did not
assert that any findings of the District Court were clearly erroneous, nor
... [did] it conclude that there was any abuse of discretion. Instead, it
state[d] merely that. the District Court gave "insufficient attention" to cer-
tain Factors in striking the equitable balance.
Id.
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in the district court and exceeded the narrow scope of review appropriate on
the backpay issue, the Court's inquiry was thus improper as a matter of pro-
cedure." The Supreme Court actually assumed the role of a district court in
weighing the equities anew and determining that retroactive monetary relief
was inappropriate in view of the Department's good faith and the potential
adverse affect on pension fund resources and innocent beneficiaries." Even
if the Manhart Court was correct in reexamining these factual issues, its
wholesale reversal of the backpay award was improper under Albemarle. In-
stead, the Manhart Court should have remanded the decision to the district
court and directed it to reconsider the Department's claims that it acted in
good faith and that a backpay award would have serious financial
consequences." 2
The Manhart Court's treatment of the backpay issue raises the question
whether the district courts must deny future requests for retroactive monetary
relief outside the pension plan context of Manhart if the employer proves that
the challenged employment policy was pursued in good faith and that a
backpay award would adversely affect the interests of innocent hen-
eficiaries."" If Manhart is so interpreted by the lower courts, the availability
"() Neither the Manhart majority nor the separate opinions which agreed with
the result on the backpay issue gave an explanation for the departure from this rule.
" 1 Even if one accepts, for the purposes of argument, that the Court properly
reconsidered the award of backpay, its reasoning is inconsistent with previous decisions
applying the Albemarle presumption. The Manhart Court maintained that the law was
unsettled and that reasonable pension plan administrators could have acted as the De-
partment did. However, this reasoning amounts to a finding of good faith without any
inquiry into whether the Department actually attempted to ascertain the legality of the
plan. See 98 S. Ct. at 2386-87 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In addition, there is persuasive authority for the proposition that the unsettled state of
the law is no defense to a claim for backpay. United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1058-59, 1 I FEY Gas. 553, 566 (5th Cir. 1975). Further, the
Manhart Court's economic justifications for denying backpay were hypothetical since
the solvency of the Department's plan was not threatened. 98 S. Ct. at 1387 (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A similar argument of financial hardship
was rejected as unfounded in EEOC v. Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 586, 13
FEP Gas. 705, 709-10 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977). Finally, the
Manhart Court's concern with the effect on other pension plan beneficiaries conflicts
with its statement in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775 (1976), that
"we find untenable the conclusion that this form of relief may be denied merely be-
cause the interests of other employees may thereby be affected."
42 See 98 S. Ct. at 1388 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
9" Support for this interpretation of Manhart is found in the separate opinions
in Albemarle and Bowman in which several Justices stressed the importance of good faith
and protection of the rights of innocent employees. In Albemarle, Justices Rehnquist
and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger each stated that considerable weight should
be accorded an employer's good faith in determining whether an award of backpay is
appropriate. 422 U.S. at 444-45 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 448 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); id. at 450-51 (Burger, C.J., concurring in ,part and dissenting in part). In
Bowman, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist expressed the view
that Title VII remedies should not adversely affect innocent employees. 424 U.S. at.
780-81 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 785-86 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Pow-
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of backpay for Title VII plaintiffs will decrease significantly. As a result, the
"make whole" philosophy of Title VII, as enunciated by the Court in
Albemarle," will be seriously undermined. The reasoning employed by the
Manhart Court in denying backpay may be restricted, however, to the peculiar
financial planning problems involved in pension plan administration. Under
this interpretation, the Manhart decision would be limited to its facts, and dis-
trict courts would not be required to accord decisive weight to a defendant's
claims of good faith and financial hardship in Title VII cases outside the
pension plan area. The Manhart Court's statement that it was not "qualifying
the Albemarle presumption in favor of retroactive relief " "5 supports this in-
terpretation since it suggests that the Court did not view its decision as rede-
fining Title VII law on the backpay issue."
Subsequent to the Court's decision in Manhart, the Department of Labor
proposed a change -in its current interpretation of the Equal Pay Act. Under
the current interpretation, the Labor Department_ holds that. an employer can
make unequal contributions for, or pay unequal benefits to, male and female
employees.97 Under the Department's proposed interpretation, however, an
employer could not legally contribute different amounts to a pension fund on
behalf of its male and female employees, nor could it pay different benefit
levels to male and female retirees although their contribution rates were
equal." The adoption of this proposal would make the Labor Department's
interpretation of the Equal Pay Act consistent with the Equal Employment.
Opportunity Commission's rulings under Tide VII." The two.agencies
would then be uniform in their prohibition of the use of sex-segregated actu-
arial tables in employee pension plans.
Although Manhart dealt with the use of sex-segregated actuarial tables in
employee pension plans, its reasoning, "as the Court specified, cannot be ex-
tended to other discriminatory insurance practices which occur outside
employment relationships, and are thus beyond the scope of Title VII. Using
the Court's own example, Manhart has no application to a plan under which
an employer sets aside equal contributions and allows each retiree to purchase
an annuity on the open market.'" Although the Court. did not specify the
ell's opinion. It thus appears that a majority of the Manhart Court may have been
persuaded, at least with regard to pension plans, by the minority views expressed in
Albemarle and Bowman.
94
 422 U.S. at 421.
95 98 S. Ct. at 1383.
99
 The Court's discussion of backpay in Bowman, 424 U.S. at 774-78, also sup-
ports the continuing validity of Albemarle.
" 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1977).
98 43 Fed. Reg. 38,029, 38,030 (1978).
99
 The EEOC has invalidated a money purchase plan which utilized sex-
segregated actuarial tables. EEOC Decision No. 74-118, 2 EMP!.. PRAC. GUIDE (CCE1)
6431 (1974). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(1) (1977).
Prior to the Department of Labor's recent proposal, its position conflicted
with that of the EEOC when the challenged pension plan involved employer, rather
than employee, contributions. See EEOC v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631, 635-36,
15 FEP Cas. 1363, 1366-67 (D. Me. 1977). This conflict was not presented in Manhart.
439 F. Supp. at 638, 15 FEP Cas. at 1368-69.
'°° See text at note 65 .supra.
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exact nature of such a plan, its reference to the open market suggests that the
employee would be dealing directly with insurance companies on an indi-
vidual basis."' Such an arrangement is admittedly beyond the purview of
Title VII. 102 The Manharl Court also noted that Title VII does not govern
the insurance industry practice of taking the sex composition of a labor force
into account in determining the cost of a retirement plan."" When a private
insurance company engages in this practice, it is removed front the employ-
ment relationship, and the Court's conclusion is therefore correct."' The
Court's comment about the inapplicability of Manharl to these insurance in-
dustry practices must he understood, therefore, as a caution against the view
that_ Title VII can correct sex discrimination throughout the insurance indus-
try.
III. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
Although employment discrimination based on religion has been pro-
scribed by federal law since the enactment of Title VII in 1964,' prior to the
' 1 In discussing the limits of the majority's opinion, Chief Justice Burger simi-
larly interpreted the Court's statement as applying to annuities purchased by an
employee on the open market. 98 S. Ct. at 1385-86 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). •
02 Nevertheless, this situation must be distinguished from an employer's
"money purchase pension plan" in which the employer arranges with an insurance
company to provide retirees with whatever level of benefits their equal contributions
will buy. See Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex-Rased Morialitv Tables, 53 B.U. L. REV. 624,
632 (1973), Money purchase pension plans are governed by Title VII. The validity of
money purchase plans which calculate benefits on the basis of separate actuarial tables
has been considered to date by two district courts. Compare EEOC v. Colby College,
439 F. Supp. 631, 638, 15 FEP Cas. 1363, 1368-69 (1). Me. 1977) (money purchase
annuity and life insurance plan valid under Title with Henderson v. Oregon, 405
F. Supp. 1271, 1276, 11 FEP Cas. 1218, 1222 (1). Ore. 1975) (money purchase annuity
plan violates Title VII), In accordance with the Labor Department's proposed in-
terpretation of Manhart and the EEOC's position, such plans woukl be required to pay
equal benefits to male and female employees. See 43 Fed. Reg. 38,029, 38,030 (I 978);
29 C.E.R. § 1604.9(f) (1977).
103 See text at note 65 supra.
114 It is unclear whether a similar situation could arise within the employment
context and thus he subject to Title VII. As the Manhari Court noted, "Title VII
applies to 'any agent' of a covered employer, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b), and the Equal Pay
Act applies to 'any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of any employer
in relation to any employee.' 29 U.S.C. 203(d)." 98 S. Ct. at 1380 11.33. if the person
or organization who determines the cost of a pension plan based on the sex composi-
tion of the work force fits one of these descriptions, the practice may be challenged
under Title VII. However, the Manhart Court also stated that since Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act protect individual employees, neither "makes it unlawful to determine
the funding requirements for an establishment's benefit plan by considering the com-
position of the entire force." Id. at 1380 n.34. It is unclear whether this comment
reflects the Court's position on the merits of a challenge to this practice or, in the
alternative, whether it merely restates the limits of Title VII in reaching insurance
industry practices beyond the employment relationship.
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 2000e-17 (1976). Section 703(a) of Title VII. •12
§ 2000e-2(a) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
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1972 amendments to Title VII, the Act itself did not define the term religion,
nor did it indicate what. acts would constitute employment discrimination
based on religion. The task of definition was left instead to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 2 which in 1966," and again in
1967, 4 issued guidelines dealing with the problem of religious discrimination.
In particular, the 1967 guidelines required employers "to make reasonable ac-
commodations to the religious needs of employees and prospective employees
where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the con-
duct of the employer's business." 5
 The EEOC did not attempt, however, to
define specifically the terms "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hard-
ship."" Rather, the Commission left further delineation of these terms to in-
dividual cases.'
In 1972, Congress incorporated the substance of the 1967 EEOC regula-
tions into Title VII by adding section 701(j)." Section 701 (j) defines religion
as follows:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reason ably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business."
Like the prior.EEOC guidelines, however, section 70I(j) itself contained no
guidance as to the degree of accommodation required of an employer. In
addition, as before the 1972 amendments, the EEOC did not attempt to
specifically define the terms "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hard-
ship" through regulations.
Prior to this Survey year, the Supreme Court twice confronted the issue of
the extent to which Title VII requires an employer to accommodate the re-
It shall he an unlawful employment practice For an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's , 	 religion	 or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's 	 religion
42 U.S.0	 2000e-12 (1976).
3 31 Fed. Reg. 8,370 (1966).




29 C.F.R.	 1005.1(h) (1978) (emphasis added).
" The Commission dkl note that "Witch undue hardship, for example, may
exist where the employee's needed work cannot he performed by another employee of
substantially similar qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath ob-
server. - Id.
Id. See note 10 in/m.
" Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub, L. No 92-261,	 2, 86
Stat. 103 (now codified at '12 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976)).
" Id. (emphasis added).
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ligious practices of an employee. In each case, however, the Court was equally
divided and therefore failed to decide the issue." During the Survey year,
the Supreme Court, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison," again faced the
issue of the extent to which Title VII requires an employer to accommodate
the religious practices of an employee. In Hardison, the Supreme Court held
that, as defined by section 701(j), an employer's obligation to reasonably ac-
commodate an employee's religious practices does not require an employer to
violate the seniority provisions of a valid collective bargaining agreement."
Moreover, the Court ruled that any accommodation resulting in more than a
de minimis cost to an employer constitutes undue hardship within the meaning
of section 701(j). 13
 The Court's decision in Hardison raises serious doubts as
to the continued viability of the religious accommodation mandate of section
701( j).
The plaintiff in Hardison was an employee of Trans World Airlines
(TWA)." After being employed by TWA for almost a year, the plaintiff
joined the Worldwide Church of God," a religious sect requiring members to
refrain from work on a Sabbath lasting from sunset on Friday until sunset on
Saturday." Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement which
TWA maintained with the International Association of Machinists, all job and
shift assignments were made on the basis of seniority." Due to his low
seniority status, the plaintiff was unable to bid for a shift assignment allowing
him to observe his Sabbath." When the plaintiff informed TWA of his re-
ligious belief's, TWA attempted to accomodate the plaintiff by authorizing the
union steward to seek a shift change for him." The union, however, was
unwilling to breach the terms of the seniority system to accommodate the
plaintiff. 2 " In the face of the union's refusal to allow a shift change, TWA
considered a proposal to allow the plaintiff to work a four day week. 2 ' TWA
'" Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 129 U.S. 65 (1976) (per curiam); Dewey v.
Reynolds Metal Co., 102 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curtain).
The cases decided by the courts of appeals prior to Hardison were similarly
inconclusive as to the degree of accommodation required of an employer. Compare
Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 183, 12 FEY Cas. 5 (10th Cir. 1976) and
Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 11 FEP Gas. 129 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (cases finding no failure to accommodate) with Draper v.
United States Pipe and Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 11 FEY Cas. 1106 (6th Cir. 1975)
and Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 4 FEP Cas. 951 (5th Cir. 1972) (cases find-
ing failure to accommodate). See generally Note, Religious Discrimination—The Reasonable
Accommodation Rule, 1975-1976 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimi-
nation Law, 17 & Cont. L. REV. 1179, 1182-88 (1976).
" 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
" Id. at 79.
' 3 Id. at 84-85.
id, at 66.
' Id. at 67.
" Id.
'' Id.
' 8 Id, at 68.
19 hi.
20 hi .
21 Id. at 68-69.
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refused to adopt this proposal because it entailed either leaving the plaintiff's
job open on weekends, moving an employee from another area with the result.
that the operation in that area would suffer, or paying overtime premiums for
an extra employee to fill the plaintiff's job." TWA concluded that the in-
creased cost and inefficiency inherent in this proposal rendered it unaccept-
able. 23 When an accommodation was not reached, the plaintiff refused to
report for work on his Sabbath, and was discharged."
After his discharge, the plaintiff commenced a timely action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against both TWA
and the union, claiming that their failure to accommodate him constituted
religious discrimination in violation of Title V11. 25 In rejecting the plaintiff's
contentions, the district court found that both TWA and the union had satis-
factorily accommodated the plaintiff's religious practices and that. any further
accommodation constituted undue hardship. 2" On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court judgment
in favor of TWA, finding that TWA had not satisfied its statutory duty to
accommodate plaintiff's religious beliefs. The circuit court maintained that
TWA could have accommodated the plaintiff without undue hardship in two
different ways. 27 First, the court determined that TWA could have permitted
plaintiff to work a four day week." That this accom modation required
either leaving the plaintiff's job open on weekends, shifting an employee from
another location, or paying overtime premiums for an extra employee did
not, in the court's opinion, constitute an undue hardship. 2" Second, the court
of appeals found that TWA could have arranged a job swap for the plain-
tiff. 3° Since, as the circuit court read the record, TWA had not even pursued
the possibility that the union would agree to such a job swap, the court did
not reach the question whether requiring the employer to arrange such a
swap, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, was required by
Title VII. 31
The Supreme Court granted certiorari." In a seven to two decision,"
the Court reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit, 24 and reinstated the
22 Id.
22 Id.
24 Id. at 69.
25
 375 F, Stipp, 877, 879, 10 FEP Gas. 502, 503 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
21' Id. at 883-84, 891, 10 ['EP Gas. at 507, 511.
27
 527 F.2d 33, 39-42, 11 FEP Cas. at 1121, 1125-27 (8th Cir. 1975). However,
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the union, finding that the plain-
tiff had not directly attacked that judgment. Id. at 43, 11 FEP Gas. at 1128.
28 Id. at 39-40. 11 FEP Gas. at 1125.
2'J
	 at 40-41, 11 FEP Cas. at 1126.
" 9 Id.
	 at 41-42. 11 FEP Gas. at 1126-27.
"' Id. at 42, II FEP Cas. at 1127.
" 2 429 U.S. 958 (1976).
:4:1 Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Marshall, _joined by




BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 20:6. 1
district court judgment for TWA. As to the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that_
TWA could have arranged a job swap without union approval, the Supreme
Court held that the duty to accommodate imposed by section 701(j) did not.
require TWA to breach the terms of a seniority system established under a
valid collective bargaining agreement. 35
 As to the circuit court's assertion that.
TWA could have permitted the plaintiff to work a four day work week, the
Court, determined that this proposal involved costs to TWA "either in the
form of lost efficiency in other jobs or higher wages."' In the Court's estima-
tion, requiring TWA to bear this burden constituted more than a de minimis
cost. Accordingly, the Court held "that each of the Court of Appeals'
suggested alternatives would have been undue hardship within the meaning
of the statute as construed by the EEOC guidelines."' Accepting the district
court's finding that TWA had done all that it could to accommodate the
plaintiff without either violating the collective bargaining agreement or incur-
ring substantial costs," the Court held that Title VII was not violated."
In holding that TWA need not violate the terms of a seniority system to
accommodate Hardison, I he Supreme Court relied primarily on section
703(a)(I) of Title VII. 41` Section 703(a)(1) provides that it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to "discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment., because of such individual's ... religion ... ."." The Court. observed
t hat
[t.]he emphasis of both the language and the legislative history of
[section 703(a)(1)J is on eliminating discrimination in employment:
similarly situated employees are not to be treated clifferently solely
because they differ with respect. to race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. This is true regardless of whether the discrimination is
directed against majorities or minorities:"
After noting the broad antidiscrimination purpose of section 703(a)(I), the
Court proceeded to examine the seniority system at. issue in Hardison.'" That.
35 Id. at 79.
`"' Id. al 8-1,
" 7 Id. at 77,
" id. at 83 11.11.
"" Id. at 77.
1 " See id. at 71-72, 79-81. The Court also supported its decision by reference to
703(h) of Title VII, -12 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(h) (1971i). Section 703(h) insulates bona fide
seniority systems from intack under Title VII absent proof of discriminatory intent. Id.
Accepting the district court's finding that the seniority system was not imbued with
discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court concluded that TWA was not required to
make rut exception to its seniority system in order to accommodate Hardison. , 132 U.S.
at 81-83.
" 12 U.S.C.	 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). Although § 701(j) is technically only a
definition of "religion" For purposes of § 703(a)(I)„ it is in reality much broader than a
definition, as it speaks of firmatively of the duty to make "reasonable accommodations
-
absent - undue hardship". See notes 8-9 sqnw.
12
 132 U.S. at 71,
-1 " Id. at 76-84.
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seniority system, the Court postulated, "represented a significant iiccommoda-
non to the needs, both religious and secular. ()I• all of TWA's employees." . 44
The Court reasoned that if TWA nevertheless chose to circumvent the senior-
ity system by ordering a more senior employee to replace Hardison on Satur-
days, the senior employee would lose his shift preference at. least in part be-
cause he was not a member of a religion observing a Saturday Sabbath.'' The
religious accommodation mandate of section 701(j) notwithstanding, the
Court concluded that section 703(a)(1) does not, condone such unequal treat-
ment.'" The Court stated that "Mt would be :inomalous to conclude that by
'reasonable accommodation' Congress meant that an employer m ast deny the
shift and job preference of some employees ... in order to accommodate or
prefer the religious needs of others ...." 47 Thus, the Court determined that
TWA was not required to make an exception to its seniority system to ac-
commodate Hardison.'
In holding that TWA need not incur more than de minimis costs to ac-
commodate Hardison, the Court again relied primarily on the antidiscrimina-
tion mandate of section 703(a)(1)." As to the proposal that TWA allow the
plaintiff to work a four day week the Court reasoned that such an accommo-
dation involved costs to TWA, "either in the form of lost efficiency in other
jobs or higher wages.'' 5" Such costs, the Court concluded, are more than de
minimis and constitute an "undue hardship'' within the meaning of section
701(j). 5 ' The Court maintained that
Mike abandonment of the seniority system, to require TWA to hear
additional costs when no such costs are incurred to give other
employees the clays off that they want would involve unequal treatment
of employees on the basis of their religion. . . While incurring extra costs
to secure a replacement titer Hardison might remove the necessity of
compelling another employee to work involuntarily in Hardison's
place, it would not change the fact that the privilege of having Satur-
days off would be allocated according to religious beliefs . . 52
From the above italicized language, it is apparent that the Court was troubled
by the idea of granting preferential treatment to some employees on the basis
of their religion. Thus, as in its consideration of the seniority system, the
Court relied primarily on the antidiscrimination principle underlying section
703(a)(1) in deciding that anything more than de minimis cost constitutes
undue hardship under section 701(j).
In Hardison, the Supreme Court discerned a conflict between the antidis-





-'s 14. at 83.
411 See id. at 84-85.
hi. at 84.
5 ' Id.
52 Id, at 84-85 (emphasis added).
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mandate of section 701(j). In reconciling this conflict, the Court contrasted
the legislative history of section 703(a)(1) with that. of the more recently
enacted- section 701(j). In the Court's opinion, the legislative history of section'
703(a)(1) was ample and unarnbiguous, 13 while the history of section 701(j)
was relatively meager and inconclusive." "In the absence of clear statutory
language or legislative history to the contrary," 55 the Court was unwilling to
construe section 701(j) "to require an employer to discriminate against some
employees to enable others to observe their Sabbath." 5" The Court thus re-
conciled the conflict between sections 703(a)(1) and 701(j) by narrowly con-
struing the religious accommodation mandate of section 701(j).
By narrowly construing the mandate of section 701(j), the Supreme
Court has severely restricted an employer's obligation to accommodate the
religious beliefs of employees. The religious accommodation mandate should
continue to have some substance, however, so long as Hardison is narrowly
limited to its immediate holding—that employers need not violate a valid
seniority system or incur more than de minimis costs in accommodating an
employee's religious practices. There are many more or less cost-free accom-
modations which an employer can use to allow an employee to observe his
Sabbath without depriving other employees of their contractual rights. 57 For
example, in Hardison, TWA could have paid overtime to a voluntary replace-
ment and required Hardison to work overtime, when needed, at regular
pay.`'" So long as employers are required to pursue such cost-free accommo-
dations, the religious accommodation mandate of section 70I(j) will have con-
tinued viability.
Nevertheless, the Hardison decision may be interpreted more broadly to
sap section 701(j) of any remaining strength. This broad interpretation of
section 701(j)'s requirement of reasonable accommodation flows from the
Hardison Court's primary reliance on the antidiscrimination mandate of' sec-
tion 703(a)(1), and would construe Hardison to mean that all preferential
treatment of employees, even though resulting in only a de minimis cost to an
employer, is invalid under section 703(a)(1). According to this broad view of
5 ' See id. at 71 - 72 & n.6, 81.
5-I See id. at 74-75 &
55 Id. at 85.
"" Id.
" In his dissenting opinion. Justice Marshall suggested several more or less
cost-free accommodations available under the facts of Hardison. First., Justice Marshall
contended that the company should have actively pursued the possibility that Hardison
might have been accommodated by a simple trade of days or shifts. Id. at 94. Second,
Justice Marshall suggested that TWA could have paid overtime to a voluntary re-
placement for Hardison on Saturdays and required Hardison to pick up the extra cost.
Id. at 95. Finally, justice Marshall postulated that TWA could have paid overtime to a
voluntary replacement and required Hardison to work overtime when needed at regu-
lar pay. Id. Justice Marshall stated that none of these accommodations "would have
deprived any other employee of rights under the contract or violated the seniority
system in any way." Id. at 96.
NH hi
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Hardison, employers may not grant preferential treatment to accommodate an
employee's religious practices unless other employees receive compensating
benefits. If such a broad interpretation of Hardison prevails in the courts, it
will completely eliminate an employer's obligation to engage in any accommo-
dation of his employee's religious beliefs.
The potential evisceration of the statutory mandate to reasonably accom-
modate employees' religious beliefs particularly troubled justice Marshall. In
his dissent from the majority's position in Hardison, justice Marshall, joined by
Justice Brennan, characterized the Court's decision as "a fatal blow to all ef-
forts under Title VII to accommodate work requirements to religious prac-
tices." 59 The dissent rejected the Court's conclusion that accommodations
which grant preferential treatment in favor of religious observers are contrary
to the underlying principles of Title VI I."° Accommodations, the dissent
reasoned, are by definition preferential, and Congress passed section 701(j) in
order to guarantee that employers grant such preferential treatment unless
undue hardship would result."' .While the dissent did not question the
Court's holding that an employer is not required to violate the terms of a
seniority system to accommodate an employee, it took serious issue with the
majority's conclusion that an employer was not obligated to incur more than
de minimis costs to allow an employee to observe his Sabbath."' In this regard,
the dissent was particularly disturbed by the Court's refusal to recognize other
possible accommodations which were almost cost-free. 63 By ignoring such
cost-free accommodations, the dissent concluded, the Court had effectively
nullified section 701(j)." 4
A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit appears to substantiate the Hardison dissent's apprehensions concern-
ing the continued viability of section 701(j). In Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,'" a
case which the Supreme Court remanded to the Sixth Circuit for a rehearing
in light of Hardison," the Sixth Circuit reversed its earlier decision finding a
Title VII violation for failure to comply with section 701(j). 67 Prior to its
decision in Hardison, the Supreme Court had affirmed, by an equally divided
vote, the earlier judgment of the Sixth Circuit that certain steps taken by an
employer failed to satisfy his duty to accommodate an employee's religious
practices." In granting a rehearing after Hardison, the Supreme Court va-
cated its earlier affirmance and remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit for
reconsideration in light of Hardison.''' On remand, the court of appeals re-
59 Id. at 86.
6° Id. at 86 -89.
61 Id. at 87.
62 Id. at 92 n.6.
63 See id. at 92 n.6, 92-96.
64 Id. at 89.
65 561 F.2d 658, 15 FEP Gas. 1098 (6th Cir. 1977).
66 433 U.S. 903 (1977) (mem.).
67 561 F.2d 658, 15 FEP Gas. 1098 (6th Cir. 1077).
" 429 U.S. 65 (1976) (per curiam), aff'g by an equally divided court 516 F.2d
544, 10 FEP Cas. 974 (6th Cir. 1975).
69 433 U.S. 903 (1977) (mem.).
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versed its earlier decision and held that the employer's efforts had satisfied
the demands of section 701(j)." Although the Sixth Circuit did not publish
an opinion indicating why it felt compelled by Hardison to reverse its prior
decision, an examination of the facts of Cummins may shed some light on that
court's view of Hardison.
The•plaintiff in Cummins was employed as a department supervisor in the
defendant's plant." In this capacity, he was required to work Monday
through Saturday. 72 After having worked for the defendant for many years,
the plaintiff joined the Worldwide Church of God." Informed that the
plaintiff's religious practices prevented him from working on Saturday, the
employer agreed to give the plaintiff Saturdays off. In the absence of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement or a negotiated seniority system, the employer ap-
peared to be free to assign work as it saw fit, and accordingly, required
supervisors from a neighboring department to cover both departments on
Saturday." The procedure of having one supervisor cover two departments
had been used by the defendant for many years with no apparent prob-
lems:75 In return for having Saturdays off, the plaintiff agreed to substitute
for the other supervisors on weekdays. 7 " Defendant accommodated the
plaintiff in this fashion For over a year." During that time, however, other
supervisors complained about the plaintiff's preferential work schedule, and
as a result of these complaints, the plaintiff was discharged."
The plaintiff brought a timely suit in United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, alleging that the defendant had failed to satisfy
its statutory duty to accommodate the plaintiff's religious beliefs." Finding
that the defendant had made a reasonable accommodation and that any
further attempt would have constituted undue hardship, the district court
dismissed the plaintiff's suit." On appeal, the Sixth Circuit, in its first deci-
sion in the case, found the evidence insufficient to support the district court's
determination that continuing to allow the plaintiff Saturdays off would con-
stitute undue hardship, and therefore reversed the district court's finding of
reasonable accommodation as clearly erroneous." In support of its decision,
the court of appeals emphasized that the employer had managed to operate
with the system for more than ayear. 82
 In addition, the court reasoned that
"[t]he objections and complaints -of fellow employees, in and of themselves, do
7 " 561 F.2d 658, 659, 15 FEP Cas. 1098, 1099 (6tli Cir. 1977).
516 E.2d 544, 545, 10 EEP Cas. 974, 975 (6th Cir. 1975).
72 Id.
'" Id. It is interesting to note that this was the same religious sect involved in
Hartils. on• See text at notes 15-16 supra.
" Id. at 548, 10 EEP Cas. at 977-78.
75 Id. at 547-48, 10 FEP Cas. at 977-78.
7" Id. at 548, 10 FEP Cas. at 977.
77 Id. at 551, 10 FEN Cas. at 980.
7 " Id. at 545, 10 FEP Cas. 976.
7" Id., 10 FEP Cas. at 975.
"" Id. at 545-46, 10 FEP Cas. at 976.
' Id. at 550, 10 HI' Cas. at 979.
"2 Id. at 551, 10 EEP Cas. at 980.
November 19781	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 199
not constitute undue hardship in the conduct of an employer's business."'"
Furthermore, the circuit court concluded that the defendant could have al-
leviated the unrest of other supervisors by pursuing a more active course of
accommodation." For example, the court postulated, the employer might
have reduced the tension by allowing the plaintiff to work longer hours on
weekdays and Sundays, by reducing the plaintiff's pay commensurately with
his shorter work week, or by taking pains to ensure that the plaintiff substi-
tuted for the other supervisors on an equitable basis rather than leaving the
other supervisors to make demands on the plaintiff."
On its facts, it is arguable that the Sixth Circuit's original decision in
Cummins could stand uncorrected under a narrow reading of Hardison. Since
the employer in Cummins did not have to infringe the collective bargaining
rights of other employees to accommodate the plaintiff, that portion of the
Hardison decision holding that employers need not violate the terms of a valid
seniority system is not controlling. Likewise, at least under a narrow reading
of Hardison, the Hardison Court's holding that employers need not incur more
than a de lninimis cost has no application to Cummins. In contrast to Hardison,
the system developed to accommodate the plaintiff in Cummins did not require
that the plaintiff's job be left open on weekends, or that overtime be paid to
another supervisor to fill the plaintiff's position." On the contrary, the
employer in, Cummins had used the procedure whereby another supervisor
would cover two departments in a supervisor's absence for many years." This
procedure did not result in extra expense, and the only possible adverse ef-
feet on the employer, apart from other employee's complaints, was the slight
inefficiency which resulted from having one supervisor cover two depart-
ments." Since the procedure had been employed for many years, a court
reading Hardison narrowly would certainly label this inefficiency de minim's.
Such a court would also find complaints from other employees not to consti-
tute undue hardship, especially since, as the Sixth Circuit had earlier noted,
these complaints could have been alleviated if the employer had taken a more
active role in the accommodation." Therefore, under a narrow view of the
Hardison decision, it seems that Hardison was not controlling in Cummins.
Although the actual reasoning employed by the Cummins court is unavail-
able, it may be concluded that the Sixth Circuit decision resulted from a
broad reading of Hardison. Under this broad view, courts would interpret
Hardison to prohibit all preferential treatment of religious employees where
there are no concomitant benefits to nonreligious employees. The particular
accommodation rejected by the employer in Cummins allowed the plaintiff to
observe his Sabbath while requiring all other employees to work on Saturday.
"" Id. at 550, 10 FEY Cas. at 979.
M4 id,
"I Id.
" Id. at 548, 10 FEP Gas. at 978.
87 Id.
Id. at 550, 10 FEP Cas. at 980.
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Such preferential treatment, at least under a broad reading of Hardison, is
prohibited. It remains to be seen whether other courts will follow the Cummins
court in its inherently broad reading of Hardison. 9° If courts do adopt this
interpretation, then Justice Marshall is correct in his estimation that section
701(j), once hailed by its proponent Senator Randolf as essential to prevent
religious discrimination in employment," is now devoid of all substance." 2
IV. EEOC ENFORCEMENT POWERS
A. Statute of Limitations Applicable to EEOC Actions: Occidental Life
Since the 1972 amendments' to Title VIL 2 the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission has had the authority to institute suit in federal district
court. against private employers engaged in unlawful employment practices. 3
"" Since the Court handed clown its decision in Hardison, several cases dealing
with the accommodation issue in the particular context of Saturday Sabbatarians have
been decided by the courts of appeals. it is interesting to note that the colitis have
decided all of these cases against the employee seeking accommodation. However, all
of these cases appear to be reconcilable with a narrow reading of Hardison. Rohr v.
Western Elec. Co.. 567 F.2e1 829, 16 FEP Cas. 64 (8th Cir. 1977) (accommodation
would have required employer' to violate collective bargaining agreement); _Jordan v.
North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72. 15 FEP Cas. 1322 (4th Cir. 1977) (prospective
employee demanded absolute guarantee of accominodation); Chrysler Corp. v. Mann,
561 F.2c1 1282, 15 FEP Cas. 788 (8th Cir. 1977), ceri. denied, 98 S. Ct. 778 (1978)
(employee failed to seek accommodatiotfthrough the existing system); Huston v. Local
93, UAW, 559 F.2c1 477, 15 [- EP Cas. 326 (8th Cir. 1977) (accommodation would have
required union to violate collective bargaining agreement).
in the context of religious objection to payment of union clues, the Sixth Cir-
cuit recently held that subsections 8(a)(3) and (h)(2) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.
I58(a)(3), (b)(2) (1976), which permit a collective bargaining agreement to require
union membership as a condition of employment but prevent discharge at the behest
of a union for any reason other than failure to pay union dues, do not represent an
accommodation to employees whose religious practices require them to refrain from
joining unions and paying union dues. McDaniel v. Essex Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 343,
16FEP Cas. 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1978). The McDaniel court held that, subsections 8(a)(3)
and (b)(2) notwithstanding, "the burden is on [the employer] to make an effort at
accommodation and, if unsuccessful, to demonstrate that they were unable to reason-
ably accommodate the plaintiff's religious beliefs without undue hardship." Id. By re-
quiring the employer to disregard the terms of a valid collective bargaining agreement,
McDaniel would appear inconsistent with even a narrow reading of Hardison.
"' 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972).
"2
 432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (1972).
2
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976) provides in part:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or
within thirty days after the expiration of any period of reference under
subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has been unable to
secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respon-
dent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision
named in the charge.
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This Survey year, in Occidental Life Insurance Ca. v. EEOC, 4
 the Supreme Court
considered what statute of limitations, if' any, applies to the EEOC's power to
bring such suits. In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the Court held that
neither the provisions of Title VII 5
 nor the applicable state statute of limita-
tions imposes any time limitation on the EEOC'S power to commence en-
forcement actions. 6
The statute of limitations issue arose in Occidental when the EEOC insti-
tuted an enforcement action against Occidental Life Insurance Company,
seeking both injunctive and back pay relief, three years and two months after
an employee of the company had filed a charge of sex discrimination with the
Commission.' The district court granted the company's motion for summary
judgment, 8 holding that section 706(1)(1) of Title VII 9 bars enforcement ac-
tions instituted more than 180 days after a charge has been filed with the
EEOC." In the alternative, the district court found the action to be barred
by the one year statute of limitations contained in the California Code of Civil
Procedure." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's decision," holding that section 706(f)(1) does not impose a limita-
tion of 180 days on the EEOC's authority to bring suit,'" and further, that the
action was not subject to any state limitations period.' 4 On certiorari,' 5 the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.'
4 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
5 Id. at 366.
6 Id. at 372.
7 Id. at 357. Between December 27, 1970, the date Occidental's employee
filed a charge with the Commission, and February 22, 1974, when the EEOC initiated
the enforcement action, the EEOC had attempted to eliminate the discriminatory
employment practices by means of conference, conciliation. and persuasion. Id. at
357-58.
EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 12 FEE Cas. 1298, 1299-1300 (M.D. Cal.
1974).
9 Section 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976), provides in pertinent
part:
If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission,
or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or
the expiration of any period of reference ... [from a state agency],
whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this
section ..., or the Commission has not entered into a concilation agree-
ment to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission ..., shall so
notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such
notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the
charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge
was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge
alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice.
10 12 FEP Gas. at 1299.
" Id. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1978).
12 EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533, 542, 12 FEE Cas. 1300,
1301 (9th Cir. 1976).
13 Id. at 536, 12 FEE Cas. at 1302.
14 Id. at 536-40, 12 FEP Cas. at 1302-05.
15
 429 U.S. 1022 (1976).
' 6 Occidental Life Ins. Co. N'. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977).
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The Supreme Court, in concluding that Title VII itself contains no time
period within which the EEOC must commence enforcement actions," ob-
served that the only temporal restriction imposed on the EEOC is found[ in
section 706(f)(1)." Section 706(f)(1) provides that the EEOC must wait at
least 30 clays after a charge has been filed with the Commission before it may
institute suit.'" Section 706(f)(1) also provides that a private individual who
has filed a charge with the EEOC may commence a civil action in his Own
name if the EEOC has not brought. suit within 180 clays after the charge was
filed. 20 The Occidental Court held, however, that neither section 706(f)(1) nor
any other section of Title VII explicitly prescribes the maximum time within
which the Commission may institute a civil action. 2 ' Thus, the district court
had erred when it interpreted section 706(f)(1) as prohibiting the Commission
from bringing an enforcement suit more than 180 clays after a charge has
been filed."
The Supreme 'Court in Occidental construed section 706(f)(1) as merely
providing complainants with a statutory alternative to the often time-
consuming procedures of the EEOC, rather than imposing a 180 day limita-
tion period upon the Commission's power to bring enforcement suits.'" This
alternative enforcement procedure, the Court observed, allows a complainant.
dissatisfied with the progress being made by the EEOC on his or her
employment discrimination charge to elect to circumvent the EEOC proce-
dures and seek relief through a private action in a district court. 24 The
Court held that this latter view of section 706(f)(1), as opposed to the view
adopted by the district court, is the natural, correct interpretation of the stat-
ute. 25 The Court further noted that its literal reading of section 706(f)(1) is
supported by the statute's legislative history. This history, the Court con-
cluded, reveals a strong congressional intent to protect the individual from
being prejudiced by administrative delays, but contains no mention of a con-
gressional desire to limit the time within which the EEOC may institute suit. 2 "
After concluding that Title VII imposes no time limitation on suits
brought by the Commission, the Supreme Court considered whether EEOC
enforcement actions are subject to the relevant state statute of limitations. 27
" Id. at 366.
'" For the text of § 706(0(1), see notes 3 and 9 su pro
'" See note 3 supra.
2" See note 9 supra.
1 ' •32 U.S. at 360.
22 Sec text at note 10 supra.
.132 U.S. at 361.
2-1 hir.
25 Id.
2" Id. at 366. The Occidental Court found further support for its interpretation
of § 706(1)(1) in the Senate Committee report on the amendment. This report ex-
pressly stated that "the primary concern should he to protect the aggrieved person's
option to seek a prompt remedy" and that the purpose of the 180 day provision was to
"preserve ... the private right of action by an aggrieved party." S. REP. No. 415, 92c1
Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1971).
27 432 U.S. at 366-72.
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The Court acknowledged that, in situations where Congress fails to specify an
express limitations period, it frequently has inferred a congressional intent to
apply state statutes of limitations to federal causes of action." Nevertheless,
the mere absence of an express limitations period in a federal statute, the
Court cautioned, does not mean that the Court must mechanically apply a
state statute of limitations." Noting' that state legislatures do not devise their
limitations periods with national interests in mind, the Court emphasized that
it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that reference to state law will not
interfere with the proper implementation of national policies. 3" Thus, state
limitations periods will not be borrowed "if' their application would be incon-
sistent with the underlying policies of the federal statute. - "'
In this light, the Supreme Court examined whether the policies underly-
ing Title VII would be thwarted by application of state statutes of limitations.
The Court observed that the 1972 amendments to Title VII, while providing
the EEOC with the additional enforcement power of initiating civil actions in
federal court, preserved the administrative functions of the Commission
created by the 1964 Act." This additional power did not transform the
EEOC into an agency whose exclusive responsibility is conducting litigation on
behalf of private . parties. Rather, the Court reasoned, the Commission must
continue its original task of investigating unlawful employment practices and
attempting to induce employers to comply with Title VII standards through
methods of conciliation, persuasion, and, if necessary, litigation." As a re-
sult, the Court determined that the Commission's administrative duties distin-
guish it from the normal private litigant against whom a state statute of limita-
tions would properly run." 4
In view of the federal policy requiring the EEOC to attempt an adminis-
trative resolution of employment discrimination claims before instituting suit,
the Occidental Court judged it inappropriate to rely on a state statute of limita-
tions." The "State's wisdom" in establishing a general limitations period
could not, the Court reasoned, have taken into account the congressional pol-
icy that judicial action by the EEOC be delayed while the Commission seeks to
end discrimination through administrative procedures. 30 In addition, the
2" Id. at 367. The Court cited as examples: Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
179-82 (1976); United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04
(1966); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914); Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906).
2" 432 U.S. at 367.
Id.
" Id.




36 Id. The Court noted that in some instances, state limitations periods would
directly conflict with other time provisions contained in the Act. Id. at 369. The Court
cited the California one-year statute of limitations as an example of this possible con-
flict. The Court noted that under CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1410-1433 (West 1971), an
aggrieved party may file a charge with the EEOC as late as 300 days after the dis-
criminatory act, The EEOC may then take another 120 days to investigate the charge
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Court concluded that the adoption of state limitations periods would be in-
consistent with the congressional intent underlying the enactment of the 1972
amendments. 37 The Supreme Court observed that the legislative history of
the amendments evinces Congress' "acute awareness of the enormous backlog
of cases before the EEOC and the consequent delays" encountered by com-
plainants." The Court therefore determined that it would be unreasonable
to suppose that Congress intended, under the 1972 amendments, to grant the
Commission additional enforcement responsibilities and simultaneously to rel-
egate its federal lawsuits to the "vagaries of diverse state limitations stat-
utes.""
The Supreme Court concluded its Occidental opinion by expressly reject-
ing the employer's contention that the absence of a specified time limitation
on the bringing of an EEOC enforcement action will deprive defendants in
such Title VII suits of "fundamental fairness or subject them to the surprise
and prejudice that can result from the prosecution of stale claims." 40 The
Court noted that Title VII defendants are alerted to the possibility of an en-
forcement suit within ten days after a charge is filed with the EEOC."' This
prompt notice, the Court reasoned, gives the defendant the opportunity to
gather evidence in anticipation of a civil action.'" The Court further noted
that during EEOC administrative proceedings, a potential defendant is kept
abreast of the action's progress. 43 In view of these procedural safeguards, the
Court concluded that the absence of any time restraints on an EEOC en-
forcement action does not unfairly prejudice Title VII defendants."
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, filed a dissenting opin-
ion in Occidental. While accepting the majority's conclusion that section
and make its determination of reasonable cause. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). The
Court observed that "even if the aggrieved party and the EEOC act within the 420-day
period expressly authorized by the Act, the California [one-year] limitations period ...
would expire before the EEOC had an opportunity to begin any conciliation efforts,
let alone bring a lawsuit." Id. at 369 n.23.
37 Id. at 369-72.
3g Id. at 369.
39 Id. at 370-71.
4° hi. at 372-73.
u 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (e) (1976).
42
 432 U.S. at 372.
43 29 C.F.R. § 1601.79b(b) (1978).
44 432 U.S. at 372. The Court further reasoned that if, despite these precau-
tions, a defendant is signiicantly handicapped in making his defense because of sub-
stantial administrative delay by the Commission, federal courts retain the power to
provide relief by restricting or denying back pay awards where appropriate. Id. at 373.
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), where the Supreme Court
observed that, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), "back pay is not an
automatic or mandatory remedy; like all other remedies under the Act, it is one which
the courts 'may' invoke." Id. at 415. • The Albemarle Court reasoned that courts must
exercise the power to limit back pay awards in light of the objectives of the Act, and
that "back pay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would
not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout
the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimina-
tion." Id. at 422.
November 1978]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 205
706(f)(1) imposes no limitation on the power of the EEOC to file suit in fed-
eral court," the dissent took issue with the majority's determination that the
EEOC's enforcement powers are not subject to the pertinent state limitations
period." Justice Rehnquist maintained that the majority's approach com-
pletely ignores a consistent line of Court opinions holding that, in the absence
of an express federal limitations period, the applicable state limitations period
should apply.'" In particular, Justice Rehnquist contended that the only ex-
ception to the general rule of applying the relevant state statute has been for
suits involving the United States in its sovereign capacity." Justice Rehnquist
argued that EEOC enforcement actions do no fall within this sovereign capac-
ity exception." According to Justice Rehnquist the primary consideration
underlying the sovereign capacity exception is that the United States is suing
to enforce its own rights." While Justice Rehnquist conceded that the gov-
ernment might be interested in the vindication of rights protected under Title
VII," this interest could not be equated with the interest of a sovereign suing
to redress injury to its own rights." Instead, Justice Rehnquist argued, when
the EEOC commences litigation, it seeks to vindicate a right which the original
private complainant is entitled to vindicate himself. Accordingly, it is impossi-
ble to consider the EEOC as suing in its sovereign capacity." In this situa-
45 432 U.S. at 373 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16 Id.
42 Id. at 373-74. Such a policy of incorporating state statutes of limitations
periods in the absence of federal ones, Justice Rehnquist explained, was applied by the
Court lals early as 1830, [when] this Court held that the state statute of limitations
governs the timeliness of federal causes of action unless Congress has specifically pro-
vided otherwise." Id. at 375 (quoting United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1960)). Justice Rehnquist observed that this policy had recently
been affirmed with respect to civil rights suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Run-
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). In Justice Rehnquist's view, the underlying policies of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 would presumably be of a magnitude comparable to those of Title VII,
so that equal treatment should be accorded suits brought under both statutes. 432 U.S.
at 377.
48 432 U.S. at 375.
' 49 Id. at 381-83.
50 Id. at 382. Justice Rehnquist relied, inter alia, on United States v. Summer-
lin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940); United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224,
264-65 (1897); United States v. Des Moines Navigation and Ry. Co., 142 U.S. 510,
538-39 (1892); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 344 (1888); and United States v.
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125 (1886), which all note
that state statutes of limitations are inapplicable to suits brought by the federal gov-
ernment in its sovereign capacity.
51 432 U.S. at 382-83. Cf Franks v. Bowman Trans!). Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778
n.40 (1976) (noting that claims brought under Title VII vindicate a major public in-
terest).
52 432 U.S. at 383.
53 Id. Justice Rehnquist argued that the fact a congressional policy is vindicated
cannot be the test for whether a suit by a governmental agency constitutes an action in
the government's sovereign capacity, since presumably the government vindicates some
congressional policy whenever it sues. Id.
206	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:61
Lion, Justice Rehnquist reasoned, the EEOC acts merely as a conduit for the
recovery of damages—such as back pay—due an individual citizen."
Since the EEOC's enforcement action could not be considered a suit by
the United States in its sovereign capacity, Justice Rehnquist concluded that
there is no legitimate reason why the relevant state statute of limitations
should not apply. The fact that a federal policy requires the EEOC to attempt.
to achieve its goals by voluntary compliance is not, in justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion, a sufficient reason to ignore a state statute of' limitations." In addition,
Justice Rehnquist maintained that even though state legislatures do not devise
their limitations periods with national interests in mind, courts have not hesi-
tated to adopt state limitations periods in other instances where important
federal policies were involved." Thus, Justice Rehnquist. would have found
the EEOC's action subject to the appropriate state statute of limitations. 57
The Occidental Court's broad interpretation of EEOC powers and respon-
sibilities resolved a difficult question concerning the scope of the authority
granted to the Commission under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972. The two courts of appeals that had previously considered the question
whether state statutes of limitation are applicable to EEOC enforcement ac-
tions had reached differing conclusions. In EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that state limita-
tions periods are not applicable to EEOC enforcement actions." Like the
Supreme Court in Occidental, the Kimberly-Clark court reasoned that the 1972
amendments, by giving the EEOC authority to enforce Title VII standards
through civil suits, were intended to afford as much protection as possible to
aggrieved parties.'" The policies underlying the amendments, the court de-
termined, dictate that absent manifest congressional intent to apply state stat-
utes of limitations, such state restrictions are inapplicable to the EEOC's
power to commence litigation."'
In the second appellate decision to consider the statute of limitations issue
prior to Occidental, EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co.," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit predicated application of a state limitations
period on the remedy being sought by the EEOC." The court in Griffin held
that when the EEOC seeks to enjoin a discriminatory practice proscribed by
54 Id. Justice Rehnquist further indicated that his conclusion as to the private
nature of EEOC enforcement actions was not affected by the nature of the remedy
sought by the Commission. Id. Although injunctive relief may appear more publicly
oriented than back pay awards, justice Rehnquist nevertheless found that suits seeking
injunctive relief compensate individuals for private harm suffered. Id.
55 Id. at 379.
Id. at 376-77.
' Id. at 389.
5 " 511 1:.2d 1352, 10 HI' Cas. 38 (6th Cir. 1975).
s" Id. at 1359, 10 FEP Cas. at 44.
" Id. at 1355, 10 FEP Cas. at 41.
Id. at 1359-60, 10 FEP Cas. at 45.
62
 511 F.2d 456, 10 FE1' Cas. 531 (5th Cir. 1975).
" 3 Id. at 459, 10 FE!' Cas. at 533.
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the United States Constitution and congressional enactments. the Commission
is suing to enforce the interest of the United Slates as a sovereign," and state
statutes of limitations are inapplicable."' However, the Fifth Circuit. in Griffin
held that when the EEOC seeks a recovery of back pay, the Commission is
siting to protect. 'private rather than public interests. Asa result, state limita-
tions periods arc applicable.'" The Fifth Circuit's remedy-oriented approach
differs from the approach taken by both the Sixth Circuit. in Kimberly-Clark
and the Supreme Court. in Occidental. These two courts, by finding state stat-
utes of limitations inapplicable to EEOC enforcement actions generally, neces-
sarily made no distinction between the nature of the Commission's interest
when enjoining a discriminatory employment. practice and when obtaining a
hack pay award for an injured complainant.
In adopting the approach taken by the Kimberly-Clark court rather than
the approach utilized by the Griffin court, the Supreme Court in Occidental
removed a potentially prohibitive bar to numerous actions pending with the
Commission. Two considerations support the majority's conclusion that state
limitations periods cannot bar EEOC enforcement actions: first, the impor-
tance of the administrative role played by the Commission, and second, the
public nature of the rights which the Commission seeks to vindicate in an
enforcement action.
As to the first of these considerations, an examination of the legislative
history of Title VII indicates that the result reached by the Court in Occidental
is necessary to ensure the continued implementation of the procedures Con-
gress considered most expedient in eliminating discriminatory employment
practices. When Congress first enacted Title VII in 1964, it selected "[cloop- ,
eration and voluntary compliance as the preferred means for achieving"
the goal of - equal employment opportunity."' Through its 1972 amendments
to Title VII, Congress intended to strengthen the EEOC's conciliatory role,
while also giving it an additional enforcement task."' The legislative history
of the 1972 amendments, while acknowledging widespread disillusionment
with the voluntary approach previously employed," indicates an intent that
"recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule and that
the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices of the
EEOC or the Attorney General, as appropriate."'" It is thus apparent that.
the EEOC's added enforcement authority is not intended to supplant the
heavy reliance on conciliation as a preferred method to be used by the EEOC
in eradicating employment discrimination."'
ii Id.
i(1.
" 7 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
"" EEOC	 Kimberly-Clark Co., 511 F.2d 1352. 1357, 10 FE1' Cas. 38, 42 (6th
Cir. 1975).
6" H.R. REP. No. 328, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 119721 U.S. Come
CONG. & Au. NEWS 2139.
7" JOINT CONFERENCE COMMIllFEE REPORT. Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 118 Conn. REC.' 7168 (1972).
7 ' Kimberly-Clark, 511 F.2d at 1357, 10 FF.1' Cas. at 43, The March 8, 1972
Conference Report stated, 	 if conciliation proves to be impossible do We expect
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Since the purpose of the 1972 amendments was simply to provide a bet-
ter administrative sanction to effectuate the still primary goal of conciliation,
Congress required the Commission to refrain from commencing a civil action
until it has discharged its administrative ditties." It is unreasonable to pre-
sume that Congress, having intended "conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion" to be the primary goals of the Commission," desired to impose state
limitations periods, determined without regard to these goals, on the Commis-
sion's conciliation efforts. Such an approach often would require the Commis-
sion to terminate potentially fruitful conciliation efforts and to institute suit
prematurely to insure that the statute of limitations did not deprive the EEOC
of its principal sanction against discriminatory employers. In addition, the
possibility of administrative delays barring enforcement suits could lead many
complainants to seek vindication of their rights under the Act through suits
brought in their individual capacity. Such recourse to private suits typifies a
result Congress clearly was attempting to avoid in granting the Commission
the power to commence its own suits.? .' In light of the policy giving prefer-
ence to an administrative resolution of employment discrimination, the Occi-
dental Court properly decided that it "is hardly appropriate to rely on the
'State's wisdom in setting a limit ... on the prosecution "' 75 when the state
"could not have taken into account the decision of Congress to delay judicial
action while the EEOC performs its administrative responsibilities." 76
The public nature of the rights which the EEOC seeks to vindicate in an
enforcement action is the second consideration supporting the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Occidental that state statutes of limitations are inapplica-
.ble to EEOC enforcement suits. It is well-settled that state statutes of limita-
tions do not apply to the United States when it is involved in a lawsuit in its
sovereign capacity," Previous cases have considered the United States to be
acting in its sovereign capacity when it is either suing to enforce its own
the Commission to bring an action in federal district court to seek enforcement." 118
CONC.. REC. 7583 (1972).
72 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86
Slat. 104, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). See note 9 supra.
73 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a),
86 Stat. 104 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(h) (1976)).
71 Section 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). See S. REP. No. 415,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 426.
7 ' 432 U.S. at 368.
7F' Id. This conclusion is further supported by Congress' acute awareness of the
enormous backlog of cases which the Commission already faced and the limited re-
sources available to the Commission to deal with its caseload. See H.R. REP. No. 238,
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 10, reprinted in [1971] U.S.  Cone CONG. & An. News 2137,
2139, 2147.
" United States v. So in merlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 •(1940); Board of County
Conim'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938); Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 514-15 (1893);
United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 34.1 (1888); United States v. Nashville, Chat-
tanooga & St. Louis Ry, Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125 (1886)1
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rights'" or to vindicate what are characterized as public rights. 7" The ques-
tion whether an EEOC enforcement action constitutes a suit vindicating public
rights figured prominently in the Sixth Circuit's decision in Kimberly-Clark and
in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Griffin. This question arose both in the con-
text of injunctive relief, and in the context of back pay awards. Both courts of
appeals concluded that the EEOC, at least when it seeks injunctive relief, is
acting in its sovereign capacity to further a public interest" and, accordingly,
that such injunctive suits are not subject to state statutes of limitations."'
Regarding the public nature of EEOC: suits seeking injunctive relief, the
decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits are consistent with the conclusion of
the Supreme Court in Occidental. The circuit courts in Griffin and Kimberly- .
Clark, however, differed as to the public or private nature of the interests
served by back pay awards, as opposed to injunctive relief. The Fifth Circuit
in Griffin held that insofar as an EEOC complaint seeks recovery of back pay,
the relief sought is private, not public, in nature and is therefore subject to
the state limitations period. 82 The Sixth Circuit in Kimberly-Clark, however,
did not distinguish between EEOC suits seeking back pay relief and those
seeking injunctive relief. Instead, the Kimberly-Clark court held that the EEOC
represents the public interest whenever it sues to enforce Title VII, and that,
in the absence of congressional intent to apply state statutes of limitations,
such restrictions do not apply to the EEOC." Thus, only the Sixth Circuit
decision in Kimberly-Clark is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in
Occidental that EEOC enforcement actions seeking the award of back pay are
not subject to state statutes of limitations.
78 E.g., United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (Florida stat-
ute requiring claims against an estate to be filed within eight months from first publi-
cation of notice to creditors could not deprive the United States of right to enforce its
claim under an assignment against the decedents estate after the expiration of the
eight month period).
?" E.g., Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123, 126
(1919) (when the United States acts to collect dividends declared on corporate shares
owned by it. the suit is an assertion of its rights as a creditor, and since such dividends
are public moneys applicable only to public purposes. state statutes of limitations do
not apply).
8" Kimberly-Clark 511 F.2d at 1359, 10 HP Cas. at 44; Griffin, 511 F.2d at 459,
10 FEY Gas. at 533.
"l The.Grilfin court noted that, in the context of injunctive relief", 'the EEOC
is seeking to enjoin practices contrary to public policy as prescribed in the United
States Constitution and in enactments of Congress." 511 F.2d at 459, 10 FEY Gas. at
533. The Filth Circuit therefore concluded that EEOC injunctive actions fall squarely
within the rule that when a federal governmental agency is the plaintiff suing to en-
force rights belonging to the sovereign, state statutes of limitations are inapplicable. Id.
In Kimberly-Clark, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that "[Of its complaint is well-
founded, [the EEOC] will be entitled to relief that will protect the interests of past,
present, and future employees of Appellee, so that Appellant represents the interests
of individuals not among the charging parties. - 511 F.2d at 1359, 10 HI' Cas. at 44.
The court. further reaso ned that the "eradication of discrimination by sex and race
promotes public interests and transcends private interests. Each step along the road to
equal employment takes us closer to the goal of" a truly open society, confining indi-
viduals only within boundaries set by their own talents and determination." Id.
" 511 F.2d at 459, 10 HP Gas. at 533. See text at notes 62-66 supra.
" 511 F.2d at 1359, 10 FE.P Gas. at 44. See text at notes 59-61 supra.
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'Iwo recent Supreme Court decisions, by emphasizing . the public charac-
ter of back pay relief. support the Occidental Court's conclusion that EEOC
enforcement. actions seeking back pay are also within the sovereign capacity
exception to state statutes of limitations. In Franks. v. Bowman Tran.sportaibm
Co.," the Supreme Court expressly stated that a suit to enfOrce Title VII
rights involves the "vindication of a major public interest."' The Court. in
Franks reasoned that one ()I' the central purposes of Title VII is to make vet - -
Soils whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment. discrimi-
nation, and thus to restore the status quo that would have obtained but for
the employer's wrongful act." 'T'o effectuate this "make whole" objective,
Franks observed that § 706(g) of Title VII " vests broad equitable discretion in
the federal courts to order such affirmative action, including back pay relief,
as may he appropriate." The Court in Fror/ks indicated, however, that while
redress for individuals is a central purpose of Title VII, the goal of eliminat-
ing all discrimination based on sex, race, religion, or national origin should
have the highest. priority." In light. of this broader goal, Franks. ruled that in
a discrimination suit, a Federal court has not merely the power but. also the
duty to render a judgment. which will as far as possible eliminate the effects of
past discrimination as well as bar discrimination in the future." Back pay
relief, while compensating individuals For past injuries, also may deter future
discrimination and thereby effectuate the goal of eliminating discrimination in
employment..
The Supreme Court's decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody," also sup-
ports the proposition that suits seeking back pay awards promote the public
interest. The Court in Albemarle observed that the primary objective of Title
VII was a prophylactic one—to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and to remove barriers that. operated in the past. to Favor an identifiable
group of employees over other employee groups—and that back pay has an
obvious connection with this purpose.' The fact. that private parties have a
stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, the Albemarle Court. concluded, does not
deprive Title VII litigation or its public character."
While neither Albemarle nor Franks. dealt. specifically with the applicability
of state statutes of limitations to EEOC enforcement actions seeking back pay,
their emphasis on the important role served by hack pay awards in achieving
the objectives of Title VII legislation suggests that the majority's Opinion in
Occidental is correct. By not predicating the application of state statutes of
limitations on a distinction between petitions for injunctive rebel and petitions
" 1
 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 124 U.S. 747 (1976).
" 5 M. at 778 11,40.
al 763.
"	 U.S.C. fi 2000c-5(g) (197(i).
" "121 U.S. at 763.
J•, !!
1111
"' 122 U.S. •05 (1975).
"2 hi. at 417-18.
" 3 N. at 41. 8-19.
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for back pay, the Occidental Court implicitly adopted the view, expressed in
Kimberly-Clark, Frank, and Albemarle, that back pay awards vindicate the public
interest. These cases indicate that hack pay relief' is merely one element in the
overall scheme provided by Congress in enacting Title VII to facilitate the
elimination of past discriminatory practices and the prevention of discrimina-
tion in the future. Viewing back pay in this light, it seems unreasonable to
hold one element of an EEOC enforcement action subject to state limitations
periods, while according the other elements immunity from such limitations.
The Occidental majority's unified treatment of EEOC suits seeking either back
pay or injunctive relief suggests that it has adopted this view.
The Supreme Court in Occidental, however, left open the question
whether the public nature of an enforcement action brought by the Commis-
sion precludes a respondent from raising a defense of laches. While it appears
that the inapplicability of state statutes of limitations to EEOC enforcement
actions by reason of the public nature of the suit also precludes a lathes de-
fense," 4 the Occidental Court expressly noted that when a defendant in a Title
VII enforcement action is significantly handicapped in making his defense
because of an inordinate EEOC delay in filing the action, the federal courts
do not lack the power to grant relief to the prejudiced defendant.' , ' The
Occidental Court reasoned that the same discretionary power which allows a
trial court to restrict or deny back pay relief when a Title VII defendant is in
fact prejudiced by a private plaintiff's conduct in a particular case can also be
exercised where the EEOC is the plaintiff." ln the Court's opinion, however,
the procedural protections of Title VII, including the prompt notice of the
possibility of an enforcement suit and the policy of keeping potential defend-
ants informed of the progress of the action during the pendency of EEOC
administrative proceedings, ensure against the possibility that a Title VII de-
fendant may be significantly handicapped because of delays on the part of the
Commission."' Thus, the Court indicated that the standard to he applied in
finding prejudice should be a stringent one. At a minimum, it would appear
that. to assert a successful ladies defense, a defendant must establish an un-
reasonable delay on the part of the Commission, resulting in serious prejudice
to the defendant." This standard is consistent with the reasoning of Occiden-
tal that the administrative functions of' the Commission merit special defer-
ence to the EEOC as a plaintiff', and that, in view of the public nature of the
rights the Commission seeks to vindicate, the Commission's noncompliance
with state time limitations will not defeat an enforcement action.
" 4
 The applicability of state statutes of limitations and the defense of [aches
have frequently been treated together. See, e.g., United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S.
41-1, •16 (19.10); Board of' County Commis v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939).
-132 'U.S. at 372-73.
""Id. :Li 373.
" 7
 Id. at 372-73.
"8 See EEOC v. Exchange Security Bank, 529 F.2d 1214, 1217, 11 1TP Gas.
764, 765 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that mere delay by the EEOC does not allow defend-
ant to assert successful ladies defense; the defendant must show that he has been
significantly prejudiced by the delay).
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B. Scope of EEOC Suits:
EEOC v. Bailey Co.; EEOC v. General Electric Co.
Section 706(b) of Title VII' authorizes the Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission to investigate charges of employment discrimination filed
either by private parties or by members of the Commission itself. Where
reasonable cause exists to establish that the charge of discrimination is true,
the Commission will attempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful practice
through an informal process of conference, conciliation and persuasion. If
such efforts fail to produce an acceptable conciliation agreement with the
employer, the EEOC is empowered to commence a civil action against the
employer under section 706(f)(1) of the Act. 2
While investigating a charge of discrimination filed by a private party, the
Commission may discover discriminatory practices unrelated to those alleged
by the private party. In such situations, if conciliation efforts prove unsuccess-
ful and culminate in the initiation of a civil action by the EEOC, a federal
court must determine whether the complaint filed by the Commission may
include the additional discriminatory practices uncovered during a reasonable
investigation, or whether a member of the Commission must first file a new
and separate charge as a condition precedent to the EEOC's initiation of a civil
action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed
this procedural issue during the Survey year in EEOC v. Bailey Co. 3 In
Bailey, a white female employee initially filed a charge alleging sex discrimina-
tion in the company's promotion and salary practices. 4 Although the EEOC
found no reasonable cause to believe that the charging employee had been
the victim of discrimination, it discovered evidence during its investigation
which suggested that the company had refused to hire qualified applicants
because of their religions After conciliation efforts relating to these addi-
tional claims of discrimination—for which no new charge had been filed—
proved unsuccessful, the Commision commenced a civil action in federal dis-
trict court alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.`' The
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). Section 706(b) provides in pertinent part:
(h) Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be
aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an employer
has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall
serve a notice of the charge ... on such employer ... and shall make an
investigation thereof.... IF the Commission determines after such investi-
gation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the
Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.
2 42 U.S.C.	 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). Section 706(f)(1), as amended in1972,
empowers the EEOC to seek compliance by means of a civil suit:
(1)(1) If ... the Commission has been unable to secure from the respon-
dent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commis-
sion may bring a civil action against any respondent ... named in the
charge.
3 563 F.2d 439, 15 FEP Gas. 972 (6th Cir. 1977).
I Id. at 442, 15 FEP Cas. at 973.
3 Id. at 442, 15 FEP Cas. at 974.
6 Id.
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district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the discrimination com-
plained of neither affected nor was directed at the white female employee.'
Because the private party was not a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of
section 706(b), her original charge of sex discrimination was held insufficient
to support the allegations of religious discrimination raised in the Commis-
sion's subsequent lawsuit. 8
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered the issue whether a member of
the Commission must file a new charge "when instances of discrimination, of
a kind other than that raised by a charge filed by an individual party and
unrelated to the individual party, come to the EEOC's attention during the
course of an investigation of the private party's charge." 9 The Sixth Circuit
stated that the appropriate test is whether "the EEOC's complaint is 'limited to
the scope of the EEOC investigation. reasonably expected to grow out of the
charge of discrimination.' "" Applying this test, the court of appeals af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of the Commission's complaint." Since
the court concluded that the claim of religious discrimination was completely
unrelated to the employee's original charge of sex discrimination,' 2 the court
held that a member of the Commission must file a separate charge regarding
the newly discovered discrimination to ensure an independent application of
the enforcement procedures set forth in section 706(b), prior to bringing a
civil action pursuant to section 706(f)(1)."
7 Id. at 444, 15 FEN Cas. at 976.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 448, 15 FEP Cas. at 979.
10 Id. at 446, 15 FEP Cas. at 978, (quoting Tipler v. du Pont Co., 443 F.2d
125, 131, 3 FEN Cas. 540, 544 (6th Cir. 1971)). This rule was first set forth in King v.
Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 1 FEP Cas. 357 (NA). Ga. 1968), where the
court discussed the proper scope of a complaint filed under Title VII:
The correct rule is that the complaint in the civil action is confined to those
issues the original complaint has standing to raise, but may properly en-
compass any such discrimination like or reasonably related to the allega-
tions of the charge and growing out of such allegations during the pen-
. dency of the case before the Commission.
Id. at 947, 1 FEP Cas. at 360. The standard was rephrased in Sanchez v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466, 2 FEP Cas. 788, 796 (5th Cir. 1970): "the 'scope' of
the judicial complaint is limited to the 'scope' of the EEOC investigation which can
reasonably be expected grow out of the charge of discrimination." With only slight
variations, the rule established in these two Fifth Circuit cases has been adopted in
other circuits. Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167, 13
FEP Cas. 52, 55 (7th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 372 F. Supp. 1117,
1120-21, 7 FEP Cas. 134, 136 (E.D. Mo. 1973), nip,  507 F.2d 944, 8 FEP Cas. 1281
(8th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2(1 533, 541, 12 FEP Cas.
1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 355 (1977). See Bailey, 563
F.2d at 446, 15 FEP Cas. at 977.
" 563 F.2d at 446, 15 FEP Cas. at 977.
12 Id. at 447, 15 FEP Cas. at 978.
13 Id. at 448, 15 FEP Cas. at 979. The employee in Bailey had amended her
original charge to include allegations of racial discrimination against black females. Id.
at 442, 15 FEP Cas. at 973-74. The EEOC. complaint included a claim of racial dis-
crimination, as well as a claim of religious discrimination. Id. However, the district
court dismissed this portion of the EEOC's complaint because it found that the white
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The Bailey court's analysis of the relationship between the scope of an
individual's original charge of discrimination and the scope of a subsequent
judicial complaint filed by the Commission reflects the approach taken by the
majority of circuit courts which have considered the issue thus far." By
limiting the scope of the civil action to the scope of the investigation reason-
ably related to the original charge of discrimination, this standard requires a
member of the Commission to file a new charge to support a subsequent
judicial complaint regarding a discriminatory practice unrelated to the origi-
nal charge. There are several considerations supporting the majority rule as
expressed by the Sixth Circuit in Bailey. First, the majority rule reflects the
notion that a governmental agency must scrupulously observe its own proce-
dures if it expects to receive deference to its actions from the courts.' 5 The
requirement that a member of the Commission file a new charge to support a
subsequent judicial complaint regarding a discriminatory practice unrelated to
the original charge recognizes that the Title VII enforcement procedure is a
unified scheme of sequential steps.'" Second, as the Bailey court noted, inde-
pendent. application of the provisions of section 706(h) to each unrelated type
of discrimination uncovered ensures more focused individual in vestigations. 17
Requiring focused though thorough investigations comports with the legisla-
tive intent to prevent EEOC investigations from becoming administrative fish-
ing expeditions." In addition, a more lOcused investigation promotes the
congressional intent that the elimination of discriminatory employment prac-
tices he accomplished through conciliation wherever possible.' 9
 Third, by
female employee lacked standing to raise such claims of racial discrimination, and be-
cause the EEOC had Failed to file a new and separate charge concerning such racial
discrimination. Id. at 444, 15 FEP Cas. at 976. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district
courts dismissal, holding that the white female employee did have standing to raise
claims of racial discrimination based on the Supreme Court's decision in Traffic:fine v.
Metropolitan Life Ins, Co,, 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972). Id. at 452-54. 15 FEP Cas. 983-
85.
'' Based on their application of the rule set forth in King v. Georgia Power
Co., 295 F. Stipp. 943, 947, I EEP Gas. 357, 360 (NA). Ga. 1968), regarding the scope
of a judicial complaint filed by the Commission, it would appear that the Fifth,
Seventh and Eighth Circuits support the position of Hie Sixth Circuit in Bailey. See
note '10 supra, Contra, EEOC v. General Electric Co., 532 F.2d 359, 366, 12 FEY Gas.
21. 25 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533, 541, 12 EEL'
Gas. 1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1976). aff'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
15
 United Slates v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811 (4th Cir. 1969). See also EEOC
v, General Electric. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 379-80, 12 FEP Gas. 21. 37 (4th Cir. 1976)
(Widener, j., dissenting); EEOC v. du Pont Co., 373 F. Stipp. 1321, 1333, 7 FEP Cas.
759, 768 (I). Del. 1974), a/f'd, 516 F.2d 1297, 10 FEP Gas. 916 (3d Cir. 1975); EEOC
v. National Cash Register Co., 405 F. Stipp. 562, 564-67, 14 FEP Cas. 1118. 1119-22
(N.D. Ga. 1975); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 366 F. Stipp. 273, 278, 6 FEP
Gas. 996, 1000 (I). Md. 1973).
L"
 EEOC v. du Pont Co., 373 F. Stipp. 1321, 1333, 7 FEP Cas. 759. 768 (I).
Del. 1974), trfrd, 516 F.2d 1297, 10 FEP Cas. 916 (3d Cir. 1975).
17 Bailey, 563 F.2d at 448, 15 FEP Cas. at 979.
Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2(I 32, 42-43, 3 FEP Cas. 155, 162-63 (4th
Cir. 1971); Parliament House Motor Hotel v. EEOC, 444 F.2d 1335, 1339, 3 FEP Cas.
663, 665 (5th Cir. 1971).
19 Bailey, 563 F.2c1 at 449, 15 FEI) Cas. at 980.
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providing an "integrated multi-step enforcement. procedure -2" that. includes
notice, investigation, reasonable cause determination and conciliation for each
separate charge of discrimination prior to the filing of' a lawsuit, Congress
intended to incorporate due process safeguards into the statutory scheme of
'Title VII."' The majority rule, by requiring strict compliance with the provi-
sions of section 706(b) including the filing of a new charge by a member of
the Commission, guarantees that the defendant employer will receive notice
of each charge, as well as an opportunity to present evidence, refute the alle-
gations, and engage in settlement discussions prior to a determination of
reasonable cause. 22
 Finally, the majority rule recognizes that the enforcement
procedures of Title VII address four distinct categories of employment. dis-
crimination, each of which may require independent application of all of the
enforcement provisions of sections 706(b) and 706(0(1). 2 "
The minority view is exemplified by EEOC v. General Electric Ca.,' a case
decided by the Fourth Circuit. during the previous Survey year. In General
Electric, the Fourth Circuit held that a charge of racial discrimination filed by
two black males was sufficient to support. a subsequent civil action brought by
the Commission alleging sex discrimination against females in addition to ra-
cial discrimination without the filing of a new charge by a Commission
member." Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit departed front the majority rule
which limits an EEOC complaint to the scope of the investigation reasonably
related to the original charge and expanded the scope of an EEOC complaint to
encompass any discrimination discovered during a reasonable investigation of a valid
charge."
The Fourth Circuit cited three considerations in support of its decision in
General Electric. First, it maintained that the defendant employer received suf-
ficient notice of and adequate opportunity to respond to the unrelated allega-
tions of discrimination through the reasonable cause determination and con-
ciliation provisions of section 706(b). 27 Second, the court analogized to the
established rule in federal civil cases to the effect that where there is no sub-
stantial prejudice to the parties, "issues arising out of evidence admitted into
the record without objection" are to be considered as having been raised in
2"
 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359 (1977).
23 Bailey, 563 F.2d at 450, 15 FE1) Gas. at 981.
22 See EEOC v. General Electric Co., 532 F.2d at 378, 12 FEP Gas. at 36
(Widener, J., dissenting). See also Patterson v. American 'Fobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257,
276, 12 FEP Cas. 314, 329 (4th Cir. 1976) (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting):
EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 796-97, 800-01, 8 l'EP Cas. 595, 602-03,
606 (D. Md. 1974).
23 See EEOC v. New York Times Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 651,
654, 6 FEP Cas. 563, 565-66 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), Wel in tart and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 542 F.2d 356, 13 FEP Cas. 813 (6th Cir. 1976).
24
 532 F.2d 359, 12 FEP Cas. 21 (4th Cir. 1976).
25 Id. at 362, 12 FEP Cas. at 22.
2" Id, at 36(1, 12 EEP Gas. at 25.
27
 Id. at 364-66, 368-69, 12 FEP Cas. al 24-26, 28. See also Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372-73 n.32 (1977).
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the pleadings." As in federal civil litigation, requiring a member of the
Commission to file a new charge "would serve no purpose other than the
creation of an additional procedural technicality" 29 which, in the court's view,
would result in needless delay and inexcusable waste of valuable administra-
tive resources." Third, the court emphasized that, through the 1972
amendments to Title VII, Congress had authorized the Commission to bring
civil actions to vindicate the public interest. 3 ' In the Fourth Circuit's view,
limiting the scope of the Commission's lawsuit to allegations related to those
raised in the private party's original charge, or requiring the filing of a new
charge by a member of the Commission, constituted an infringement upon
the Commission's ability to represent the broader public interest and an un-
warranted interference with the intent of Congress. 32
While the Sixth Circuit's position, as expressed in Bailey, has substantial
support in other circuits, there is little support outside the Fourth Circuit for
the expanded standard advocated in General Electric." The basic difficulty
with the Fourth Circuit's positon is that it encourages an erroneous perception
of the enforcement provisions of sectiohs 706(b) and 706(f)(I) as "unrelated
activities, rather than as sequential steps in a unified scheme for securing
compliance with Title VII."" 4 It is submitted, therefore, that the standard
applied in the Sixth Circuit in Bailey represents an approach more consistent
with the congressional intent underlying the enforcement mechanism of Title
VII. Not only does it ensure that each charge of discrimination, whether filed
by an individual or by a member of the Commission, will receive thorough
and independent treatment, but it also exemplifies the legislative concern for
fair and even-handed treatment of all parties involved in an enforcement pro-
ceeding.
V. REMEDIES—ATTORNEY'S FEES
Under the American common law rule, a prevailing party in federal liti-
gation generally cannot recover attorney's fees absent certain exceptions such
as when it is shown that the losing party proceeded in bad faith.' An express
2"
 532 F.2d at 366, 12 FEP Cas. at 26. See FED. R. Giv. P. 15(b); EEOC v.
Raymond Metal Prod. Co., 530 F.2d 590, 596, 12 FEP Cas. 38, 41-42 (4th Cir. 1976).
2" Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1972), quoted in General Electric, 532
F.2c1 at 366, 12 FEP Cas. at 25.
3" 532 F.2d at 365-66, 12 FEP Cas. at 25-26.
31 Id. at 373, 12 FEP Cas. at 32. See note 2 supra.
:0 Id.
" See note 14 supra.
" EEOC v. du Pont Co., 373 F. Stipp. 1321, 1333, 7 FEP Cas. 759, 768 (D.
Del. 1974).
' Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,247-57 (1975).
The court of appeals in Alyeska had awarded attorney's fees to a prevailing federal
litigant based on its equity powers and on the litigant's standing as a "private attorney
general." 421 U.S. at 241. The Supreme Court reversed and, in the process, reviewed
the development of the American rule against awarding attorney's fees absent certain
exceptions. Id. at 247-64. In addition to express statutory exceptions, the Alyeska Court
recognized exceptions where there is an enforceable contract, id. at 257; where attor-
ney's fees become part of a fine levied for willful disobedience of a court order, id. at
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statutory exception to the American rule is section 706(k) of Title VII, which
provides federal district courts with discretion to award prevailing parties
reasonable attorney's fees in employment discrimination suits.' During the
Survey year, three significant decisions regarding the award of attorney's fees
in Title VII suits were handed down. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EFOC,3
the Supreme Court considered the award of attorney's fees in the context of a
Title VII suit against a private employer. The Christiansburg Court set forth
the standard to guide district court discretion in awarding attorney's fees to
prevailing private defendants under section 706(k). 4
The remaining two Survey year decisions concerned the award of attor-
ney's fees in the context of a Title VII suit against a public employer. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Parker
v. Califano, 5
 approved an award of attorney's fees to a federal employee plain-
tiff which included compensation for legal services rendered in administrative
proceedings conducted prior to a suit in federal courts And, in Copeland v.
Martinez,' despite the express language of section 706(k) precluding agencies
of the federal government from recovering attorney's fees, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia awarded attorney's fees to a pre-
vailing federal agency under the "bad faith" exception to the American com-
mon law rule!' This chapter will discuss the rationale and significance of the
holding in each of these cases.
A. Award of Attorney's Fees to Prevailing Private
Defendants: Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC
Although section 706(k) of Title VII allows a federal district court to
exercise its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party in an employment discrimination action,9 the section does not distin-
guish between the standard for awards to prevailing plaintiffs and that for
prevailing defendants. With regard to prevailing plaintiffs, the Supreme
258; under the "common benefit" rule which spreads the cost of litigation among
those who benefit from it, id. at 257; in diversity actions where state law permits an
award, id. at 259 n.31; and where the plaintiff has acted in "bad faith" in bringing suit,
IV. at 258-59.
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). Section 706(k) states:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the
Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a
private person.
3 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
Id. at 421-22. The standard for awarding attorney's fees to prevailing Title
VII plaintiffs was previously set forth in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
415 (1975). See note 10 infra.
5 561 F.2d 320, 18 FEP Cas. 391 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
6 Id. at 333, 18 FEP Cas. at 401.
435 F. Supp. 1178, 15 FEP Cas. 453 (D.D.C. 1977).
8 Id. at 1181, 15 FEP Cas. at 456.
9 See note 2 supra.
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Court has held that attorney's fees should be awarded "unless special cir-
,cumstances would render such an award unjust.' 10 Two reasons are ad-
vanced to justify this standard. First, the Title VII plaintiff is considered a
"private attorney general - empowered to bring a judicial action to enforce the
federal policy against employment. discrimination." Second, the prevailing
plaintiff is deemed entitled to compensation for the costs of legal services
because such an award is made against a violator of federal law. 12 Absent
special circumstances, therefore, a prevailing plaintiff will be awarded attor-
ney's fees to encourage the vindication of rights granted by federal law, and
to penalize those employers who violate such rights.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Christiansburg, the circuit courts
were in conflict over whether the standard which informed a district court's
discretion in awarding attorney's fees to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs was
equally applicable to prevailing Title VII delendants.' 3 The United States
Court. of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in EEOC v. Bailey Co.," declared that
judicial adoption of a double standard for the award of attorney's fees to
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants is impermissible. 15 Establishing different
standards for prevailing plaintiffs and defendants, the court reasoned, is a
matter for Congress and not the courts." Accordingly, the Bailey court re-
fused to hold that a more stringent standard was necessary for awarding at-
torney's fees to prevailing defendants.' 7 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Bailey
expressly rejected " the view of the Fourth Circuit in EEOC v. Chrisliansburg
Garment Co.," which sanctioned an explicit double standard for awards to
prevailing plaintiffs as opposed to prevailing defendants.'" Asserting compet-
ing policy considerations found in the legislative history of section 706(k) as
justification, the Fourth Circuit ruled that attorney's fees should be denied to
a prevailing private Title VII defendant, absent. a showing that the plaintiff
proceeded in had faith."'
'° Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). This
standard was enunciated for actions brought, under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The Supreme Court later adopted the Newman standard for suits brought under
Title VII in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
" Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 727, 13 FEP Cas. 1521, 1525 (2d
Cir. 1976); See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
12 Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418.
13 Compare EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 456, 15 FEP Cas. 972, 986 (6th
Cir. 1977) (no double standard) with EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 550 F.2d
949, 951, 14 FEP Cas. 262, 263 (4th Cir. 1977); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d
722, 727, 13 FEP Cas. 1521, 1525'(2d Cir. 1976); United States Steel Corp. v. United
States, 519 F.2d 359, 364, 10 FEP Cas. 1106, 1109 (3d Cir. 1975) (double standard).
14 563 F.2d 439, 15 FEP Cas. 972 (6th Cir. 1977).
15 Id. at 456, 15 FEP Cas. at 986.
' 6 Id.
" Id.
18 Id. at 455-56, 15 FEP Cas. at 985-86.
19 550 F.2d 949, 14 FEP Gas, 262 (4th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 951„ 14 FEP Cas. at 263.
Id. at 951-52, 14 FEP Cas. at 263-64.
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In view of the conflict among the circuit courts, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Fourth Circuit case. 22 The Court approved the utili-
zation of a double standard in Christiansburg by declaring that the intent of
Congress, as gleaned from the rather sparse and ambiguous legislative history
of section 706(k), justifies the use of a more stringent standard for the award
of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants. 23 After examining the twofold
purpose of section 706(k)—to encourage persons of limited means to bring
meritorious suits and to discourage frivolous or groundless actions—the
Court reasoned that strong equitable considerations exist in favor of the
award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs which are not present for prevailing de-
fendants." Accordingly, the Court held that a prevailing private defendant
should be awarded attorney's fees only where the district court finds that the
plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plain-
tiff continued to litigate after it became so. 25
In upholding the Fourth Circuit's sanction of a double standard in the
award of attorney's fees, the Supreme Court nevertheless rejected the Fourth
Circuit's ruling that a finding of "bad faith" on the part of the plaintiff is
required to justify an award to the prevailing defendant." The Court noted
that even absent a statute such as section 706(k), bad faith provides grounds
for an award under the American common law rule. 27 Thus, the Court
reasoned, it is apparent that in enacting section 706(k) Congress did not in-
tend to limit the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant to situa-
tions where the plaintiff instituted the action in bad faith." The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that a district court should award attorney's fees to a pre-
vailing private. defendant, even in the absence of bad faith, where the plain-
tiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless."
The Christiansburg decision is susceptible to criticism on two grounds.
First, the Supreme Court has stated that "the circumstances under which at-
torney's fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in
making these awards are matters for Congress to determine." 3° Given this
premise, it is questionable whether the Supreme Court's willingness to carve
out a double standard for the award of attorney's fees can be justified by the
rather sparse and ambigious legislative history of section 706(k)." Second,
the standard set forth in Christiansburg may not reflect sufficient sensitivity to
the interests of nondiscriminating employers. In view of the broad investiga-
tory and enforcement powers of the EEOC which are available to prospective
private plaintiffs and the prohibitive costs of defending a judicial action, pri-
22 432 U.S. 905 (1977).
23 434 U.S. 412, 420-22 (1978).
24 Id. at 418-19.
25 Id. at 422.
28 Id. at 421.
27 Id. at 419.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 422.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness SoCy, 421 U.S. 240, 261 (1975).
3 ' Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420.
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vale employers—particularly small businessmen 32 —are deserving of more
protection when they prevail than the Christiansburg standard may permit.
The holding in Christiansburg nonetheless appears to be a reasonable
compromise in view of the congressional intent in enacting section 706(k). In
balancing the competing policies of encouraging legitimate claims and dis-
couraging groundless suits, the Court correctly concluded that equity favors a
less stringent standard for prevailing plaintiffs. Since Title VII is intended to
protect individual employees against discriminatory conduct by employers, it
is logical to expect that the interests of prevailing plaintiffs will receive a
greater degree of consideration by the courts.
B. Award of Attorney's Fees in the Public Sector
1. Attorney's Fees Attendant to an Administrative Proceeding: Parker v. Califano
The 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made the provi-
sions of Title VII applicable to employees of the federal government. 33 In
contrast to an aggrieved employee in the private sector, whose EEOC com-
plaint triggers the investigation and conciliation efforts of the Commission," a
federal employee must seek redress of his claim of unlawful discrimination
through an elaborate administrative procedure unique to the public sector. As
a statutory prerequisite to bringing a judicial action for enforcement, section
717 mandates that a federal employee first must attempt to resolve the claim
within his own agency and, if unsuccessful, through an appeal to the Civil
Service Commission. 35 Because the attorney's fees provisions of section
706(k) are applicable to federal employees by virtue of section 717(d), 38 the
question arises whether the phrase "[On any action or proceeding" of section
706(k)" should be construed to allow the award of attorney's fees to a federal
employee for legal expenses incurred in administrative proceedings related to
a judicial action.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
confronted this question in Parker v. Califano. 38 Parker involved allegations by
a black female employee that race and sex discrimination •existed in the
promotional practices of the Office of Education (OE), a division of the
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)." The
employing agency investigated the charge, concluded that there was evidence
of discrimination, and recommended immediate promotion of the complain-
32 See Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 975 n.13, 13 FEP Cas. 245, 247 n.13
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
33 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 11(a),
86 Stat. 111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976)).
" Section 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
35
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976).
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (1976).
" See note 2 supra.
" 561 F.2d 320, 18 FEP Cas. 391 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
39 Id. at 321, 18 FEP Cas. at 392.
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ant." Despite this recommendation, HEW issued a final determination dis-
regarding the OE report and disapproving any further remedial action.'" As
a result, the employee filed suit in the federal district court.'" Two months
later, however, HEW reversed its position and concluded that the plaintiff
had been discriminated against and should be promoted retroactively.'" The
district court approved this settlement and, exercising its discretion under sec-
tion 706(k), awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff for both the
administrative and judicial proceedings. 94
In affirming the district court's decision, the District of Columbia Circuit
invoked rules of statutory interpretation to hold that, in a Title VII action
brought by a federal employee, attorney's fees awarded pursuant to section
706(k) may include compensation for legal services rendered at both the ad-
ministrative and the judicial levels.° 5 Noting that Title VII requires a federal
employee to utilize the administrative provisions of section 717 prior to seek-
ing a judicial remedy," the court of appeals construed the "in any action or
proceeding under this subchapter" language of section 706(k) to mean that
Congress did not intend to restrict the award of attorney's fees solely to judi-
cial actions. 47 In support of this construction, the court observed that the
word "proceeding" in section 706(k) cannot be interpreted to mean a judicial
proceeding alone since it is used to refer to administrative proceedings in
other parts of Title VII." The court further noted that section 706(k) refers
to "in any action or proceeding," while the attorney's fees provision of Title 11
simply states "in any action." 49 Lastly, the court emphasized that the inter-
relatedness of the administrative and judicial provisions of section 717 5 ° and
the legislative history of Title VII 51 support an interpretation of section
706(k) as applying to both administrative and judicial proceedings.
The court of appeals found further support for its interpretation of sec-
tion 706(k) in the structure and aims of the Title VII provisions governing
public employees. Given the quasi-judicial nature of the required administra-
tive proceedings, the court maintained that the services of an attorney are




" Id. at 322, 18 FEP Cas. at 392.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 322-29, 18 FEP Cas. at 393-98.
46 Id. at 323, 18 FEP Cas. at 393 (quoting Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 829
(1976)).
42 Id. at 328-29, 18 FEP Cas. at 397-98.
45 Id. at 327, 18 FEP Cas. at 396.
49 Id. at 327-28, 18 FEP Cas. at 396-97.
5° Id. at 328-29, 18 FEP Cas. at 397-98. See also Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820,
829-33 (1976).
51 See 561 F.2d at 333-39, 18 FEP Gas. at 401-05 (an appendix to the opinion
in which the court sets forth the relevant legislative history).
52 Id. at 332, 18 FEP Cas. at 400.
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handling of any subsequent judicial proceeding. 53
 More importantly, the
court of appeals believed that an award of attorney's fees to a federal
employee for both administrative and judicial proceedings promotes the legis-
lative policy of employee enforcement of Title VII rights. 54
Although Parker dealt only with administrative proceedings related to a
judicial action,55
 subsequent decisions have extended its scope to award attor-
ney's fees to a party who prevails solely in administrative proceedings. 56 In
Smith v. Califano, 57 the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia held that the Civil Service Commission has the authority to award attor-
ney's fees without court approval to a federal employee who prevails only in
administrative proceedings." Perhaps a more correct interpretation of Parker
was rendered subsequently in Noble v. Claytor, 59 where the District of Colum-
bia District Court held that a federal employee who succeeds only at the ad-
ministrative level may petition a court for an award of attorney's fees since the
employee remains aggrieved until such an award is made."" In so holding,
the Noble court emphasized that the award of attorney's fees is committed to
the discretion of the district court, not to the Civil Service Commission,' and,
to that extent, the court disagreed with the earlier decision in Smith.
2. Attorney's Fees Awarded to a Prevailing Agency Defendant: Copeland v. Mar-
tinez
The express language of section 706(k) of Title VII precludes the award of
attorney's fees to the EEOC or to the United States." This statutory exclu-
sion from the protection inherent in the award of attorney's fees may ad-
versely affect federal agencies by denying them access to an effective
mechanism for deterring groundless suits and for defraying the expense of
defending against such suits. The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia confronted this problem in Cope/and v. Martinez," where a black
53 Id. at 333, 18 FEP Cas. at 401-02. See also Johnson v. United States, 554
F.2d 632, 633, 16 FEP Cas. 1732, 1733 (4th Cir. 1977).
" 561 F.2c1 at 329-31, 18 FEP Cas. at 398-99.
55 Id. at 324, 18 FEP Cas. at 894. See NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164, 1166
(D.D.C. 1978).
51' Smith v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 530, 533-34, 18 FEP Cas. 657, 659-60
(D.D.C. 1978) (district court approved award of attorney's fees by Civil Service Com-
mission to plaintiff who prevailed solely in administrative proceedings); Taylor v.
Claytor, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. ¶ 7854 (D.D.C. 1977) (prevailing party in administrative
proceedings allowed to bring judicial action solely to collect attorney's fees). But cf.
Fischer v. United States Dept. of Transp., 430 F. Supp. 1349, 1352, 18 FEP Cas. 665,
667 (D. Mass. 1977) (the term "proceeding" in § 706(k) does not include administrative
proceedings, but refers only to actions in which the court participates).
" 446 F. Supp. 530, 18 FEP Cas. 657 (D.D.C. 1978).
58 Id. at 533-34, 18 FEP Cas. at 659-60.
59
 448 F. Supp. 1242 (D.D.C. 1978).
6" Id. at 1247-48.
"' Id. at 1246, 1248.
1 i 2 See text of § 706(k) at note 2 supra.
r.3 435 F. Supp. 1178, 15 FEP Cas. 453 (D.D.C. 1977).
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female employee brought suit against a federal agency alleging discriminatory
promotion practices." In its findings of fact, the district court observed that
the plaintiff's claim not only lacked credible evidence, to support a charge of
race or sex discrimination, but also that the action was the culmination of a
long series of intentionally vindictive and abusive actions taken to harass her
superiors." 65 Accordingly, the court dismissed the suit with judgment for the
defendant, finding that maintenance of the action constituted bad faith and
an intentional abuse of the judicial process."
In so holding, the district court recognized that section 706(k) of Title
VII bars the award of attorney's fees to a public employer. Nonetheless, the
court held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficiently vexatious, malicious,
and groundless as to fall within the common law "bad faith" exception to the
American rule." Examination of the legislative history of section 706(k) led
the court to conclude that Congress had expressed no opinion regarding the
award of attorney's fees to prevailing government agency defendants under
the traditional common law exceptions." Finding no explicit congressional
action to the contrary, the district court awarded reasonable attorney's fees to
the prevailing public defendant under the bad faith exception to the Ameri-
can rule.
The district court's award of attorney's fees in Copeland appears to be
both correct and creative in terms of statutory analysis and the common law.
Since statutory authorization is only one of the exceptions to the American
rule for the award of attorney's fees 69 and since the legislative history of sec-
tion 706(k) is silent as to the availability of other exceptions to the American
rule for prevailing agency defendants," it is reasonable to conclude that utili-
zation of the bad faith exception does not conflict with congressional intent.
Further, the use of common law grounds to award attorney's fees to federal
employers is consistent with the trend in judicial decisions toward uniformity
in applying the provisions of Title VII to the public and private sectors."
" Id. at 1179, 15 FEP Cas. at 454. Plaintiff, an employee of the federal Office
of Human Rights of the Community Services Administration, alleged that she had
been denied promotion because of race and sex discrimination, and as reprisal for her
previously having filed EEOC complaints. Id.
66
 435 F. Supp. at 1179-81, 15 FEP Cas. at 454-56. The district court made
thirty-one individual findings of fact, including: blacks comprised eighty percent of
the staff, id. at 1179, 15 FEP Cas. at 454; twice as many females than males were on
the staff, with mostly black females being promoted, id.; plaintiff used EEOC com-
plaints and threats of complaints to harass her supervisor; plaintiff's witnesses were
"completely incredible," id. at 1180, 15 FEP Cas. at 455; plaintiff was "intensely biased"
against her supervisor, id.; and plaintiff's action was an "integral part of [her] ven-
detta" against her supervisor, id. at 1181, 15 FEP Cas. at 456.
66 Id. at 1181, 15 FEP Cas. at 456.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1181-82 n.3, 15 FEP Cas. at 456 n.3.
69 See note 1 supra.
" Copeland, 435 F. Supp. at 1181-82 n.3, 15 FEP Cas. at 456 n.3; Grubbs v.
Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 976 n.15, 13 FEP Cas. 245, 247 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Burgess v.
Hampton, 73 F.R.D. 540, 543-44, 14 FEP Cas. 1646, 1648 (D.D.C. 1976).
7 ' E.g., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 848, 864 (1976).
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The ruling in Copeland is also in accord with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Christiansburg. The Christiansburg Court held that the standard for
awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing private defendant under section
706(k) is to determine whether the plaintiff's action is frivolous, unreasonable,
or groundless. 72
 The Court expressly stated that the plaintiff's conduct need
not rise to the level of bad faith for the prevailing private defendant to re-
cover attorney's fees." Thus, even if one interprets the exclusion of federal
agencies from the provisions of section 706(k) as constituting evidence of a
congressional intent to provide public employers with less protection from
groundless suits than private employers, the award in Copeland, under the
more stringent common law bad faith exception, remains consistent with the
spirit of any such congressional intent. Lastly, it cannot be seriously argued
that Congress intended federal agencies to expend sizeable amounts of their
limited financial resources defending against vexatious and malicious actions,
with absolutely no opportunity to deter such suits or to recover the costs of
defending against such bad faith actions through recovery of attorney's fees.
Even the sparse and ambiguous legislative history of section 706(k) expressly
states such concerns as the motivation for congressional authorization of the
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 434 U.S. at 421.
73 Id.
74
 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420; Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722,
727 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1976).
